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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and other central banks around the world have reached far beyond classical 
monetary policy in order to prevent the collapse of the financial system. As interest rates hit 
the zero lower bound, these banks engaged in unprecedented levels of unconventional 
monetary policy, such as credit and liquidity facilities, large-scale asset purchases, and 
forward guidance (Issing 2013). Central banks justified their policies by citing the impairment 
of the traditional transmission mechanism of interest rate decisions because of the looming 
possibility of government default, the dominance of credit risk in business thinking, and the 
need to battle the fall in output and the rise in unemployment (Hannoun 2012). Today, several 
years after any immediate risk of financial collapse has passed and despite the questionable 
track record of unconventional monetary policy, monetary policy has still not normalized, 
leaving us wondering why the ECB continues to engage in unconventional monetary policy. 
The pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy can be summarized in four central hypotheses: 
macroeconomic stability can be achieved through price stability, monetary policy-making 
could and should be separated from regulation and supervision, the short-term interest rate is 
the only policy tool necessary, and the “keep your own house in order” doctrine that, as long 
as every regulatory agency in every country ensured the soundness of their respective  
financial institutions, the whole financial system was in order; all central banks had to do was 
to keep inflation at home in check (Borio 2011). This consensus was strengthened by two 
additional developments: the perceived failure of Keynesianism as an economic concept in  
the 1970s and Germany’s success with the Bundesbank’s pragmatist version of monetarist 
policy before the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). All over the world, but 
especially in the Western world, central bank independence became the dominating monetary 
policy paradigm. The broad coalition of economists that supported the framework and its 
perceived success gave legitimacy and credibility to the belief that monetary policy-making 
was best left to an independent and technocratic institution. This view solidified the illusion of 
the central bank as a benevolent non-political planner, optimizing society’s welfare in a 
technocratic and efficient way (McNamara 2006). In line with this consensus, the ECB was 
granted far-reaching independence. In fact, contrary to its member national central banks,  the 
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ECB’s independence is constitutional in character. Only unanimity among all Eurozone 
member states can change the structure or mandate of the ECB. 
Unconventional monetary policy in Europe over the past seven years has had mixed success. 
Measured against the main goal of any form of crisis-resolution mechanism to keep the short- 
and long-term costs (in this case, in terms of output loss and unemployment) as low as 
possible, unconventional monetary policy’s success has been limited. On one hand, no 
government in the EMU went into default, the EMU survived, and the financial system did  
not collapse, so the main benefit of unconventional monetary policy, its psychological effect, 
proved effective, as it allowed the ECB to battle the short-term liquidity and confidence  
crises. By making clear that the central bank will do whatever it takes, the ECB prevented the 
collapse of financial markets and possibly much more dire consequences for output and 
unemployment. In addition, some countries, such as Austria and Germany, appear to have left 
the crisis behind them, as their growth rates have picked up and their unemployment levels  
are falling. On the other hand, the majority of countries in the EMU are still experiencing 
sluggish, if any, growth, high unemployment, and rising debt levels. Average unemployment 
in the EMU rose from 7.6 percent in 2008 to 12.0 percent in 2013, real GDP decreased 0.3 
percent per year in the six years since 2008, and the average general government debt in the 
EMU stands at 92.6 percent of GDP. The countries in the EMU periphery (i.e., Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy) have been hit even harder; they are struggling with unemployment rates 
between 12.2 percent and 27.3 percent, their real GDP has decreased between 1.0 percent and 
4.4 percent per year, and their general government debt levels stand at a staggering 93.9 
percent to 175.1 percent of GDP (Eurostat 2014). 
Unconventional monetary policy and the crisis itself have shaken the pre-crisis consensus on 
monetary policy, and politicians and the general public increasingly view central banks as 
omnipotent saviors. Central banks are credited with the ability to deliver everything at the 
same time: price stability, resolution of sovereign debt problems and problems with 
commercial balance sheets, reduction of unemployment, prevention of unfavorable exchange 
rates, and determination of interest yields along the whole yield curve. Any change of 
monetary policy that would lead to the end of the current ultra-low policy would likely be met 
with fierce resistance. The absence of deep structural reforms and calls for further quantitative 
easing and reflationary programs in the EMU show excessive reliance on cheap liquidity and 
the waning commitment to price stability as the primary goal of an independent central  bank. 
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At the same time, the risks of unconventional monetary policy become more obvious as time 
passes. On the functional side, unconventional monetary policies delay balance sheet 
adjustments, lead to moral hazard, and run the risk of making the central bank the market- 
maker and take up financial intermediation. On the distributional side, the effects include the 
rising risk of inflation and indirect wealth redistribution. Finally, the ECB risks a possible loss 
of credibility if its policies are clearly distributional in character or fail to achieve the 
promised economic growth. The question of central bank independence, once believed to be 
settled for good, is being raised again with regard to both structure and mandate. 
The risks associated with unconventional monetary policy today are likely far greater than the 
possible benefits. The argument that the ECB continues to be convinced of the effectiveness  
of these instruments and that the associated risks are tolerable is at least questionable. Based 
on this assumption, I suggest that the ECB has initiated and continues to engage in its risky, 
ultra-low monetary policies because it is less independent from national interests than implied 
by the treaties of the EMU. 
In theory, the treaties of the EMU grant the ECB far-reaching de-jure independence, making 
the ECB de-jure one of the most independent central banks in the world. However, the ECB 
itself may not be the right object of analysis for the assessment of the de-facto independence  
of European monetary policy-making. Contrary to widespread belief, the ECB does not have a 
pre-eminent position over the national central banks that form the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). Instead, most monetary policy decision-making powers in the Eurozone, 
especially the right “to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community,” lie  
with the ESCB instead of the ECB (Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union Art.  
105, Paragraph 2). In addition, national central banks’ governors dominate the ECB through 
their overwhelming majority in the Governing Council, the ECB’s decision-making body. 
Therefore, the ECB’s monetary policy depends directly on the governors’ voting preferences. 
Instead of being the first among equals, the ECB resembles a supranational subsidiary of the 
international ESCB, entrusted with performing executive functions for the Eurosystem (Seidel 
2003). Following this view, the de-facto independence of those who dominate decision- 
making at the ECB (the national central banks’ governors) should be the focus of analysis. 
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the national central banks’ governors do not participate 
in the Governing Council as ad personam but as representatives of their respective national 
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central banks and countries. Contrary to “Eurocrats,” national central banks’ governors are 
part of their respective national political spheres and are likely to place a premium on the 
economic well-being and the wishes of their home countries. Therefore, I disregard the 
possibility that governors’ voting preferences depend on Europe-wide aggregates and  
underpin my assumption regarding the governors’ ad personam qualities with references to 
the Governing Council reform process and the literature on the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Directors. I focus on the Governing Council and its rules before the rotating voting system 
came into effect, as most decisions regarding unconventional monetary policy were made 
under the old rules. 
My guiding hypothesis is that the ECB’s de-jure independence is annulled in practical terms 
through the exertion of national influence on monetary policy via the Governing Council. I 
assess the influence of external pressure on the ECB’s Governing Council using the Political 
Audience Cost Theory, which suggests that institutions depend on the support of political 
audience groups for their credibility, assertiveness, and (ultimately) independence. In the 
following, I seek to determine whether the ECB has the necessary support of crucial political 
audience groups in a majority of Eurozone countries by defining the core political audience 
groups present in all EMU member states and assessing their preferences regarding a more 
restrictive or a looser monetary policy. Doing so allows me to estimate the preferences of  
each central bank’s governor in the Governing Council and, therefore, his or her likely voting 
behavior. I do not believe that political audience groups try to challenge the de-jure status of 
their national central banks or that such a direct assault is necessary, as the very possibility of 
such an alliance would force national central banks into compliance. I argue that the de-facto 
independence of the national central banks, which—contrary to the ECB’s banks—are often 
not of a quasi-constitutional character, is weakened in order to prevent the return to normal 
monetary policy, as normalization would result in further hardship in EMU countries. 
Applying the Audience Cost Theory, this dissertation shows that the ECB is indeed 
susceptible to external audience groups’ monetary policy preferences. The analysis shows that 
these preferences are a good indicator of actual ECB policy-making between 2007 and 2014, 
as for the majority of the time period covered, the ECB’s refinancing rate moved in line with 
the average Eurozone monetary policy preference. Today, the majority of audience groups in 
all Eurozone countries clearly support ECB policy-making, so a reversal of preference is 
unlikely, despite the increase in economic well-being and a projected surge in inflation   rates. 
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The support for current ECB policies is almost universal, applying to both the crisis countries 
of Europe’s south and the northern European member countries, where the crisis hit far less 
heavily. In fact, in no Eurozone country does a majority of audience groups currently demand 
a more restrictive monetary policy. A plausible explanation for the accordance between 
preferences and the ECB interest rate is that national central bank governors vote along their 
home countries’ interests, thereby ensuring a monetary policy that is to their domestic 
audience groups’ liking. To support my hypothesis, I present case studies on the ECB’s most 
controversial monetary policy decisions. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. The next section provides a short overview of 
conventional monetary policy and central bank independence theory. I argue that the fact that 
the pre-crisis consensus on the “right” monetary policy was congruent with the mandate of the 
ECB lent support to the national central banks’ de-facto independence, as the support of 
political and economic elites and the academic consensus on monetary policy gave the ECB 
sovereignty in interpretation. The overview allows me to consider the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of unconventional monetary policy and to assess the success of these policies in 
the EMU. The second section focuses on the resulting breakdown of the pre-crisis consensus 
and the current dissent about the “right” monetary policy in the literature. The third section 
addresses decision-making in the ECB’s Governing Council and assesses the ECB/ESCB’s 
legal framework, responsibilities, and dilemmas. This section also provides an overview of 
theories that have been used to explain institutional decision-making and singles out the two 
core assumptions in the literature: the difference between de-jure and de-facto independence 
and the central bankers’ regional biases. The fourth section presents the Political Audience 
Cost Theory in order to show that Political Audience Cost is a transmission mechanism that 
connects audience groups’ underlying institutional and political economy-related motives  
with the preferences of ECB Governing Council members and actual monetary policy- 
making. The fifth section defines audience groups in the Eurozone and discusses their 
motivations regarding monetary policy in order to identify their likely monetary policy 
preferences and draw conclusions on the national central banks’ presidents’ likely voting 
behavior. The section focuses on three core political audience groups’ stances toward 
monetary policy: the mass electorate, political actors, and economic actors. The sixth section 
focuses on the methodology. I assess the mass electorate’s stance by focusing on its economic 
circumstances, its deep-seated beliefs with regard to central bank independence and   aversion 
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to inflation, and the effect of ideology and elite communication. I assess political actors’ 
stance by focusing on external constraints on government budgets, the partisanship of 
governments and chambers of parliament, and electoral motives. Finally, I assess economic 
actors’ stance on monetary policy by focusing on the composition of the economy. Based on 
this discussion, I apply in the seventh section the Political Audience Cost Theory to the 
member states of the Eurozone and determine the extent to which audience groups support 
current ECB policies. For simplicity’s sake, the choice of political audience groups is between 
the extremes of loose, unchanged, and restrictive monetary policy. As an example of the 
influence of audience groups, the eighth section presents four case studies on the ECB’s most 
controversial monetary policy decisions: the decision announced on May 3, 2010, to remove 
collateral requirements for all Greek debt until further notice, the decision announced on May 
10, 2010, to purchase private and public debt on secondary markets, the granting of ELA 
credits to Greek commercial banks during the height of the standoff between creditors and the 
Greek government in the spring and summer of 2015, the ECB’s decisions in January 2015 to 
embark on quantitative easing, dubbed the Expanded Asset Purchase Program, and the 
Trichet/Draghi letter to Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi in 2011. Using these case studies, I 
analyze the extent to which decisions were driven and based on economic necessities and the 
extent to which external variables, such as pressure from national audience groups, played a 
role. The final section provides an outlook on future developments.  The  dissertation 
concludes with a suggestion for measures that could be taken to stop the capture of monetary 
policy by national political audience groups via national central banks' governors, to stop the 
ECB’s power decay, and to enforce its de-jure independence. 
My dissertation seeks to achieve two goals. First, it fills a gap in the current literature by 
refining Political Audience Cost as a concept and by making it usable for research on central 
banks’ decision-making. Despite its intriguing logic and with the exception of Lohmann’s 
(1998) study on the pre-EMU Bundesbank, the Political Audience Cost Theory has received 
almost no attention in the central banking discourse. Applying the theory to the ECB fills this 
gap and moves the discussion of unconventional monetary policy from the economic sphere 
into the political science sphere. The dissertation widens the debate by adding an umbrella 
theory to the discussion that encompasses many of the concepts in the current discourse in the 
literature. It also contributes to shifting the debate to the macro level by focusing on the 
fundamental  mechanics  of monetary policy-making.  The second  contribution  is  that  of an 
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empirical assessment of the ECB’s independence through a variety of case studies covering 
some of the ECB’s most important decisions in the past six years. 
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2. Assessing the status quo – overview of central banking theory, unconventional 
monetary policy, and the EMU 
 
2.1. Central banking theory 
 
2.1.1. Central bank independence 
Central bank independence refers to central banks’ freedom from direct political and 
governmental influence or interference in the execution of their policies (Walsh 2008). This 
somewhat vague concept can be broken down into personnel independence, financial 
independence, and operational independence (Debelle/Fischer 1994; de Sousa 2001; 
Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). Personnel independence focuses on the procedures and conditions 
in the central bank for appointments from regular staff to members of the directorate, for 
dismissals, and for determining term lengths. Personnel independence covers the final 
appointment procedures and how much influence political actors can wield in the selection 
and nomination of candidates (Ullrich 2003). Financial independence prevents direct or 
indirect pressure to finance state deficits, as only when central banks do not rely on the 
government for their budgets can they credibly resist (Ullrich 2003). Operational 
independence takes two forms: goal independence and instrument independence. Instrument 
independence is the ability to choose the best instrument for accomplishing the set goals, 
while goal independence is the ability to choose the goals of monetary policy (Ullrich 2003). 
Goal independence can take various forms, including how many goals there are and how 
precisely goals and their order are defined, as if neither the goals themselves nor their order 
are precisely defined, central banks have considerable room to maneuver. The same question 
of degree holds true for instrument independence (Amtenbrink et al. 1999; Ullrich 2003). As 
de Haan and Eijffinger point out, central bank independence does not imply the banks’ 
complete disentanglement from politics but a restriction of political influence. Complete 
independence is often utopic, as the example of nomination and appointment of central bank 
governors shows; as the governors are appointed by politicians, total personnel independence 
is not possible (Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). 
Central banks around the world are equipped with various degrees of independence along 
these dimensions. However, the resulting legal framework, the de-jure independence, does not 
always correspond with actual practice, the de-facto independence (Koshie 2013; Ullrich 
2003). 
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2.1.2. The ECB as one of the most independent central banks 
The ECB is de-jure one of the most independent central banks along all three dimensions. 
Unlike almost any other central bank—another example is the central bank of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina—the ECB’s de-jure independence is of a constitutional character, where 
unanimity among all member states is necessary to change any part of its legal framework 
(Crowe /Meade 2007). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the protocol 
on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank lay 
out the legal basis for the ECB’s operations. The ECB’s personnel independence is secured 
through a president and a directorate with office terms that are longer than those of legislators 
in the Eurozone, and dismissals occur only in rare circumstances of personal misconduct 
(Treaty Art. 283, Paragraph 2; Protocol Art. 11.2, 11.4). The majority of the ECB’s council 
members are governors of the national central banks of the EMU member states. Like the 
ECB, national central bank governors have longer office terms than their legislators 
(minimum of five years) and are dismissed only rarely (Treaty Art. 131; Protocol Art. 14.1, 
14.2). However, unlike the ECB, national central bank governors are chosen with full 
discretion by their respective national governments, have shorter average office terms than the 
ECB directorate, and can be re-elected. The European Council, on the other hand, appoints  
the members of the directorate, whose financial independence is guaranteed by the separation 
of its budget from the common budget of the European Union, by the ability to keep 20 
percent of its annual net income for its general reserve fund, and the ability to offset losses 
against the reserve fund and through its net income (Treaty Art. 282, Paragraph 3; Protocol 
Art. 33). Finally, the ECB’s general operational independence is increased by the ban on 
interference from EU institutions, national governments, and other bodies (Treaty Art. 282, 
Paragraph 4; Protocol Art. 7). While the ECB’s Governing Council acts by simple majority 
with a quorum of two-thirds of the members, the President of the ECB can circumvent the 
quorum rule by convening an extraordinary meeting at which no quorum is necessary 
(Protocol Art. 10.2). With regard to goal independence, the ECB is limited through the 
prioritization of price stability, but it can pursue other goals in support of the general 
economic policies in the Union as long as doing so does not interfere with price stability, 
establishing a clear order of goals (Treaty Art. 127, Paragraph 1; Protocol Art. 2). The ECB’s 
instrument independence is limited by the ban on providing credit to or buying debt from 
national government agencies and EU institutions, and its role as lender of last resort is not 
specifically sanctioned (Treaty Art. 127, Paragraph 1&5, Art. 123; Protocol Art. 2, 21.1). 
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Studies have constructed various indicators to measure central bank independence, and the 
vast majority of these studies focus on the de-jure independence of central banks. By 
calculating some of the most common central bank indices (Alesina et al. 1989; Grilli et al. 
1991; Cukierman et al.1992; Eijffinger/Schaling 1993), de Haan and Eijffinger (1996) show 
that the ECB is highly independent. Across all indices, it is the more independent than any of 
the other G-7 central banks. Crowe and Meade (2007) find in applying Cukierman et al.’s 
(1992) Central Bank Independence (CBI) index to their sample of ninety-six industrial and 
developing countries that the ECB was the second most independent central bank among 
advanced countries, after Sweden’s Riksbank. 
2.1.3. The pre-crisis consensus: central bank independence and price stability 
Over the past decades, an increasing number of countries have transferred monetary policy- 
making rights to independent central banks. Especially since the late 1990s, major changes in 
central bank law have taken place; more than half of the forty-seven countries analyzed by the 
Bank for International Settlements have changed their central bank laws since 1998 
(Cruz/Ortiz 2009). Before the late 1980s most central banks basically represented a division  
of their countries’ treasuries. Their objectives were wide-ranging, including high levels of 
growth, low unemployment, and financing government deficit, so while price stability was 
often an objective, it was just one of many. Although some central banks had a certain level of 
legal independence, they usually had less independence than the law indicated. With only a 
few exceptions, central banks had no instrument independence (Cukierman 2008). By 
calculating the de-jure CBI indices as of the end of 2003 for 163 central banks in 181 
countries, Arnone et al. (2007) show that all country groups (i.e., advanced economies, 
emerging markets, developing countries) increased their levels of CBI since the late 1980s but 
also that they all exhibited higher levels of CBI at the end of 2003 than that reached by 
advanced economies in the late 1980s. Almost all central banks in the sample had been 
mandated with price stability by 2003, often with priority over other goals. In addition, most 
central banks had provisions in place to limit the financing of government deficits or at least 
the quantity of such credits and to make them temporary (Moser-Boehm 2006). Finally, most 
of the central banks’ governments had granted them autonomy in setting the policy rate 
(Arnone et al. 2007). In a similar study, also building on the 2003 IMF database of central 
bank  laws,  Crowe  and  Meade  (2007)  show  that  the  average  independence  score,      1.0 
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indicating complete independence, doubled from 0.3 in the 1980s to 0.6 in 2003 across their 
sample. 
Scholars have tried to explain the puzzling trend of politicians’ voluntarily giving up control 
over monetary policy, even though they could influence election-deciding parameters like 
unemployment and output levels at least in the short term (Landström 2013). After all, 
economic voting theory suggests that incumbents who preside over economic downturns are 
more likely to lose elections than are those that do not, and studies show that the lack of 
control over monetary or fiscal policy leaves long-serving leaders especially endangered 
(Clark et al. 2013). 
2.1.3.1. Theoretical arguments for delegation 
The literature provides three core theoretical arguments for the delegation of monetary policy, 
the most prominent of which refers to the time-inconsistency problem, where today’s strategy 
might be suboptimal tomorrow. Policymakers are systematically tempted to use the short-term 
trade-off between inflation and output to stimulate the economy even though that this  
behavior leads to high inflation rates and no real output gains in the long run. Private actors 
raise their inflation expectations as they incorporate politicians’ likely opportunistic behavior 
(de Sousa 2001), so the public and government are drawn into a form of prisoners’ dilemma 
(Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). The promise of policymakers to pursue low inflation is not 
credible as reneging on the goal of price stability promises political gains. To solve the time- 
inconsistency problem policymaker’s behavior must be limited (Rogoff 1985; Barro/Gordon 
1983; de Sousa 2001). 
The second argument for delegation refers to the need to safeguard low inflation despite 
partisan cycles (which describe differences in policy choices and outcomes that depend on 
partisan governments acting in their constituencies’ interest (Hibbs 1977)) and election cycles 
(Cukierman 1994; Eijffinger/De Haan 1996; Ullrich 2003). The public choice argument states 
that central banks are under pressure to behave in accordance with their governments’ 
preferences. Monetary tightening strains government budgets by reducing tax income through 
a slowed economy, lower seingiorage receipts, and a short-run increase in the interest burden 
on government debt. Therefore, it is in the government’s interest to ensure cheap money 
(Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). Partisan and election cycles may explain the kind of monetary 
policy governments  prefer.  While left-leaning  governments  seek  low unemployment  at the 
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expense of higher inflation, right-leaning governments prefer the reverse (Hibbs 1977). 
Election cycles describe monetary policy changes before and after elections. Nordhaus (1975) 
and Lindbeck (1976) propose that opportunistic governments use fiscal and monetary policy 
before elections to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment, resulting in increased 
electoral support. After the election victory, they contract these policies to cushion the 
inflationary consequences of their pre-election policies (Nordhaus 1975; Lindbeck 1976). 
The third argument deals with the dominance of fiscal over monetary policy (Sargent/Wallace 
1981). If fiscal policy dominates, the fiscal authority can set its budget deficit at will, before 
the monetary authority can set its policies, so monetary policy will have to accommodate 
fiscal policy, making money supply endogenous. If the public is not willing or able to acquire 
additional government debt, monetary authorities will be forced to finance deficits by printing 
money. On the other hand, if monetary policy dominates and the monetary authority can set  
its policies independently, fiscal authorities will have to satisfy long-run government budget 
constraints and adhere to the monetary authorities’ wishes (Sargent /Wallace 1981; 
Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). 
Other arguments have been made in favor of delegating monetary policy. Among others are 
arguments regarding signaling creditworthiness to foreign investors, especially when 
government debt is high (Maxfield 1997), and arguments regarding the strength of the 
financial sector’s and the public’s opposition to inflation (Forder 2005; Posen 1995; Hayo 
1998). 
Summarizing the theoretical arguments for delegation, the core problems that drive all 
delegation arguments regard governments’ inflation bias and their lack of credibility. With 
their inherent inflation bias, governments cannot credibly commit to a low inflation target. 
While there is consensus that, in the long-run, policymakers can achieve price stability only 
through monetary policy, central bank independence is by no means the only way to ensure 
low levels of inflation and inflation variability (Debelle/Fischer 1994; Landström 2013).  
Other routes to price stability include a strict low-inflation rule, delegating monetary policy to 
an overly conservative central banker, and fixing monetary policy contractually (Rogoff 1985; 
Barro/Gordon 1983; Keefer/Stasavage 2003; Farvaque 2002; Walsh 1995; Persson/Tabellini 
1993; Svensson 1997). All of these alternatives have serious shortcomings (de Sousa 2001; 
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Eijffinger/De Haan 1996; Barro/Gordon 1983; Hayo/Hefeker 2002; McCallum 1995;   Jensen 
1997; Cukierman 1992). 
 
2.1.3.2. Empirical arguments for delegation 
Tests of the theoretical concepts mentioned above have been inconclusive. While empirical 
studies are generally supportive of central bank independence, their results have not been 
compelling. 
The question concerning whether central bank independence is negatively correlated with 
inflation has drawn the attention of numerous scholars, whose results depend on the group of 
countries (i.e., developed countries, developing countries, and emerging countries) studied. 
Most studies compare an index of the central bank’s de-jure independence with inflation rates. 
The design of the index, the question concerning which aspects of independence to include, 
and their weights and normalization procedures all affect outcomes and result in indices that 
are largely uncorrelated (Pollard 1993; Klomp/De Haan 2010; Lybek/Morris 2004; Mangano 
1998). The consensus is that there is a negative correlation between average inflation and the 
degree of central bank independence in developed countries (Cukierman 1992; 
Alesina/Summers 1993; Grilli et al. 1991; Walsh 2008; Klomp/De Haan 2010; Bade/Parkin 
1984; Landström 2013), but there is no such relationship in developing countries (Cukierman 
et al. 1993; Landström 2013). One reason for this difference may be that the authorities 
enforce legal independence only when the shift to a market economy has strengthened 
sufficiently (Cukierman 2008). The causal relationship between CBI and low and stable 
inflation has been disputed in terms of, for example, whether good economic policies lead to 
price stability and central bank independence or the other way around (Posen 1995; 
Daunfeldt/de Luna 2007; Walsh 2008; Cukierman et al. 1992; Hielscher/Markwardt 2012; 
Lybek/Morris 2004). 
 
The relationship between CBI and the inflation-output variability trade-off is also not clear- 
cut, mostly because of the comparatively low number of empirical studies. The argument that 
greater central bank independence decreases inflation variability rests on the assumption that 
stable money growth and the absence of electoral and partisan cycles decrease inflation 
variability (Alesina 1988; Eijffinger/De Haan 1996). With regard to central bank 
independence and output variability, the argument is that low inflation caused by restrictive 
monetary   policy   leads   to   high   real   interest   rates,   which   hurt   economic       growth 
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(Alesina/Summers 1993). Predictability induced by central bank independence also enhances 
economic growth through economic stability, reduces the risk premium, and leads to a more 
constant monetary policy (Alesina/Summers 1993). In addition, high inflation may distort the 
pricing mechanism and impose significant costs on society (Fischer 1993). While Chowdhury 
(1991) shows a significant positive relationship between inflation and inflation variability, 
other scholars find little or no relationship between central bank independence and real 
economic variables (Walsh 2008; Pollard 1993; Alesina/Summers 1993; Parkin 2013; Grilli et 
al. 1991; Cukierman 2008). Cukierman et al. (1993) find that, while there is no association 
between legal independence and per capita income growth in developing countries, the 
association between growth and actual independence (political vulnerability of central banks 
and governor turnover) in these countries has a positive impact on growth. After examining 
one of the most comprehensive data sets, Landström (2013) finds no such trade-off, even after 
controlling for the level of central bank independence, and finds instead a strong positive 
correlation between inflation and output variability. Countries that stabilized output variability 
and implemented central bank independence reforms stabilized inflation variability more than 
countries that did not implement such reforms (Landström 2013). 
2.1.3.3. Historical arguments for delegation 
The consensus that monetary policy is best left to independent central banks was strengthened 
by two additional developments: the perceived failure of Keynesianism as an economic 
concept in the 1970s and Germany’s success with the Bundesbank’s pragmatist version of 
monetarist policy before the creation of the EMU. While such was not the case in the 1960s 
and 1970s, it became the accepted view that inflation and its uncertainties reduce growth. The 
policy shift was not driven purely by ideological commitment to liberal orthodox principles 
but was the political response of leaders who were facing deteriorating national economies 
and increasing international competition (Cukierman 2008; Sandholtz 1993). Sluggish  
growth, the low economic performance of high-inflation countries, the gradual tearing down  
of controls on capital flows, and the resulting broadening of international financial markets 
and governments’ declining ability to deliver the economic results they promised in the 1970s 
all sparked a quest for price stability (Bernhard/Leblang 2002; Cukierman 2008; Sandholtz 
1993). The failure of Keynesianism in the wake of stagflation after the first oil crisis in 1973 
and the widespread impression of crisis gave greater salience to monetarist theory. A 
neoliberal  consensus  made  the  pursuit  of  low  inflation  more  important  than  growth and 
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employment, so it replaced the former Keynesian beliefs of the political elites. Monetarist 
theory prioritized price stability over all goals, as expansionary monetary policies used to 
stimulate demand and employment would produce only inflation and inflationary expectations 
(Scharpf 2011). It provided an alternative policy model to Keynesianism, appealing to policy- 
makers by addressing both the changed economic conditions and their need for a reform- 
legitimizing framework (McNamara 2006). The German success with a pragmatic version of 
monetarist theory provided a strong and compelling example of the theory’s benefits. While 
most of Europe was struggling with stagflation, Germany stood out as an example of 
successfully steering the economy. Because of the Bundesbank’s restrictive anti-inflationary 
policies, unemployment and inflation rates were low (McNamara 2006; Cukierman 2008). All 
over the world, but especially in the Western world, central bank independence became the 
dominating monetary policy paradigm. The broad coalition of economists who supported the 
framework and its perceived success gave legitimacy and credibility to the belief that 
monetary policy-making was best left to an independent, technocratic institution. It solidified 
the illusion of the central bank as a benevolent, non-political planner that optimized society’s 
welfare in a technocratic and efficient way (McNamara 2006). The inflation-bias story 
triggered by Kydland, Prescott, Barro and Gordon, and the comparatively simple theory of the 
prisoner’s dilemma in monetary policy-making helped to cement the view that using  
monetary policy to raise output beyond its equilibrium is not effective and leads to inflation 
(Cukierman 2008). 
However, this consensus was largely elite-based, and the ease with which the ECB’s 
independence was agreed upon did not necessarily reflect the depth of Europe’s commitment 
to the idea (Forder 2005). The public’s and political elites’ support for the EMU increased 
with the single-market process in the 1980s, but public opinion was not the driving force. 
Preparation for the EMU was already long underway, and governments tended to run faster 
than their publics were willing to go when polls began to focus on the public’s attitude toward 
a single currency (Sandholtz 1993). Price stability fit the general political and economic scene 
and was supported by the contingencies of the time, such as the struggle to control inflation 
(Forder 2005). In the 1970s and 1980s most of Germany’s EC partner countries were wedded 
to inflationary policies, following cycles of inflation and devaluation. Joining the EMU meant 
a radical shift, as the government had to abandon the idea that inflation could be used to 
achieve economic goals like employment and growth (Sandholtz 1993; McNamara 2006). 
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The accession criteria that had been defined for the common currency were met by some 
candidates with brutal budget consolidations and socials pacts that were difficult to sustain 
over the long term (Scharpf 2011). After the creation of the central bank, the political and 
historical factors (like the need to anchor a re-unified Germany in the West) that drove the 
agreement began to dissolve quickly as the goal of price stability was achieved. Popular 
support had no historical roots in most EMU member states, so as some scholars predict, the 
support is likely to fall apart in times of economic hardship (Forder 2005; Sandholtz 1993). 
2.1.3.4. The pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy 
Central bank independence has emerged as the consensus theory of monetary policy in the 
past two decades. The consensus on monetary policy can be summarized in four central 
hypotheses: macroeconomic stability can be achieved through price stability as long as the 
central bank manages to keep inflation under control in the short- to medium-term and there 
are no exogenous shocks; monetary policy-making could and should be separated from 
regulation and supervision, which focuses on the health of individual financial institutions, 
since as long as the individual institutions are healthy, the stability of the whole system is  
safe; the short-term interest rate is the only policy tool necessary, as control over the short- 
term interest rate in combination with the market’s expectation about the future is sufficient to 
capture the impact of monetary policy on the economy; and as long as  every regulatory 
agency in every country ensures the soundness of its respective financial institutions, the 
whole financial system will be in order, so all central banks have to do is to keep inflation at 
home in check (Borio 2011). 
The consensus was driven on the theoretical side by the fact that none of the proposed 
alternatives seemed to be able to solve the commitment problem that lies at the heart of 
monetary policy-making. Resting on the core assumption that price stability is fundamental,  
as high inflation or deflation has enormous economic, political, and social costs, actors 
acknowledged the overall economic benefits of central bank independence to be expected by 
making price stability the dominant goal and by limiting financing state deficits through the 
printing press (McCallum 1997; Lybek/Morris 2004; Crowe/Meade 2007; de Sousa 2001). To 
satisfy modern democratic societies’ demands for transparency and accountability, central 
banks should be instrument-independent but goal-dependent, with price stability the 
overriding goal (Mishkin 2000; Koshie 2013; Martin 2013). Although  supportive    empirical 
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studies have not been compelling, central bank independence has generally prevailed 
(Lybek/Morris 2004). 
 
2.2. Monetary policy during the global financial crisis 
 
During the global financial crisis central banks around the world stepped up to prevent the 
collapse of the financial system, which would have had even more dire consequences for 
output and unemployment. As interest rates hit the zero lower bound, central banks engaged  
in unprecedented levels of unconventional monetary policy (Issing 2013; Fahr et al. 2010). 
These policies were justified by the impairment of the traditional transmission mechanism of 
interest rate decisions, which impairment was due to the looming possibility of government 
default and the dominance of credit risk in business thinking. However, seven years after the 
start of the crisis and long after any immediate liquidity risks were overcome, there are still 
only a few signs that monetary policy has normalized (Hannoun 2012), a notable exception 
being the Fed’s tampering with asset purchases. Instead, ultra-easy monetary policy continues 
to be employed on the grounds that aggregate demand needs to be restored and because high 
debt levels make policy-makers reluctant to employ fiscal policy (White 2012; Hannoun  
2012; Blinder 2012). As White (2012) observes, monetary policy has become the only game  
in town. 
2.2.1. Best-practice crisis-resolution principles and their application during the crisis 
The main goal of any form of crisis-resolution mechanism is to minimize the short- and long- 
term costs in terms of output loss and unemployment. The example of the financial crisis in 
the Nordics in the early 1990s provides three widely acknowledged principles with which to 
achieve this goal (Borio et al. 2010). The first principle is the need to recognize the problem 
early and intervene, as the longer authorities wait, the greater the cost will be. Unless 
problems are identified and addressed, actors have no incentive to correct misallocations of 
resources. As the former Citigroup chief executive Chuck Prince put it, “When the music 
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, 
you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Nakamoto/Wighton 2007). With regard 
to the recent crisis, policy-makers identified liquidity risks in the interbank market rapidly and 
acted swiftly to provide emergency funding (Borio et al. 2010). 
The second principle is the need for comprehensive and in-depth intervention to restore 
confidence in the financial markets, enable them to act efficient and effective again, and to 
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prevent subsequent policy correction resulting from piecemeal policies. While governments 
and central banks employed liquidity operations and guarantees rapidly, the restructuring of 
balance sheets via write-downs and outsourcing the management of bad assets have not 
proceeded as swiftly, nor has much attention been paid to reducing excess capacity in such 
sectors as the banking sector (Borio et al. 2010). 
The third principle is the need to balance systemic costs with considerations of moral hazard. 
While overly abrupt and imprecise exercise of market discipline can cripple financial markets 
and the real economy, unsustainable investments must be purged. Those who got themselves 
into difficulties must bear some consequences to prevent future reckless actions. During the 
crisis, rescued companies’ management saw few dismissals, ownership takeovers by the 
government, or restructuring (Borio et al. 2010). 
Overall, policy-makers’ intervention has so far been incomplete. Governments have put more 
weight on supporting lending and aggregate demand in the short run than on boosting 
adjustment and reducing overhang capacity in the financial sector. Consistent crisis 
management has been hindered by differing central banking cultures and monetary policy 
preferences in the EMU member countries (Schwäbe 2013). The high level of financial 
globalization, the complexity of the products involved, and general aversion to government 
intervention in Anglo-Saxon countries have also made a thorough intervention more difficult 
(Borio et al. 2010; White 2012; Martin/Milas 2012). It is this incomplete nature of crisis 
resolution that makes prolonged use of unconventional monetary policy both necessary and 
dangerous. 
2.2.2. Benefits of unconventional monetary policy 
The single biggest benefit of unconventional monetary policy is its psychological effect. By 
making clear that they will do whatever it takes, central banks prevented the looming collapse 
of the financial system. While their readiness to honor this commitment was never tested, 
market participants believed that central banks would serve as a backstop to the collapse of  
the financial system. 
Unconventional monetary measures can be grouped into four main types of policies. First, 
central banks used liquidity facilities to provide liquidity through short-term lending and to set 
currency swap lines with other central banks, especially the Fed. The main benefit of liquidity 
facilities is their ability to prevent a breakdown of the financial markets. In times of crisis, the 
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inter-banking market can be impaired, as banks no longer trust each other, so they reduce their 
relative lending exposure. Second, credit facilities were used to encourage lending, as credit 
facilities can help to avert a financial market crisis’s spreading to the real economy. The 
additional available credit allows banks to continue their lending to the real economy. Third, 
large-scale asset purchases were used once interest rates hit the zero lower bound. Central 
banks started to reduce rates along the whole yield curve by expanding their balance sheets, 
changing their structures, or doing both. Large-scale purchases of assets are used if the normal 
monetary transmission mechanisms break down. Normally, the monetary transmission 
mechanism ensures that changes in the short-term interest rate affect the whole yield curve, 
but if this mechanism is no longer working, central banks use large-scale asset purchases to 
ensure the effect of their interest rate decisions (Hannoun 2012; McKinsey Global Institute 
2013). Finally, central banks used forward guidance to set expectations about the future 
development of monetary policy (Hannoun 2012) to convince market participants that the 
interest rate reduction would not be temporary in the short run (McKinsey Global Institute 
2013). 
2.2.3. Risks of unconventional monetary policy 
Unconventional monetary policy involves a number of risks and unintended effects that can  
be broadly grouped into functional and distributional effects. While function effects are the 
effects unconventional policies have on the functioning of the economy, distributional effects 
are the monetary effects on various groups in the economy. 
2.2.3.1. Functional side effects 
I begin with an overview of three primary functional side effects of unconventional monetary 
policy. First, unconventional monetary policy measures delay balance sheet adjustments in the 
economy (McKinsey Global Institute 2013; Borio et al. 2010; White 2012; Hannoun 2012). 
Liquidity provisions by the central bank cannot solve underlying solvency problems and may 
instead prevent the purge of poor investments by propping up non-performing loans  
(Hannoun 2012; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013). Vertical and horizontal misallocation of resources 
continues, leading to a new series of bubbles (e.g., real estate in western Europe) and the 
potential for lower growth rates (Borio 2011). An asset price boom is fueled either directly by 
asset purchases through the central bank or indirectly through portfolio rebalancing 
(Rawdanowicz et al. 2013; White 2012). Toughened regulatory standards for financial 
institutions  that  are  still  coping with  balance  sheet  risks,  de-leveraging,  and  a  search for 
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safety, reduce spreads and prevent long-term lending, deepening the downturn. The sector 
needs low policy rates in order to survive, but they are also increasingly less effective in 
shoring up the financial sector. Second, unconventional monetary policy may encourage a 
new round of risk-taking and leveraging in the financial system (McKinsey Global Institute 
2013; Hannoun 2012; Borio et al. 2010; White 2012), as the impression that central banks 
stand ready to do whatever it takes may increase moral hazard (Hannoun 2012). The easy 
monetary conditions that led to imprudent lending, increasing collateralization, and a rate of 
credit growth that was far beyond the growth rates of nominal income is likely to have the 
same effect again (Borio 2011). Third, financial markets lose their ability to discover prices 
and be market markers; instead, the central bank takes over financial intermediation, and 
depending on the size and scope of its interventions, becomes the most important player in 
asset price formation (Hannoun 2012; White 2012; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013; PIMCO 2013). 
2.2.3.2. Distributional side effects 
The first and probably most prominent distributional effect is the likelihood of rising inflation. 
Inflation has a profound influence on almost all economic actors, including households, 
financial and non-financial firms, and nation states. While ultra-low monetary policy almost 
inevitably leads to rising inflation in the long run, the dangers in the short term are limited, as 
inflation expectations are still anchored at low levels and the combination of excess global 
production capacities and depressed demand make rising inflation unlikely (Rawdanowicz et 
al. 2013; White 2012) . 
In addition to inflation, unconventional monetary policy also has more direct distributional 
side effects. While conventional monetary policy influences wealth distribution through the 
(overnight) short-term interest rate, which influence affects banks’ funding costs and interest 
income directly and asset prices indirectly (Brunnermeier/Sannikov 2012), unconventional 
monetary policy has a similar but stronger effect, as it uses measures beyond the short-term 
interest rate to affect the whole yield curve (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). 
2.2.4. Unconventional monetary policy in the Eurozone 
During the global financial crisis, the ECB engaged in many unconventional monetary 
policies, many of which are similar to those the Bank of Japan undertook (with limited 
success) to stimulate demand during the 1990s (White 2012). With regard to liquidity 
facilities, the ECB expanded its refinancing operations for banks and moved from an   auction 
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system to a system of full allocation at fixed rates, allowing banks to borrow any amount of 
funds they wanted at a fixed interest rate if they posted adequate collateral. The ECB’s 
increased credit support for banks, designed to encourage lending, changed its Long-Term 
Financing Operations Program from three months to three years, increased the number of 
assets accepted as collateral, and increased the amount available through these operations. To 
affect the interest rate yield along the whole yield curve, the ECB purchased sovereign debt  
on the secondary market through its Securities Markets Program and announced its Outright 
Monetary Transaction Program, which would have allowed it to buy short-term government 
debt directly from banks. While this program was never executed, it announcement alone was 
sufficient to drive government yields down. Finally, while the ECB used its forward guidance 
to signal the continuation of ultra-low rates, it did not name conditions like unemployment 
thresholds like the Fed did (McKinsey Global Institute 2013; Borio/Disyatat 2009; PIMCO 
2013; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013). 
Overall, unconventional monetary policy in the European Union has been at least partially 
successful, as the European banking system did not collapse, and no country had to leave the 
Eurozone (Scharpf 2014). It is my view that these successes can be attributed to 
unconventional monetary policy and the ECB’s unwavering stance. After ECB President 
Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech at the London Global Investment Conference on July 26, 
2012, sovereign interest rates tumbled, and the spread between European countries narrowed 
again (Draghi 2012; Martin/Milas 2012) as the two-year borrowing costs of the largest crisis- 
ridden countries, Spain and Italy, reacted within minutes of the speech dropping by 74 basis 
points to 5.68 percent and by 89 basis points to 4.06 percent, respectively. At the same time, 
stock markets in both countries gained roughly 5.6 percent each (Wilson et al. 2012). This 
result underscores the beneficial psychological effect of unconventional monetary policy. 
However, apart from these short-term effects, the track record of unconventional monetary 
policy in the Eurozone has been mixed. According to Eurostat data (2014) some countries, 
such as Austria and Germany, seem to have left the crisis behind them, as their growth rates 
have picked up and their unemployment levels are falling. However, most countries in the 
EMU are still experiencing sluggish (if any) growth, high unemployment, and rising debt 
levels (Scharpf 2014). The average unemployment rate in the EMU rose from 7.6 percent in 
2008 to 12.0 percent in 2013, real GDP decreased by 0.3 percent per year over the past six 
years, and the average general government debt in the EMU stands at 92.6 percent of GDP. 
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The countries in the EMU periphery (i.e., Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy) have been hit 
even harder. They are struggling with unemployment rates of 12.2–27.3 percent, their real 
GDP has decreased 1.0–4.4 percent per year, and their general government debt levels stand  
at 93.9–175.1 percent of GDP (Eurostat 2014). The result of unconventional monetary policy, 
often in combination with austerity measures, differs widely depending on the viewpoint 
taken: the perspectives of the creditor states and the Eurozone would just them successful, 
while the debtor states’ perspective—or at least the debtor states’ citizens’ perspective— 
would just them as flawed because of their high social cost (Scharpf 2014). 
When analyzing the policies’ success from the viewpoint of the Eurozone aggregate it shows 
that some of the above mentioned functional and distributional side effects are being visible. 
Turning to the functional effects of unconventional monetary policy, balance sheets have 
adjusted in the Eurozone slowly, as banks, especially in the crisis countries, are still burdened 
with bad assets. Low interest rates have not transmitted into the real economy, as banks are 
still coping with balance sheet risks, and the private sector remains hesitant because of the 
incomplete and uncertain nature of the crisis resolution (Borio et al. 2010; White 2012; 
Martin/Milas 2012; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013). In addition, financial institutions are still  
highly dependent on cheap liquidity. The fact that these institutions, especially in the southern 
European countries, have continued overloading their balance sheets with high-yield 
government debt aggravates the problem (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). Therefore, ultra- 
low policy rates and unconventional measures have become essential for the stability of the 
financial system. New asset price bubbles are also emerging in some countries. For example, 
the Bundesbank in Germany issued a warning in November 2012 that real estate prices were 
rising fast and that, while the bubble had yet to develop, all the factors necessary were in  
place (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012). Finally, the high volatility of stock markets, reacting to 
every sign of action by the central banks, underscores the central banks’ having become one  
of the most important players in the price formation of a large array of assets. 
As for the three primary distributional side effects of unconventional monetary policy, first, it 
is unlikely that inflation will become an issue any time soon, although the danger of deflation 
in Europe looms large. Inflation rates in the Eurozone remained below 1 percent in 2014, 
which is far below the ECB’s goal of around 2 percent. Inflation expectations are firmly 
anchored at low levels, but doubts about the return of central banks’ long-term rule-based 
decision-making might lead to abrupt upward shifts (Issing 2013; PIMCO 2013). Second, 
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while the jury is still out on the final re-distributive effects of unconventional monetary  
policy, overall, government and non-financial institutions have benefited significantly from 
unconventional monetary policy. Both groups have large liabilities and only limited assets and 
have benefited from the decline in debt service payments. The picture for financial institutions 
is mixed, but it is clearly negative for the whole Eurozone. The reduction of net interest 
margins has squeezed banks’ profitability in their core business of lending. Third, long-term 
investors like insurance co-operations and households have lost out, as they tend to hold far 
more assets than liabilities and have suffered from reduced interest income as a result 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2013). 
Including in the calculation the effects of unconventional monetary policy on asset prices 
changes the picture, as measured by McKinsey Global Institute (2013) and PIMCO (2013), 
even though the impact on asset prices remains inconclusive. Strong positive effects on bond 
prices have occurred, but stock prices are unlikely to be influenced in the long run (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2013; PIMCO 2013). Companies have not increased investments markedly, 
nor has significant portfolio rebalancing taken place. Instead, lower borrowing costs have led 
to an increase in short-term consumption spending (PIMCO 2013). Most market participants 
see the increase in corporate profits as temporary and the stock market rally as a correction of 
the overreaction after the Lehman crisis (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). Unconventional 
monetary policies have not increased housing prices directly, but they may have prevented a 
steeper decline and affected the accelerated recovery. While housing prices have risen in the 
Eurozone, their levels, measured by income-to-price ratios, remain far below previous highs. 
Therefore, rising prices in most areas are not yet excessive, and their increase should be seen 
as a recovery from recession (Rawdanowicz et al. 2013).Whether such increases in wealth 
increase consumption is debatable, while the lost interest income is tangible (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2013). Even the question concerning whether higher asset prices equal greater 
wealth remains unclear, as wealth implies increased future income (White 2012). Regardless, 
it is difficult to imagine how higher asset prices would transfer into higher spending right  
now, as few banks are willing to offer consumer credit based on leveraging real estate. In 
addition, the impact of increased wealth on spending might differ during times of recession. 
Especially in southern European countries, real estate and equity are still worth less than they 
were in 2007 (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). 
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To sum up, unconventional monetary policy is and will remain a hotly debated topic in both 
academic circles and the public discourse. While the jury is still out on the sum of 
unconventional monetary policy’s effect, one problem is clear: it is difficult to end 
unconventional monetary policy. In the Eurozone, the ECB is confronted with unemployment 
at record highs and sluggish economic growth, especially in the southern member states. At 
the same time governments’ incentives to liberalize labor markets and improve investment 
conditions are low, and fiscal discipline is weakening (Issing 2013). Expectations about the 
ability of monetary policy have reduced governments’ need to reduce their deficit spending 
and have again leveled risk premiums across countries. Today, the risk premium on Spanish 
bonds is again almost as low as the risk premium on US bonds. Instead of reducing their 
spending to long-term sustainable levels, governments are becoming increasingly dependent 
on cheap central bank liquidity. Having shown politicians their ability to expand the money 
and credit supply, central bankers will find it difficult to avoid calls for such measures in the 
future (Meltzer 2013). Almost all countries in the Eurozone are breaching the rules of the 
fiscal pact, their deficits exceed 3 percent, and their debt to GDP ratios exceeds 60 percent. 
The strongly negative market reaction at first indication of tempering by the Fed gave a 
preview of what is to come. 
Political pressures to continue unconventional monetary policy will mount, as an end to the 
era of ultra-low interest rates will have several effects (Hannoun 2012; Borio 2011; Borio 
2014; Taylor 2012; White 2012). First, it would increase risk in the financial markets, as the 
withdrawal of liquidity will increase tail risk, leading to an increase in price volatility; the risk 
increases as the asset holdings of a central bank increase (Hannoun 2012; McKinsey Global 
Institute 2013; Rawdanowicz et al. 2013; Cukierman 2011). Prolonging of unconventional 
monetary policy out of fear of market instability only amplifies the problem as assets are 
added to the central bank’s balance sheet. Second, investors in bond markets will face serious 
losses, hitting banks in southern Europe with high levels of government securities and 
insurance companies with large fixed-income assets especially hard. Banks in northern 
Europe would benefit from a widening of net interest margins, but this benefit is not likely to 
make up for the problems from increasing financial instability. Third, government  debt 
service costs will explode, although the effect will hit those countries with already 
unsustainably high debt levels the hardest, increasing the temptation to reduce the burden via 
inflation  (Cukierman  2011;  Borio/Disyatat  2009;  Issing  2013;  Hannoun  2012; McKinsey 
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Global Institute 2013). This conflict of interest between governments and central banks will 
come at a time when central banks need to coordinate their policies with the treasuries to 
reduce the size of their balance sheets (Turner 2014). Fourth, household debt service costs  
will rise (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). While household debt have fallen since the height 
of the crisis, it is still higher as a percentage of GDP and in nominal terms than it was before 
2000. This increased cost will be countered by an increase in interest income, but since wealth 
is not evenly distributed across societies, only a small percentage of households will be better 
off. Fifth, non-financial co-operations will have to improve their capital efficiency and de- 
leverage if liquidity is withdrawn from the market and interest rates rise again. Sixth, central 
banks will bear certain losses once interest rates return to normal, and those with the least 
assets to sell on the market will see the greatest losses because of the fear of asset price 
volatility (Rawdanowicz et al. 2013). Finally, capital flows to emerging markets will dry up 
and capital will flow instead from emerging markets to developed countries, increasing the 
chances of payment problems and lowering growth in emerging markets. This effect will then 
hit export-dominated economies in the Eurozone that relied on emerging markets as export 
destinations during the crisis (McKinsey Global Institute 2013; Caruana 2013). 
Considering the risks and benefits of unconventional monetary policy, especially with respect 
to the likely opposition to ending it, it is surprising that the ECB continues to engage in such 
policies. While its use during the height of the crisis is understandable, its continued use raises 
questions. Relying solely on monetary policy, especially unconventional monetary policy, 
risks overburdening central banks and has created an “expectations gap” between what central 
banks are expected to deliver and what they can deliver (Borio 2014; Caruana 2013; 
Orphanides 2013). Despite ultra-low interest rates and massive use of the central banks’ 
balance sheets, growth has been disappointing in many countries. Public frustration about low 
growth and high unemployment has been growing and has been pinned squarely on the  
central banks (Farvaque et al. 2011). 
 
2.3. Post-crisis dissent - developments in central bank theorizing since the global 
financial crisis 
At first glance, central banks emerge as the clear winners from the turmoil of the global 
financial crisis. They are hailed as saviors, their de-facto mandates have been broadened, and 
few doubt their central role in monetary and financial stability policy (Borio 2011). The   pre- 
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crisis consensus on central banking has been shaken, as central banks reached far beyond 
classic monetary policy during the global financial crisis. However, central banks are now 
faced with a number of challenges. On the economic side, they have to operate in a hostile 
economic environment, despite years of ultra-low interest rates. On the theoretical side, they 
are heading into unknown territory; they know that their macroeconomic models failed to flag 
systemic risk, inter-linkages, and pro-cyclicality, but there is no consensus on how to adapt 
them so they work more effectively (Borio 2011; Caruana 2013). On the institutional side, 
their independence is likely to come under pressure because of ballooning public debt, their 
use of unconventional monetary policy, and questions surrounding both performance and 
legitimacy. The crisis has exposed a rift between monetary policy theory and practice, and as 
a result, a worldwide discussion has emerged among all key stakeholders of monetary policy 
about the need for a new monetary policy regime and an accompanying institutional setup 
(Issing 2013). 
2.3.1. What monetary policy after the crisis? 
Over the past decades, most economists have come to agree on an independent central bank as 
the preferred institutional structure and inflation-targeting as the preferred policy with which 
to keep prices stable. The economic theory at the heart of this convergence of belief is the 
quantity theory of money that was first put forward by Irving Fisher (Fisher 1922). While 
Fisher defines a linear relationship between the quantity of money and inflation, modern 
monetarism builds on Milton Friedman’s (1956, 1998) revised neo-quantity of money theory, 
which adapts the quantity of money theory by placing greater weight on inflation expectations 
and the increasing role of financial markets. Monetarism, which has become the mainstream 
economic theory since the perceived failure of Keynesianism, replaced quantity of money 
targeting with inflation-targeting. However, the convergence of belief that resulted in the 
primacy of monetarism as economic theory during the “Great Moderation” fell apart during 
the recent financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, financial stability has rivaled the 
singularity of price stability as a goal of monetary policy, and other mechanisms with which  
to set the optimal interest rate, such as the Taylor rule, have rivaled inflation-targeting. 
Today, most economists and central bankers agree that a broader understanding of central 
banking is necessary and call into question some core beliefs about monetarism (Carré et al. 
2013). Among the items of consensus is some agreement concerning the inability of low and 
stable  inflation  to  guarantee  financial  and  macroeconomic  stability (Borio  2011; Caruana 
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2013; Brunnermeier/Sannikov 2012), but the absolute priority of the price-stability goal no 
longer goes unquestioned, and some central banks’ de-facto mandates have already been 
broadened to include financial stability (Klomp 2009; Borio 2011). As the interest rate was  
not sufficient to cope with financial instability, new instruments and additional supervisory 
and regulatory powers will be required to ensure financial stability (Issing 2012; Borio 2011). 
Unlike central bankers, economists go so far as to see inflation-targeting no longer the state- 
of-the-art approach (Carré et al. 2013; Issing 2013). After all, it was during a time of low and 
stable inflation when the credit and asset price bubbles began to inflate. Possible alternatives 
to inflation-targeting include the Taylor rule, which places economic variables other than 
inflation into the equation that derives the nominal interest rate. Proponents suggest that the 
Taylor rule would remove inefficiencies created by the current discretionary policy (Taylor 
1993). Second, it is generally accepted that the interest rate alone is not sufficient to overcome 
the crisis and to kick-start the recovery; instead, central banks have to deploy their balance 
sheets to influence interest rates along the whole yield curve and stabilize the financial system 
(Borio 2011). Third, there is consensus that the focus of regulation and supervision has to 
expand beyond the individual financial institution and to take into account system-wide 
developments. As Caruana (2010) points out, macroprudential policies require not only 
regulation and monitoring on the microprudential level but also close interaction with fiscal 
authorities and international coordination. Overall, more flexibility toward and tolerance of 
inflation, stronger coordination with fiscal and other monetary authorities, and a broader 
mandate for central banks that includes financial stability describe the broad consensus (Issing 
2013). 
Outside these broad areas of common understanding is disagreement regarding the specifics, 
as illustrated by the answers to a questionnaire by central bankers and economists (Carré et al. 
2013). Among these disagreements is the role of central banks in ensuring financial stability, 
which economists see as important and central bankers consider to be of secondary 
importance, since monetary policy could be endangered if central banks’ focus expands to 
include financial stability. Second, disagreement surrounds the future role of central banks. 
Should they return to the Jackson Hole consensus by not targeting asset prices, by not trying  
to deflate bubbles, and by following a “mop-up” strategy after bubbles burst (Issing 2012)? 
Should they continue to support output through balance sheet measures and other 
unconventional monetary policies, or should they return to their original task of ensuring price 
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stability? Should they “lean against the wind” to prevent the build-up of future imbalances, or 
should they continue to follow the old concept of cleaning up afterward? Carré et al.’s (2013) 
survey results show that economists tend to favor the “lean against the wind” principle and a 
broader mandate for central banks. At the same time, economists point to the reputational risk 
central banks face when the so-called neutrality of money principle no longer holds. The 
broadening of Bagehot’s (1873) “lender of last resort” principle, the coordination of policy 
with fiscal authorities, and the call to abandon a strict inflation-targeting approach all 
endanger the banks’ reputation by increasing the likelihood that the line between fiscal and 
monetary policy is crossed and that the central bank becomes part of politics (Issing 2012; 
Borio 2011; Taylor 2012; Caruana 2013; Taylor 2013; Hannoun 2012). Multiple mandates, 
some of which may be influenced by fiscal policy, will cause central banks to run the risk of 
fiscal dominance as higher public debt and intrusion in the name of coordination lead to 
pressure on the central bank (Martin 2013; Koshie 2013; Stella 2010; Brunnermeier/Sannikov 
2012; Hannoun 2012). Such a wide broadening of mandate is not necessary, as the 
government could replicate almost all policies, apart from interest-rate setting, in  which 
central banks have engaged since the outbreak of the crisis (Borio/Disyatat 2009; Hannoun 
2012). As Buiter (2012) points out, the only unavoidable fiscal dimension of monetary policy 
is the generation of seigniorage; avoidable dimensions include credit risk in general and the 
monetary financing of Euro sovereign debt in particular. The great concern is that an  
excessive focus on financial stability may interfere with the long-term objective of price 
stability (Cukierman 2011). As shown in Carré et al. (2013), central bankers tend to be in line 
with the more skeptical economists and to be hostile toward the notion of considering more 
than inflation in their interest-rate decisions. They would prefer the “cleaning-up afterwards” 
principle and a return to pre-crisis principles, demoting financial stability to a temporary issue 
of importance only in times of abnormal financial market distress (Borio 2011; Carré et al. 
2013; Caruana 2013). Pre-crisis thinking, which is the basis of their credibility and  
legitimacy, still looms large in central banks (Carré et al. 2013). 
With the breakdown of the consensus, the public’s and politicians’ expectations regarding 
central banks’ abilities changed too, and the range of acceptable goals for monetary policy 
broadened in several ways, as the public increasingly sees central banks as the guarantors of 
economic growth, while the priority of the price stability goal has become shaky. In addition, 
central  banks’  ability  to  shore  up  public  finances  through  low  refinancing  costs  for 
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governments has also become a focal point as public debt balloons, debt-to-GDP ratios 
worsens, and large spending deficits become more common. Finally, the public has come to 
expect central banks to guarantee financial stability (Issing 2013). While it is too early to 
make a final judgment, it is difficult to imagine how central banks can achieve this goal 
single-handedly, as doing so would include a “lean against the wind” strategy during the 
build-up of a crisis, liquidity provision during the crisis, and the clean-up after a crisis 
(Orphanides 2013). 
As a result of the lack of consensus among economists, central bankers and academics the 
ECB no longer commands sovereignty of interpretation over monetary policy, and central 
banking theory no longer serves as the basis for unquestionable authority. Instead, the ECB is 
torn between competing political interests, has no clear theoretical monetary policy roadmap, 
and faces expectations that are difficult to fulfill. The advocates of a more aggressive 
monetary policy claim the ECB is doing too little, too late, while the supporters of more 
cautious policies claim that the ECB has overstepped its mandate and lacks the necessary 
legitimacy for its current policy course. The dissent concerning the correct monetary policy 
has allowed central banks to stretch far beyond traditional monetary policy to contain the 
financial crisis without initiating a public outcry, but the lack of consensus on how to tackle 
the crisis means that it can no longer be argued that the ECB has objectively selected the 
“right” policy option. Instead scholars point to the profoundly political nature of the ECB’s 
monetary policy (Scicluna 2013; Issing 2013). 
2.3.2. A new institutional setup for central banks? 
In addition to goals and policy tools, the discussion extends to the question of the appropriate 
institutional setup. As the lines between fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies become 
blurred, central banks’ independence is no longer a given. Despite their success during the 
“great moderation,” their policies and status have come under attack (Issing 2013). Criticism 
focuses on the role of central banks before the crisis, especially after 2000, and on the highly 
discretionary policy choices of the past few years. Critics question broadening central banks’ 
mandates to include questions of financial stability and regulatory policies, as doing so 
undermines the principle of separation that has shielded monetary policy from outside 
influences. In the field of crisis resolution, where fiscal resources might be placed at risk 
outside national parliamentary control and discretionary powers are used, the case for central 
bank autonomy is much weaker than it is in the field of monetary policy (Stella 2010; Scharpf 
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2013; Goodhart 2010; Wrobel 2010; Scharpf 2014). While critics may accept a central bank 
with no substantive accountability’s setting the interest rate, they do not accept that the bank 
is the lender or market-maker of last resort and an important fiscal actor (Buiter 2012). 
While there is some agreement on the fact that the structure of central banks must be reviewed 
to reflect new tasks and policies, the propositions for change differ widely. Some call for 
rebalancing the trade-off between independence and accountability to reflect the possibility of 
an enlarged mandate, while others call the whole concept of independence into question 
(Borio 2011; Carré et al. 2013; Wrobel 2010; Scharpf 2014), as the central banks of Sweden 
and the UK are a working example of much less independent—but not less successful— 
central banks (Forder 2005). Finally, some believe that, despite risks of an enlarged mandate, 
no structural change is necessary, as the interventions have been in line with monetary policy 
orthodoxy and, in this case, the ECB’s legal provisions (Schwäbe 2013). 
2.3.3. Conclusion 
The discussion regarding the future role of central banks is far from over, as consensus has 
broken down as a result of the global financial crisis. While everyone seems to agree that 
central banks need a broader mandate and that the central four hypotheses regarding the role  
of central banks no longer hold, no new consensus has emerged. While a discussion 
surrounding both role and ability of a central bank could be potentially harmful to any central 
bank, the risk for the ECB is especially serious, as unlike national central banks, the ECB is 
not embedded politically, it has no central fiscal authority with which to coordinate, and it is 
disconnected from national debates surrounding monetary policy (Scicluna 2013). Over the 
past two decades, monetary theory has supplied technocrats in central banks with arguments 
for why monetary policy-making should be left to central banks instead of to democratically 
legitimated or at least accountable institutions, the outcome of which has been the ECB’s total 
independence from elected politicians. However, the technocratic argument for simply 
executing economic best practices has lost its appeal, and technocratic institutions like the 
ECB have to find new ways to defend and legitimize their policies. The open dissent among 
economists, central bankers, and other stakeholders regarding the future functions and 
institutional set-up of central banks render a return to “normal” monetary policy illusive. At 
the heart of the economic disagreement lie the question of durability and the consequences of 
unconventional monetary policy (Issing 2013; White 2012). 
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In the following discussion, I deviate from the economic discourse by focusing not on the 
economic consequences of unconventional monetary policy in terms of changes in inflation 
expectations but on the question concerning why the ECB continues to engage in 
unconventional monetary policy despite its harmful effects on the ECB’s credibility and 
chances for continued independence. 
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3. Decision-making in the Governing Council 
 
 
3.1. The EMU in crisis 
 
3.1.1. ECB and ESCB: structure, responsibilities, and dilemmas 
The ECB reflects the pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy-making in both its structure and 
its mandate. Following monetary policy best practices, the EMU member states grant the bank 
far-reaching independence and enshrined price stability in the treaty as the bank’s primary 
policy goal (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol on the Statute of the 
ESCB and of the ECB). 
Next, I discuss the structure and responsibilities of the ECB and then outline the dilemmas  
that arise from the chosen structure. 
3.1.1.1. Structure and Responsibilities 
Contrary to widespread belief, the ECB is not a classic central bank. As Seidel (2003) shows, 
the ECB is the supranational subsidiary of the intergovernmental ESCB—or, more precisely, 
of the intergovernmental Eurosystem that encompasses all national central banks of the ESCB 
that participate in the Euro (Seidel 2003). Nevertheless, some scholars compare the ECB to 
Germany’s Bundesbank and the national central banks of the member states to Germany’s 
Landeszentralbanken. The Twin Sister Hypothesis proposes that the resemblance between the 
ECB and the Bundesbank goes beyond legal provisions to include concrete patterns of 
decision-making and norms of behavior (Buiter 1999; Debrun 2001). Some scholars believe 
that, similar to Germany’s system, a powerful ECB at the core of the system can discipline the 
national central banks. Such equating is misleading (Seidel 2013). 
The participating states presented the EMU as a way to pool and share monetary powers but 
not as a transfer of these powers (Howarth 2007). Therefore, despite being declared integral 
parts of the ESCB, the member states’ national central banks remain national institutions 
within the realms of their national constitutional structure, have legal personalities within their 
national laws, and have not been transformed into European institutions (Seidel 2003;  
Scheller 2006). The fact that member states can independently choose the governors of their 
national central banks, who can dominate the Governing Council of the ECB via the simple- 
majority rule, underscores the intergovernmental character of the ESCB (Seidel 2003). In 
addition, monetary policy in the EMU is much more decentralized with regard to policy 
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implementation than is the Bundesbank or the Fed. Therefore, the ECB has no institutionally 
pre-eminent position over the national central banks that form the ESCB (Seidel 2003; 
Howarth 2007). 
The institutional structure of the ECB is the result of a compromise between the need for a 
unified decision-making process in a monetary union and the desire to involve national central 
banks (de Grauwe 2000). While the Governing Council of the ECB represents a unified 
decision-making approach, the presence and influence of national central banks’ governors 
reflects the geographic and national representation approach. A system of central  banks 
instead of a real central bank was set up for three primary reasons. First, the establishment of  
a central bank, possibly concentrated only in Frankfurt, was unacceptable to many national 
politicians on political grounds; the presence of strong national central bank governors on the 
Governing Council was an important selling point when the EMU was presented to the 
national publics (Howarth 2007). Second, the Eurosystem’s approach was to build on the 
experience of the national central banks by preserving their structures and operational 
capabilities, especially since national central banks still need to perform tasks that have no 
connection to the Euro. Third, given the many nations and cultures that participate in the Euro 
and the wide geographic area they cover, national central banks provide interest groups a 
better access point to the system than a centralized ECB would provide (Scheller 2006; 
Badinger/Nitsch 2014). The importance of national macroeconomic policy-making and the 
weak Europe-wide coordination of economic policy are additional reasons for national central 
banks’ serving  as the direct link between the ECB and the member states (Howarth 2007). 
Of course, geographic and national representation has both costs and benefits. While the 
added value of the national central banks’ knowledge about local institutional circumstances 
and financial markets is likely high, national representation also gives national central banks 
considerable influence on decision-making (Berger/De Haan 2002), the size of which 
influence depends on voting procedures, agenda-setting, and the role of the members of the 
directorate. Parts of the literature consider the Executive Board to be the agenda-setter at the 
Governing Council that proposes a policy that is then discussed and decided upon in the 
Council. However, since many of the discussions with national central bank governors that 
lead to policy proposition are informal and bilateral, there can be an information imbalance 
between the directorate and the national central bank governors (Heisenberg 2003). 
Heisenberg’s (2003) interviews with national central bank employees support this view.   The 
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question concerning whether members of the directorate focus on Eurozone or national needs 
is still up for discussion; while most of the literature sees a Eurozone focus, national 
preferences are not unrealistic. An explanation for the directorate’s focus on national needs 
could, for example, focus on the pragmatic retention of power. In order to safeguard the 
ECB’s status and independence, the directorate could always choose to present proposals in 
line with the majority of national central bank governors’ monetary policy preferences 
(Heisenberg 2003). 
Turning now from the ECB’s structure to its responsibilities, most monetary policy decision- 
making powers in the Eurozone, especially the right “to define and implement the monetary 
policy of the Community,” lie with the ESCB instead of the ECB (Treaty Art. 105, Paragraph 
2). As the ESCB has no legal capacity on its own and not all national central banks of the 
ESCB participate in the Euro, the ECB acts on behalf of the ESCB only by exercising the core 
functions of the Eurosystem in partnership with the national central banks that form the 
Eurosystem. However, these functions are not delegated to the directorate of the ECB but to 
its Governing Council, of which all national central bank governors of the Eurosystem are ex- 
officio members (Seidel 2003; Scheller 2006); the directorate itself has been given 
responsibilities of only secondary importance. One example is the directorate’s authority to 
issue instructions to national central banks, which scholars who attempt to demonstrate the 
ECB’s pre-eminent position often cite, but since no national central bank has to fear direct 
consequences from disobeying an instruction, the authority is a blunt sword. Such instructions 
can be enforced only via a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice, but filing a lawsuit  
against a national central bank that is not following the instructions issued by the ECB 
requires a vote of approval through the Governing Council. Therefore, contrary to the  
wording of Protocol Article 12.1, Paragraph 2, the authority to enforce instructions issued to 
the national central banks does not in practice lie with the directorate but with the Governing 
Council (Seidel 2003). 
3.1.1.2. Dilemmas 
The structure and responsibilities of the ECB present a number of dilemmas for the ECB, the 
first of which is related to perception. While the public views the ECB as a powerful and 
independent European institution that hovers above national interests, the ECB is neither a  
real European institution nor very powerful in itself. It is not a community institution, as it is 
not referred to in the Treaty Article 7, but a supranational institution dominated by national 
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representatives. Individual governments choose the governors of their national central banks, 
and these governors remain under the authority of their national constitutional structures. As a 
result, the governors are an important avenue for national interest groups that range from 
special-interest groups to the general public to affect European monetary policy. The simple- 
majority decision-making rule in the Governing Council empowers the governors at the 
expense of the (possibly) more Europe-focused directorate. 
The second dilemma, closely related to the first, is the inherently intergovernmental character 
of the ECB. Although it is an institution protected by a ban against interference by national or 
European bodies, the “one country, one vote” principle of the ECB almost demands that the 
central banks’ governors act as representatives of their respective member states. Their 
countries’ governments choose them, they act as experts on their nations’ monetary policy 
needs, and they vote on decisions that directly affect their home countries. The urge to focus 
on national needs and preferences is strengthened by the structure of the monetary union: 
According to monetarist theory, monetary policy should focus on the actual condition of the 
economy if the policy is to work properly, and with nineteen national economies in the EMU, 
this precondition is almost impossible to fulfill (Scharpf 2011; 2012). The systematic 
economic performance and preference differences that prevail between, for example, the fast- 
growing central and eastern European States and the slower-growing foundation members 
increase the risk that national considerations will prevail over European ones  (Berger/De 
Haan 2002; Eijffinger 2006; Heisenberg 2003). In addition, national autonomous fiscal policy 
creates externalities in a monetary union, as any successful supply-side policy that reduces the 
cost and increases the profitability of domestic production must have a beggar-my-neighbor 
effect (Scharpf 2011). The lack of coordination means that the EMU can rely only on the 
Stability and Growth Pact to internalize these externalities (Collignon 2013). Differences in 
economic performance between regions are common to any monetary union, but the absence 
of political and fiscal union in the EMU complicates possible solutions. While at the national 
level differing preferences can be mediated via the political system, this route is blocked by 
the absence of a unified political system in the EMU (Gros/Hefeker 2000). Therefore, the 
ECB has been operating under sup-optimal conditions from the beginning (Scicluna 2013). 
Because of the “one country, one vote” principle, which prevents an alignment of voting 
power to economic weight, and the missing fiscal and political union, the ECB always runs 
the risk of a bias through the overrepresentation of more inflation-prone states (Eijffinger 
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2006; Baldwin et al. 2001; Howarth 2007). The criticism about recent interest rate decisions 
from some of the national central banks’ governors from economically strong countries 
supports the view of such overrepresentation. The question concerning the extent to which the 
ECB should be concerned about these regional differences is important, as the member states 
remain the core political units of the EMU (Gros/Hefeker 2000; Cancelo Ramón et al. 2011). 
 
3.2. Theory overview – How to explain decision-making in independent central banks 
 
3.2.1. Theoretical approaches to institutions and institutional decision-making 
Certain core questions regarding institutions’ influence are how they are set up and what 
influences their decision-making. The same ideas and assumptions that drive how institutions 
are set up can often also explain institutional behavior, as these ideas and assumptions are 
bound to affect the decisions these institutions make later. The two concepts most often used 
in the literature are the calculated cost-benefit concept of rational actors and the cultural 
concept, where an actor’s view of the world shapes his or her decision-making (Hall/Taylor 
1996). With regard to central banks and monetary policy, the literature generally agrees that 
the broader social, political, economic, and historical contexts in which central banks are 
embedded play a role in how they are set up and, therefore, in their decision-making. 
Monetary policy, which creates domestic winners and losers, is affected by the dominant 
public and political ideology and by the country’s international political and economic 
relationships (Ball 1999; Levy/Spiller 1994; Stasavage/Guillaume 2002). 
The public choice and related political economic literature, such as that which addresses 
rational choice institutionalism, focuses on the possibility that non-economic factors influence 
monetary policy. Rational choice institutionalism draws on the new economics of 
organization, emphasizing property rights, transaction costs, and institutions to circumvent 
collective-action problems. Rational choice institutionalists assume actors’ preferences to be 
fixed and actors to behave completely instrumentally and strategically so as to maximize gain 
(Hall/Taylor 1996; Huber/Shipan 2000). While, in the tradition of rational choice 
institutionalism, economic factors like GDP growth and inflation rate have considerable 
impact, scholars also recognize that central banks operate in the political sphere and face 
political factors that might influence monetary policy-making, including external pressure by 
interest groups and governments, as well as the general public’s stance on monetary policy 
(Maier/Bezoen 2004; Eijffinger/De Haan 1996; Hielscher/Markwardt 2012). Scholars in    the 
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related field of independent regulatory agencies propose policy conflict, political uncertainty, 
expertise, and constituent support as factors that also influence independent agencies’ 
decision-making autonomy (Christensen/Yesilkagit 2010; Furlong 1998). The literature 
assesses several proxies for external pressure. For example, Maier and Bezoen (2004) find  
that pressure on central banks from national governments, commercial banks, industry, trade 
unions, and other sources increases if unemployment is rising and governments’ approval 
rates are falling. Lohmann (1998) examines the pre-EMU Bundesbank to show that 
Germany’s central bank’s discretionary powers varies greatly with the popularity of the 
chancellor and his or her economic policies; the more popular the chancellor, the greater the 
government’s ability to influence monetary policy. Ringquist et al. (2003) consider the related 
topic of independent regulators to show that public salience public salience increased 
politicians’ efforts to influence the agency, and complexity decreased it. Another significant 
driver of pressure on central banks is the unity of the veto players, as the more veto players 
there are and the less aligned they are with each other, the greater the chance that central 
banks’ de-jure independence actually corresponds to de-facto independence (Lohmann 1998; 
Hayo/Voigt 2008). Not surprisingly, not all scholars accept this view on political 
determinants, as some find that political determinants have little influence on policy-making 
independence (Christensen/Yesilkagit 2010; Furlong 1998; Egeberg/Trondal 2009). Gersl 
(2006) finds that political pressure for easy monetary policy had no effect on the Czeck 
national central bank, and Maier et al. (2002) find similar results for the Bundesbank, which 
does not react to pressure from politicians, trade unions, and associations but only to pressure 
from the financial sector. The extent to which the ECB faces such pressures is debatable: 
Some scholars point out that the ECB, as a supranational institution, is less susceptible to and 
less accessible to pressures than national institutions, especially if they originated in the 
national sphere (Maier/Bezoen 2004). 
Social choice and historical and sociological institutionalism go further by challenging the 
self-interested cost-benefit calculus, a core pillar of traditional economics. Scholars claim that 
purely functional explanations provide a good starting point for the analysis of institutions and 
institutional decision-making but are insufficient to explain the wide variety of outcomes. 
Historical institutionalism focuses on normative ideas and institutional factors, which scholars 
define as formal or informal procedures, norms, and conventions in the relationship between 
political actors. Scholars accept that conflict between groups for political gain lies at the heart 
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of politics. Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, includes cognitive ideas and an 
even broader definition of institutional factors, including habits, rituals, and cues. They posit 
that institutional forms and procedures are adopted not because they are the most efficient but 
because they are culturally embedded and socially constructed (Thatcher/Sweet 2002; 
Thatcher 2011). Hofstede (2001: 9) describes culture as the “collective programming of the 
mind.” Therefore, institutions do not only affect actors’ utility calculations; institutions shape 
actors’ very preferences and identities (Campbell 1998; Hall/Taylor 1996; Ball 1999). 
Christensen and Yesilkagit (2010) show that historical and cultural determinants best explain 
the creation and independence of an agency, even when controlling for alternatives like the 
functional argument of credible commitment, the ideology of the government, and the 
constitutional character of the enacting law. Bohn and de Jong (2011) and de Jong and van 
Esch (2013) use national cultural variation to explain EMU member countries’ differences of 
opinion regarding how to overcome the financial crisis. 
Structural choice combines social-choice and rational-choice approaches. From social choice 
comes the emphasis on the instability of majority rule, and from rational choice comes the 
emphasis on how institutions can mitigate collective action problems so politicians can realize 
gains (Moe 1990). The positive theory of institutions recognizes that social choices are not 
chaotic but stable, as they rely not only on majority rule but are also constrained by all sorts of 
institutions that limit their alternatives (Moe 1990). Institutions serve the double purpose of 
helping to mitigate collective action problems and providing the structural means of coercion 
and redistribution of gains by political winners (Moe 1990), so politicians are faced with two 
major problems: the problem of hierarchical control and how to ensure that an organization 
takes actions in line with its creator’s preferences, and the problem of political uncertainty. 
Bawn (1995) points out that legislators would like to design procedures so agencies gather 
information and use it exactly as the legislator would have used it. As to political uncertainty, 
since the danger of political uncertainty can be anticipated and ex-post sanctions of 
independent organizations are generally weak, politicians have to choose the degree to which 
organizations are isolated from the political process (Moe 1990; Huber/Shipan 2000;  
Bernhard et al. 2002). However, the isolation and independence of the agencies limit their 
political responsiveness (Bawn 1995). The greater this initial zone of discretion on behalf of 
the organization, the more significant the effects and the unanticipated consequences 
(Thatcher/Sweet 2002). At the same time, actors try to manipulate the organization’s design to 
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increase transaction costs to prevent future changes and optimize their expected payoff in  
light of political instability (Huber/Shipan 2000). Contrary to economic theory,  political 
actors cannot just leave arrangements behind once they have outlived their purpose, as they 
are trapped within the system (Moe 1990). Institutions then act as a barrier to high transaction 
costs for any coalition that wants to implement policy change. Bohte and Wood (2004) show 
that decision-makers’ perceptions about political instability are important in determining the 
design of organizations. In the politics of structural choice, interest groups, not the general 
public, are the most important social actors. Unlike the general population, which usually 
cares only about policy and, therefore, outcomes, interest groups are well aware that structure 
and policies are closely linked, so they make demands and exert pressure (Moe 1990). While 
some of the literature considers that procedural decisions made during the creation of an 
agency affect its subsequent decisions, game theory models assume that agencies’ preferences 
are endogenously, not exogenously, given (Bawn 1995). Agencies are not passive actors; 
instead, they entrench themselves in supportive clientele and try to broaden that clientele. 
Over time, the relationship between principals and agents changes as agencies gain power and 
importance. They learn to exploit their power to go beyond their formal rules, and to grow 
informal norms. They become key actors, acquire expertise, and structure their policy areas, 
thereby changing how they make decisions (Thatcher/Sweet 2002; Thatcher 2011). In doing 
so, they raise the political cost of disruption if the legitimacy of their independence from 
government has been postulated and transnational communities of experts have contributed to 
making delegation part of good governance orthodoxy (Thatcher/Sweet 2002; Moe 1990). 
3.2.2. Core assumptions – De-jure versus de-facto independence 
The core hypothesis made explicitly or implicitly by scholars when they analyze the decision- 
making process is that de-jure independence is not necessary the same as de-facto 
independence (Christensen/Laegreid 2007; Hanretty/Koop 2013; Maggetti 2007). Legal 
indices are often difficult and even unreliable indicators, as laws rarely spell out the limits of 
authority between central banks and political actors clearly, and they largely ignore possible 
external influences (Sturm/De Haan 2001). The fact that monetary policies in advanced 
economies look increasingly alike while legal indices differ increases skepticism about the 
value of these indices (Siklos 2008). Economists and political scientists tend to rely on the 
principal-agent theory to describe the relationship between the political sovereign and the 
independent delegate (Majone 2001), but when such a delegation amounts to a more or less 
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permanent transfer of responsibilities, the principal-agent relationship is more along the line  
of the fiduciary principle (Majone 2001). Nevertheless, as Siklos (2008) points out, the notion 
of independence is generally misleading, as the central bank is a state’s creation, so the bank 
can be at best autonomous but not entirely independent from the state that created it (Siklos 
2008). Central banks’ autonomy is, by definition, a matter of degree, as their authority is  
based on statutes or constitutional provisions, both of which politicians can change (Franzese 
1999). A central bank’s freedom to carry out its policies can vary with the government’s 
preferences, so the bank independence is a continuous variable (Siklos 2008; Thatcher 2005; 
Meltzer 2013; Lohmann 1998). While monetary policy in general might have low political 
salience and be seen as best left to specialists in central banks, rising levels of unemployment 
and inflation can increase its political salience (Scharpf 2011). Lohmann (1998) shows that  
the Bundesbank’s formal status remained unchanged between 1957 and 1992, during which 
time the degree to which monetary policy was accessible to political pressures changed 
regularly, and Meltzer (1998) states that the Fed’s independence has always varied over time. 
Politicians will always watch monetary policy, as it heavily influences macroeconomic 
developments like GDP and wage growth and, through this channel, affects politicians’ 
election chances (Gersl 2006). The complete de-politicization of monetary policy is utopian 
(Watson 2002; Down 2004). 
3.2.3. Core assumptions – Regional bias and the myth of decision-making based on a 
European view 
The second core assumption in the literature is that members of any central bank decision- 
making body have regional biases. National central banks’ governors have never been  
genuine homines economici but citizens of countries with interests in local concerns 
(Heisenberg 2003; Cancelo Ramón et al. 2011). As de Grauwe et al. (1999) point out, there 
are no provisions in the European treaties that prohibit national central banks’ governors from 
placing more weight on their countries’ needs than on any other needs. Most of the literature 
assumes that, despite contradicting statements from the ECB, the national central banks’ 
governors vote in keeping with their national economic needs, but opinion on the directorate’s 
voting behavior is mixed (Heisenberg 2003; Heinemann/Hüfner 2002; Bindseil 2001; 
Fahrholz/Mohl 2008; Ullrich 2004; Heinemann/Hüfner 2002; Belke/Styczynska 2006; 
Bénassy-Quéré/Turkisch 2008). The view that there is a regional bias has been reinforced by 
press  leaks,  doubts  about  the actual  degree of the ECB’s  independence,  the role of  public 
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opinion in the utility functions of the national central banks’ governors, and empirical 
evidence from both the Fed’s Open Market Committee and the pre-EMU Bundesbank 
(Meade/Sheets 2002; Heisenberg 2003; Heinemann/Hüfner 2002; Berger/De Haan 2002; 
Badinger/Nitsch 2014). Meade and Sheets (2002) show that the Fed is designed to represent 
both national and regional needs and show in their analysis of the Fed’s Open Market 
Committee’s voting records that regional unemployment levels significantly influence the 
committee members’ decisions. These results are reinforced by Berger’s and de  Haan’s 
(2002) finding that regional differences in inflation and real growth influenced voting 
behavior in the Bundesbank’s Governing Council. As for the ECB, the reform of the ECB’s 
decision-making rules and the introduction of the rotation groups support the regional bias 
assumption. In principle, as all member of the Governing Council participate as experienced 
experts and not as national representatives, a simple rotation model should have been 
sufficient, but the reform process itself suggests that governors defended the macroeconomic 
interest of their home countries and that their levels of bargaining power differed. The reform 
recognizes that the statuses of the central banks’ governors vary, as they can vote more or less 
often depending on their home states, and that they are not ad personam members of the 
Governing Council (Howarth 2007). First empirical studies show that the ECB’s interest-rate 
policies are best modeled by national preferences with regard to monetary policy 
(Badinger/Nitsch 2014; Hayo/Méon 2011). Meade and Sheets (2002) show that, in nearly 
every case, the majority of ECB officials voted in a way that could be justified by the 
difference between their preferred national interest rate and the Euro area interest rate 
(Meade/Sheets 2002). Proponents of the so-called German Dominance or Twin Sister 
Hypothesis also contend that members’ differing statuses are mirrored in the ECB’s interest 
rate decisions and show that larger countries, such as Germany, have more impact on the 
decision-making process than smaller countries do, resulting in interest rates that are more in 
line with the larger countries’ national needs (Petrova 2010; Fatum 2006; de Grauwe et al. 
1999). Other scholars show that, when the crisis started, the interest rate moved away from 
German preferences and toward those of the hardest-hit countries, so interest-rate setting 
seems to be directed largely toward countries that fare economically worse than the Euro-area 
average (Drometer et al. 2013). 
Differing preferences among members of the Governing Council could result from a range of 
issues.  First,  member  countries’  macroeconomic  performance  can  vary  and  influence the 
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voting behavior. Second, although price stability is, at least for the moment, the overriding 
principle, inflation preferences may differ based on interpretation of data and the perceived 
medium-term inflation risk. Third, preferences may differ depending on whether Euroarea 
aggregates or national economic data weigh more heavily. Finally, the differences in 
transmission mechanisms among member states can influence inflation preferences or at least 
preferences about the magnitude of change. Possible variables in the transmission mechanism 
are consumer borrowing, level of public debt, debt maturities, and the degree to  which 
national commercial banks buffer changes in the interest rate (Heisenberg 2003; de Grauwe 
2000; Angeloni et al. 2003; Petrova 2010; Howarth 2007; Bénassy-Quéré/Turkisch 2008; 
Dreher et al. 2010; de Grauwe et al.1999). Additional non-economic explanations include 
ideology, opposition from the financial sector, aversion to inflation, social cohesion, and the 
culture and tradition of monetary stability in member states. 
National central banks’ regional biases may also depend on the banks’ appointment 
mechanisms and reputation. Governments, which voters have chosen to formulate policies 
along voters’ preferences, choose the governors of their national central banks, so it is likely 
that the governors’ and voters’ long-term preferences are compatible. Vaubel (1999) posits 
that, since the ECB’s Governing Council members have more policy independence than  
tenure security, they will be inclined to pay attention to their home countries’ governments, 
ideologies, and election cycles. Vaubel also shows that central bankers are independent, but 
they are also loyal to the politicians who appointed them and whose ideologies they share 
(Vaubel 1999). In addition, national central banks’ governors rely for their reputation on 
national media, which increases their motivation to consider national concerns first (Bénassy- 
Quéré/Turkisch 2008; Heinemann/Hüfner 2002). 
Summing up, monetary policy is a function of the central banks’ preferences as they relate to 
economic variables, the transmission of the interest rate, the state of the economy, and shocks 
that may unexpectedly change the state of the economy, as well as non-economic variables 
like the appointment mechanism and the governors’ individual reputation (de Grauwe et al. 
1999). While the majority of the literature that addresses central banks’ independence treats 
central banks as some kind of nonpolitical benevolent planner that works to improve the 
general welfare, they do act within and are influenced by a political and economic ecosystem; 
they are societal actors with their own political interests (Bernhard et al. 2002). 
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4. Political Audience Cost Theory 
 
Most scholars have focused almost entirely on the question of why independent central banks 
were established and what economic benefits they can provide. Considerably less attention  
has been paid to the question concerning why, in an environment in which  institutional 
change regularly occurs, the ECB has managed to protect its decision-making powers. 
Institutions are not set in stone and delegation is not irrevocable; policy-makers regularly 
change central banking laws, hire and fire central bank governors, and infringe on central 
banks’ de-facto independence to achieve political advantage. However, central banks have 
displayed impressive survival ability and restraining powers on policy-makers, which is even 
more striking considering that the interests of central banks and governments are often 
fundamentally at odds (Lohmann 2003; Keefer/Stasavage 2003). As Miller (1998) points out, 
the fact that independent central banks were created in the first place and that they have 
survived shows that they enjoy the support of many politicians and a  sufficiently  large 
number of political interest groups. 
An institution’s prestige alone is not sufficient to ensure its continued existence, let alone its 
independence (Keefer/Stasavage 2003; Thatcher 2005). Formally, independent central banks 
can pursue a low inflation policy only if there is an anti-inflation coalition that can protect the 
bank against inflation-biased politicians (Lohmann 1998). Therefore, monetary policy must  
be in line with the public’s medium-term to long-term preferences (Farvaque et al. 2011). As 
Berman and McNamara (1999) point out, the real source of the pre-EMU Bundesbank’s 
effectiveness was not its formal independence but widespread support and public acceptance 
of the anti-inflation stance of its monetary policy. As part of the wider political system,  
central banks need political support to achieve their objectives (Posen 1995; McNamara  
2006). 
Clearly, there are strong reasons to believe that de-jure independence does not map easily into 
de-facto independence and that, instead, a wide range of influences affect monetary policy- 
making. While this observation is not new, the post-crisis dissent in academic circles, the 
resulting breakdown of the ECB’s sovereignty of interpretation, and the highly questionable 
use of unconventional monetary policy have all exacerbated the problem. Even so, the  
existing literature is rarely explicit about the transmission mechanism that connects the 
underlying  institutional  and  political-economic  motives  to  the  preferences  of  the  ECB’s 
Governing Council members. 
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One transmission mechanism that has not received the attention it deserves is the Political 
Audience Cost Theory. Developed to explain the outcomes of intergovernmental bargains, the 
theory forms part of Transaction Cost Theory, which focuses on the types of costs—the most 
important of which is the cost of the failure of credible commitment—that arise from the need 
to measure and enforce agreements. Transaction costs influence the structure of institutions, 
with which politicians try to control decision-making (Huber/Shipan 2000; North 1993). 
Transaction cost measurement is frequently difficult, as the characteristics and dimensions of 
the transaction being measured are not easily defined. The theory assumes that political actors 
are rational optimizers without complete information (Huber/Shipan 2000). The transaction is 
a swap of promises for votes, but there is no direct enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
contractual agreements are carried out (North 1993). 
Proponents of Political Audience Cost Theory have modeled international crises as wars of 
attrition in which politicians can choose at each stage whether to escalate, attack, or back 
down (Fearon 1994). The longer the confrontation lasts, the higher the audience costs for the 
politician who backs down first, as voters punish politicians who issue threats or promises and 
fail to follow through. According to Tomz (2007), who studied audience cost with regard to 
US presidents, voters think even less of leaders who back down than they do of leaders who 
never commit; empty threats cause disapproval rates to rise and approval rates to fall, 
especially among the politically active segments of the population. It is relative audience cost 
that matters. The state with higher audience costs will be less likely to back down than the 
state with lower audience costs, no matter the price or how great the states’ initial resolve 
(Fearon 1994). 
In a paper on institutional commitment, on which most of the following paragraphs are based, 
Lohmann (2003) shows how Political Audience Cost Theory explains the persistence of 
institutional commitment to independent central banks. At the heart of the theory lies the idea 
that every institution is made vis-à-vis an audience and that it derives its credibility from a 
political cost that that audience can inflict. This audience must be able and willing to monitor 
the institution so it can punish the institution’s failures and politicians’ attempts to affect the 
institution’s business. By being associated with a monetary institution, politicians also select 
the attached audience and establish the cost of reversing a decision (Lohmann 2003). Similar 
to the original theory, political audience cost prevents policy-makers from issuing threats 
unless they are willing to follow through. 
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In addition to depending on credibility, institutions also rely on a certain degree of flexibility, 
as unforeseen events can always happen. To be flexible, institutions must have an audience 
that is able and willing to differentiate between necessary and unnecessary moves away from 
promises. Therefore, the perfect audience would be able to inflict serious political costs in 
case of fundamental institutional defection, such as if German policy-makers decided to 
change the Bundesbank’s mandate to increase inflation, while also excusing necessary 
defections, such as when the inflation rate stands for a limited time at 1 percent instead of 2 
percent. Of course, since this perfect audience is usually difficult to find, most institutions rely 
on multiple audience groups to create a complex web of guardians. The two key types of 
political audiences are the mass electorate and specialized elites. These audiences differ in the 
degree to which they are informed and can understand and allow defections that are validated 
by certain situations and the kind of punishment they can inflict. While elite audiences like 
policy-makers, the financial sector, unions, and economists can execute a precise sanction 
strategy and excuse justified defections, the mass electorate’s simpler, cruder form of 
punishment is levied without distinction between justified and unjustified defection. Having 
multiple audiences allows institutions to combine flexibility and credibility, with their 
credibility stemming from the audience cost that especially the mass electorate inflicts—the 
highest cost being voting policy-makers out of office in the event of an institutional defection 
or an undue attack on the institution—and their flexibility being rooted in the ability of 
specialized elites to excuse defections that go unnoticed by the mass electorate when 
unforeseen events require them (Lohmann 2003). 
Political Audience Cost Theory not only explains why central banks have managed to 
preserve their independence, it also helps to clarify why central banks are responsive to 
outside influences. In fact, Political Audience Cost is a transmission mechanism that connects 
actors’ underlying institutional and political economic motives with the preferences of the 
ECB’s Governing Council members and actual monetary policy-making. In order to secure  
the support of their audience groups, central banks cannot ignore the possibility of hostile 
political reactions to their policies, so they must incorporate into their policies outside 
preferences to a certain degree (Jones 2009). As a result, monetary policy will be a 
combination of the policy that would prevail if the bank could set it truly independently and 
the policy that would prevail if only the government had a say; therefore, the anti-inflation 
stance will not be constant but will vary with the broader political economic environment 
46  
(Franzese 1999). Most studies show that even the most independent central banks are 
responsive to political pressure, at least to a degree (Gersl 2006). For example, the Fed,  
despite its independence, is not insensitive to political and public reactions to its policy. It 
attaches more weight to costs arising from negative output gaps than to costs arising from 
positive output gaps. In times of stable inflation rates, avoiding recession is the dominant 
preference (Cukierman 2008). The behavioral independence of the Bundesbank, considered to 
be one of the most independent central banks, also varies over time depending on the party 
control of veto points (Lohmann 1998). Lohmann (1992) and Moser (1999) show that central 
banks accommodate politicians’ preferences if the banks’ decisions run the risk of being 
overridden. The EMU has no veto mechanism, so politicians can only indirectly try to force 
the ECB into submission by signaling their preferences and threatening to use all levers 
possible, including changing the bank’s status, changing its structure, or even ending the 
bank’s entirely, to gain compliance (Gersl 2006). Politicians can also attempt to control the 
bank via their powers of appointment, selecting central bankers who share the same electoral 
or party political goals (Lohmann 1998). Such attempts to intervene in the operations of 
(formally but not necessarily actually) independent central banks are referred to as a second- 
order commitment problem (Berggren et al. 2012; Hayo/Voigt 2005). 
Apart from these kinds of direct influence on the central bank, politicians also influence 
monetary policy through decisions related to national economic policy. National economic 
policy affects price stability, financial stability, and monetary policy, thereby affecting the 
welfare of all member states. There is significant interdependence between national economic 
policies in the EMU and monetary policy, as well as possibilities for free-riding. National 
economic policy also affects the individual country’s economic structure, which, in turn, 
influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. In the absence of coordination among member 
states, potential conflict looms, and fiscal and monetary policy compete in determining 
aggregate demand and inflation (von Hagen/Mundschenk 2001; Beetsma/Bovenberg 2000). 
As such a macroeconomic program is not sustainable, one side will have to give in 
(Blackburn/Christensen 1989). 
When using Political Audience Cost to explain why central bankers are susceptible to outside 
influence, the underlying assumption is that audience groups can threaten the status of the 
central bank. However, changes to the ECB statues are unlikely. The condition of unanimity 
among member states and the lengthy process to change the status of the ECB doom almost 
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any attempt to failure. However, as Forder (2005) points out, it might be the ECB’s total 
independence that is its greatest source of weakness. The performance of the Eurozone since 
its creation has greatly reduced the dominance of the permanent and pervasive risk of  
inflation in political thinking; the ideational consensus on currency stability that existed when 
the EMU began has disappeared (McNamara 2006). Instead, low growth and high 
unemployment has come to the forefront of political disputes. Even when today’s low 
economic performance is overcome, growth will still be regionally uneven. The theory of 
optimal currency zones makes clear that benefits are dispersed, while the costs of 
misalignment are concentrated, and countries that have to bear a high share of the burden 
could become hostile toward the ECB, which lacks depth of popular support compared to 
national central banks. In that case, national politicians might find it convenient to attribute 
national distress to the ECB, especially as key decisions about monetary policy are now 
detached from national politics. In combination with a general hostility toward European 
integration and the ECB’s lack of democratic accountability, these factors might spark a 
political reform movement (Forder 2005). It is possible, of course, that a hostile reaction 
would not necessarily come through a vote on the ECB itself but by making its actors more 
directly accountable (Jones 2009). Although arguing that a reform of the ECB is conceivable 
does not mean that a reform will actually take place, it helps to clarify why the ECB might 
take action to prevent it (Forder 2005). 
Even if one is not convinced by Forder’s (2005) argument, the vulnerability of national  
central banks is another avenue through which they can be influenced. National central banks 
in the Eurozone are not constitutional in character, the tenure of governors averages only five 
years and is renewable, they are staffed with nationals, and they are part of their national 
political establishment. While the special character of the ECB’s founding treaty protects it 
from overriding, as defined by Lohmann (2002), and intervention by governments, national 
central banks are not so protected. Therefore, they have to mobilize support for their monetary 
policies from interest groups and the general public to protect their operational independence 
(Schwäbe 2013). The public opinion in their home countries should matter more to national 
central banks’ governors than the European public opinion, as the greater the support from 
their countries’ populations, the lower the chance that central banks will have to deal with 
attacks on their status (Heinemann/Hüfner 2002; Farvaque et al. 2011). Therefore, it is more 
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than plausible that national central banks’ governors take domestic opinion on the  
performance of monetary policy and the ECB into account. 
The present dissertation applies the concept of Political Audience Cost Theory to the ECB in 
order to identify the likely voting behavior of national central banks’ governors. Building on 
three primary suppositions—the regional bias of national central banks’ governors, the 
intergovernmental character of the ECB, and the need for national central banks to mobilize 
support for their monetary policy in order to protect their operational independence— I sketch 
the often neglected link between the underlying institutional and political economy motives 
and the preferences of ECB Governing Council members. To do so, I analyze the monetary 
policy preferences of core audience groups in every Euro member state and match them with 
the ECB’s actual monetary policy decisions, choosing certain variables and audience groups  
to combine the Political Audience Cost Theory with some of the most popular concepts in the 
literature. The dissertation seeks to achieve two goals: to contribute to the empirical 
assessment of the ECB’s independence through a variety of case studies covering some of the 
ECB’s most important decisions in the past years and to fill a gap in the literature by refining 
Political Audience Cost as a concept and by making it usable for research on central bank 
decision-making. Despite its intriguing logic, and with the exception of a study by Lohmann 
(1998) on the pre-EMU Bundesbank, the Political Audience Cost Theory has received almost 
no attention in the central banking discourse. Applying the theory to the ECB helps to fill this 
gap and move the discussion of unconventional monetary policy from the economic sphere 
into the political science sphere. The dissertation widens the debate by adding an umbrella 
theory to the discussion that encompasses many concepts in the current discourse. It 
contributes to shifting the debate to the macro level by refocusing on the fundamental 
mechanics of monetary policy-making. 
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5. Political Audiences in the Eurozone 
 
Defining three main audience groups—the general public, political actors, and economic 
actors—and several proxies for monetary policy preferences facilitates the application of the 
Political Audience Cost Theory to the Eurozone. In line with the majority of the literature, I 
have decided to focus on the general public, political actors and economic actors. 
 
5.1. The general public 
 
The general public is the largest and most powerful audience group in the Eurozone. While it 
cannot exercise a differentiated punishment, its strength lies in its ability to vote governments 
in and out of office. As the EMU is not a single nation with a shared culture and language, 
there is no EMU-wide general public, so each member state has a public whose preferences I 
must assess individually. While the publics in the member states each have their own 
preferences, there are a number of common determinants for these preferences. The global 
financial crisis has considerably lowered public support for the EU in general and specifically 
for the ECB, an institution that started out with a high level of trust. Since 2007, the trend has 
constantly been downward and support has reached historic lows in the aftermath of the crisis 
(Gros/Roth 2010). This decline is worst among young workers, executives, and those with 
high levels of education, the categories that are normally Europhiles. In 2013, trust stood at 
lower levels in all but one EU country (Zalc 2013), yet development of public opinion has not 
been uniform in all EMU member states. During and after the crisis trust fell especially hard  
in the three largest member states, Germany, France, and Italy (Gros/Roth 2010), but the most 
worrisome cases are those of Italy, Spain, and Greece, where trust has fallen persistently since 
the Euro’s inception in 1999 and has reached new lows (Deroose et al. 2007; Farvaque et al. 
2011). In the past, scholars have used individual characteristics and circumstances to explain 
support, such as gender (men are more supportive than women), education (those with higher 
education have stronger support), income (those with higher levels of income have stronger 
support), satisfaction with national democracy (those more satisfied have stronger support) 
frequent discussions of politics (those who have more frequent discussions have stronger 
support) knowledge about the EU (those with more information have stronger support), 
importance given to the EU parliament (those who give the EU parliament more importance 
have stronger support), use of media (those who watch more news have stronger support), and 
employment  status  (the  employed  are  more  supportive  than  the  unemployed  and retired 
people) (Hayat/Farvaque 2012; Bernhard et al. 2002; Ehrmann et al. 2012). 
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Generally, explanations of the public’s opinion of the EMU can be grouped into three 
categories: an economic explanation that depends on a calculation of EMU’s costs and 
benefits, a social identity explanation that includes cultural and historical explanations, and an 
explanation related to political/ideological cues or elite communication (Hooghe/Marks  
2005). 
In general, economic considerations are shaped by preferences related to individual well- 
being and national economic development (Hooghe/Marks 2005). On the individual level, 
preferences are driven by the distributional effects of unemployment and inflation. Scheve 
(2004), who studies public preferences for macroeconomic priorities in advanced economies, 
finds that the economic context has a strong impact on the public’s economic preferences. If 
either inflation or unemployment rises, the public’s priority is to turn this  development 
around. If the population is more vulnerable to the losses from unemployment than it is to 
losses from inflation, aversion to inflation decreases. The population’s exposure to costs 
depends on the labor market’s structure and how the ownership of assets and liabilities is 
distributed. On the national level, preferences are driven by characteristics that affect the costs 
of unemployment and inflation. Individuals in countries with higher government debt and 
expenditures are less inflation-averse, as the cost of unemployment is shared by all (Scheve 
2004; Farvaque et al. 2011). Farvaque et al. (2011) show that this conclusion holds true only 
for the original EMU members, while in the new member states, the ECB is often seen as a 
check to profligate governments. Scheve (2004) also finds considerable cross-country 
variation in economic preferences when controlling for the economic context, which Scheve 
explains partially with nation-level factors like the cost of unemployment and inflation, 
demand for government income, and the composition and size of the financial sector. Scheve 
also points out that inflation aversion depends on the structure of the national economy, as the 
more open the economy is, the higher the inflation aversion is because uncertainty about 
future inflation and high exchange rate volatility hurt open economies. While some scholars 
challenge the cost-benefit explanation and contend that economic growth plays a role only in 
crisis situations, while unemployment plays no role at all, when one considers the political 
salience of economic questions in recent elections in EMU member states, it seems unlikely 
that personal and national economic well-being plays no role in forming preferences 
(Gros/Roth 2010). 
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Empirical evidence on the EMU also underpins the assumption that economic performance 
influences the public’s preferences. As Zalc (2013) shows, support for the EU runs alongside 
the public’s perception of their countries’ economic development. Since 2007, positive 
correlations between national economic development and the general EU image, confidence  
in the EU, and optimism about the future of Europe have been 0.42, 0.43, and 0.46, 
respectively (Zalc 2013). Even from 1999 to 2005, a period characterized by high overall 
support levels for the EMU, public attitude varied from one member country to another, with 
perceived economic performance being the most important explanatory factor (Deroose et al. 
2007), and output in terms of inflation and economic outlook is the key factor that shapes the 
single currency’s acceptance (Deroose et al. 2007). However, the public holds the ECB 
responsible for both low inflation and financial stability, so higher inflation, banking distress, 
and financial turmoil have all negatively affected the public’s opinion of the ECB (Farvaque  
et al. 2011). Other scholars have observed similar results, attributing the loss of trust in the 
ECB to the sudden decline in economic growth in 2008/2009 (Gros/Roth 2010; Farvaque et  
al. 2011; Ehrmann et al. 2012). As Watson (2002) points out, one reason for this development 
is more people than ever have a financial interest in the well-being of the financial system, so 
they support independent central banks that introduce policies that bolster the financial 
markets (Watson 2002). 
National cultures and histories also play an important role in determining the public’s 
preferences, so developments in one country are not necessarily blueprints for developments  
in other countries (Christensen/Laegreid 2007). Inflation preferences form part of the 
economic culture of a country, defined as the ingrained values and attitudes of the population 
(Hayo 1998). Such deep-seated preferences are relevant to everyday monetary policy, as the 
public ensures a monetary policy to its liking and a fitting institutional form of the central 
bank by voting in and out of office the governments that shape central banking laws. Inflation 
preferences are stable as long as there are no exogenous shocks, so public opinion will 
continue to support price stability even if it harms some people in some situations (Hayo 
1998). The economic culture is influenced by historical experience and prior inflation-related 
experiences, such as hyperinflation or persistently high inflation rates, so these experiences 
play an important role in the formulation of today’s policy preferences. Experiences are 
passed on from generation to generation, which helps to explain the emergence of low- 
inflation cultures, as cross-country variation in inflation aversion results from a process of 
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inter-generational learning (Bernhard et al. 2002; Farvaque et al. 2011; Campillo/Miron 1997; 
Hayo 1998; Farvaque 2002; Farvaque/Mihailov 2014; Hayo 1998). One of the most well- 
known and often cited examples is Germany. Studies explain its inflation aversion culture by 
means of its history with hyperinflation after the first world war (Lohmann 1998). Other 
authors have shown that this explanation holds for other countries as well. For example, Hayo 
(1998) finds evidence that populations from countries with low-inflation cultures are more 
sensitive to a rise in inflation, and Vaubel (1999) shows that national sensitivity to inflation 
explains as much as 85 percent of the cross-sectional variance in inflation. A good example of 
the transfer of policy preferences into everyday politics is the high level of support that the 
ECB enjoyed at the outset in countries with histories of high inflation, as voters in these 
countries felt that the credibility gained from price stability would compensate for potential 
costs in terms of unemployment (Majone 2001; Deroose et al. 2007). 
Much of the culture-focused research is based on Hofstede’s (1984) study on differences in 
national cultures. Hofstede identified four factors—power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance—as explaining differences in cultures. Power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance describe the public’s relationship to governments and markets, as 
high scores in uncertainty avoidance are associated with a preference for stricter rules (which 
corresponds with an independent central bank and higher aversion to inflation), and high 
scores in power distance are associated with acceptance of differences in power and wealth 
(which corresponds with dependent central banks, as all power should rest with politicians) 
(de Jong/van Esch 2013; Steenkamp/Geyskens 2012). Therefore, politicians from countries 
with high power distance scores find it difficult to accept rules and limitations to their power, 
such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, and countries with low scores for power 
distance and higher scores for uncertainty avoidance resemble the Anglo-Saxon view, 
believing in dominant markets and only a regulatory role for government (Bohn/de Jong 
2011). Countries with high scores for power distance and low scores for uncertainty  
avoidance resemble the southern European view, which allows governments to play an 
important role in the economy (Bohn/de Jong 2011; Steenkamp/Geyskens 2012). 
The final explanation for the public’s preferences rests on building political cues. Elite 
communication and ideology play an important role in the formation of public preferences. 
Some scholars point out that people who are exposed to conflicting views are likely to 
become more ambivalent and distrustful (Jones 2009; Hooghe/Marks 2005). The ECB has 
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benefited from the political and economic consensus in favor of an independent central bank, 
but to maintain this popular acceptance, monetary policy has to be seen as working properly, 
as only then can the generally weak collective commitment support monetary institutions and 
policies (Jones 2009). Today’s greater uncertainty and the fact that policy-makers struggled to 
keep pace with events during the crisis created the perception that monetary policy is failing. 
Since, in case of public opinion, perception often matters more than hard economic data, the 
perception of inflation has had a greater influence on public opinion than real inflation (Jones 
2009; Deroose et al. 2007; Farvaque et al. 2011). The matter of perception also means that, as 
long as the ECB’s monetary policy is generally accepted, validated, and built into action by 
experts and functional groups, public opinion is likely to remain high. However, the post- 
crisis dissent in economic opinion about how to deal with the crisis has exposed the public to  
a large variety of interpretations and has reduced the ECB’s sovereignty of interpretation on 
monetary policy. Ehrmann et al. (2012) find that the loss of trust in the ECB was  
accompanied by a generalized loss of trust in the European integration project and European 
institutions. 
 
5.2. Political actors 
 
The second important audience group is political actors. For the length of their terms, 
politicians in democratic systems turn from being agents to being principals, wielding the 
powers entrusted to government, and to remain in power, they need to please a majority of 
voters. Not surprisingly, scholars have shown that governments, especially democratic 
governments, are more responsive to public opinion than central banks are. Most politicians 
place considerable weight on employment and growth and so favor lower interest rates. Only 
the most conservative government would match the central bank’s aversion to inflation 
(Franzese 1999). Unlike the ECB, politicians are more concerned with national factors than 
with Eurozone factors, and in addition to electoral motives, their preferences for monetary 
policy may be due to ideology and external pressures. 
According to some scholars, the government’s monetary preferences are best reflected in its 
partisan orientation or ideology. Left-leaning governments emphasize unemployment and 
growth, while right-leaning governments focus more on price stability (Mukherjee/Singer 
2007). While in price stability is costless in the long term, deflation is costly in the short term. 
As  inflation  declines,  unemployment  tends  to  increase  and  growth  tends  to  slow (Down 
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2004). Depending on the country’s labor and goods market structure, the effect of the short- 
term trade-off can be substantial (Down 2004). 
Politicians’ preferences for monetary policy may also be due to electoral motives. To 
safeguard their power, governments in democratic regimes must take their electorates’ 
preferences into account, and both individual and national economic well-being greatly 
influences the public’s stance on monetary policy. The ability of governments to achieve 
promised economic outcomes has decreased because of increased internationalization’s 
creating increasing numbers of interdependencies in the world economy and reducing the de- 
facto control of single governments over important variables of economic development. At  
the same time, governments are increasingly held responsible for the performance of the 
public sector and for managing the economy, including job creation, income growth and 
availability of goods (Scharpf 2011). Scholars have shown that, in line with the economic 
voting theory, macroeconomic indicators influence incumbents’ shares of votes, so poor 
economic performance leads to a loss of power or at least to big electoral losses (Bernhard et 
al. 2002; Down 2004; Clark et al. 2013). Following the electoral-motive explanation, political 
actors should be more concerned with growth and employment and less with inflation. 
The third possible explanation for politicians’ preferences for monetary policy relates to 
external constraints. Regardless of their ideology and electoral motives, political actors are 
constrained by external factors, the most powerful among them the need for state financing. 
High deficit spending, especially if it is used for welfare spending, which is often considered 
to be all but untouchable, and high overall debt levels push politicians to prefer growth, as  
low growth can rapidly make debt ratios unsustainable, even if the nominal amount of debt 
does not actually increase. What’s more, worsening debt ratios could quickly dry up external 
financing sources. Therefore, governments are incented to intervene in monetary policy, as  
the higher interest paid on debt and lower demand for government debt that come from 
restrictive policies reduce the room to maneuver. In fact, they have a strong incentive to 
manipulate any macroeconomic instrument possible (Clark et al. 2013). In addition, restrictive 
monetary policy indirectly influences government budgets through the lower seigniorage 
income and tax income that results from reduced growth(Schwäbe 2013). The higher a 
government’s expenditures and the lower its ability to collect non-inflation-affected taxes, the 
stronger the temptation for loose monetary policy (Campillo/Miron 1997). This observation is 
consistent with the explanation that politicians in currency unions are biased toward inflation, 
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as they know that the costs of their own actions are at least partially shared among all 
members. This bias becomes stronger as the common costs of an exit outweigh the cost of 
sharing the burden (Ehrmann/Fratzscher 2011; Grilli et al. 1991). 
To sum up, governments have three primary reasons for wanting to intervene in monetary 
policy to ensure low interest rates: they are tempted to spark growth prior to elections, 
ideological motives drive them, and they want to reduce the real value of debt and deficit 
financing. Other arguments that increase politicians’ willingness to incur the additional costs 
of inflation include the desire to improve the national balance of payments via devaluation  
and to guarantee financial stability in times of crisis (Miller 1998; Barro/Gordon 1983). The 
stance of political actors toward monetary policy probably depends on a combination of these 
factors. For example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) find that politicians’ preference for 
growth increases if national economic performance is low, public trust in the ECB is low, and 
the government is politically left-oriented. The extent to which governments actually get 
involved in monetary policy depends party on the public salience and the complexity of the 
topic. Whenever public attention is high, such as when unemployment rates are high and 
growth is sluggish, politicians pay close attention to monetary policy. However, highly 
complex issues tempers politicians’ tendency to intervene, reducing the effect of the topic’s 
salience with regard to monetary policy (Ringquist et al. 2003; Calvert et al. 1989). The loss  
of this influence in monetary policy has some advantages for politicians, as monetary 
institutions can persuade legislators of the inevitability of certain policies, help forge 
coalitions across diverse monetary preferences, and provides a basis for policy bargaining and 
agreement (Bernhard/Leblang 2002). Central banks can also be scapegoats, as depending on 
the level to which the banks have public support, putting the blame for weak economic 
development on the central banks can produce political benefits for the politicians 
(Hayat/Farvaque 2012; Christensen/Laegreid 2007; Hanretty/Koop 2013). 
 
5.3. Economic actors 
 
The third audience group is economic actors. While their influence might be less obvious than 
that of the public or political actors, it is strong. Economic actors can influence monetary 
policy-making both directly and indirectly. They can lobby the general public, political actors 
and the central bank itself directly, and these efforts may be successful considering the 
importance of economic well-being displayed by all three groups. Economic actors exercise 
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indirect influence using a wide array of tools, including influence on their employees. 
Employees of a company may align their own monetary policy preferences—and votes—with 
those of their employers, as what is good for the company might also be good for the 
employee. 
Economic actors can be divided into the real economy—that is, the tradable and non-tradable 
sector—the financial sector, and trade unions and trade associations. In support of their 
constituencies, trade unions almost always call for lower monetary policy because its positive 
effects on GDP growth and employment overcompensates trade unions for the lower 
purchasing power of a weak currency and the possible negative side effects on the prospects  
of the non-tradable sector. Trade associations usually mirror the preferences of their 
constituents’ sector (Maier et al. 2002). However, Maier et al. (2002) find no evidence that the 
pre-EMU Bundesbank responded to trade unions’ and associations’ demands. In contrast, 
Havrilesky (1995) finds that the Fed does respond to pressures from these interest groups in 
the US. 
The dividing line in terms of monetary policy preferences in the real economy runs along the 
division between the tradable and the non-tradable sector. The tradable sector usually calls for 
lower monetary policy than its non-tradable counterpart because of monetary policy’s effects 
on the exchange rate. The effect of exchange rates on income causes a strong currency to 
increase national purchasing power, thereby raising the relative prices of domestic products, 
while the substitution effect usually causes consumers to substitute foreign for  domestic 
goods if the currency is weak. Both effects make it harder for producers from countries with 
strong currencies to compete internationally because they create entry barriers that protect 
producers in their home markets. Companies’ preferences with regard to monetary policy are 
also influenced by the level of product standardization, their reliance on imported inputs, and 
the structure of their balance sheets (Frieden 2014; Maier et al. 2002; Steinberg/Walter 2013). 
The financial sector has significant interest in monetary policy, as higher inflation rates affect 
the credit market, with negative consequences for the financial markets’ performance and 
long-run prospects. Inflation drives down the real rate of return on assets and increases credit 
rationing. As a result, fewer loans are made, the allocation of resources becomes less efficient, 
and intermediary activity is reduced (Boyd et al. 2011). Boyd et al. show that low to moderate 
rates of inflation reduce lending to the private sector, banks’ balance sheets, liquidity, and 
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trading volume at the stock market, and these effects stabilizes price levels through a coalition 
of the financial sector and the central banks (Dreher et al. 2010). Even so, the financial sector 
welcomes loose monetary policy as long as it does not negatively affect price stability. In line 
with the pre-crisis consensus, the watershed should be just below 2 percent of inflation, an 
inflation goal that was generally accepted as “sensible” monetary policy. Support for the 
independent central bank as an institution is generally a given, as there is no clear substitute 
for price stability for the private sector (Posen 1995). 
The influence on monetary policy the financial sector wields is strong (Maier et al. 2002; 
Havrilesky 1995; Posen 1995). The financial sector uses a wide range of tools to exercise this 
influence on monetary policy, including public statements, personal interaction, the 
employment of former central bank officials, and regular consultations (Posen 1995; Maier et 
al. 2002). Posen (1995) shows that, in OECD and developing countries, the higher the 
opposition by the financial sector, the lower the inflation and the higher the central banks’ 
independence. According to Posen, the intensity of the financial sector’s opposition depends 
on three factors: a financial sector with universal banking, which are more opposed to 
inflation; a financial sector that is not regulated by the central bank; and a federal system with 
high party unity. Maier et al. (2002) argue that the influence of the financial sector, which 
influence they detect with regard to the Bundesbank, can be explained as a factor of 
commercial and central banks’ basing their decisions to a large degree on similar databases 
and central banks’ being maximizing agents that try to maximize their reputations vis-à-vis 
commercial bankers as an intellectually similarly wired and, therefore, a natural audience, 
which increases the central banks’ incentive to follow commercial banks’ preferences. A 
central bank that is shielded from political influence might even simplify the financial sector’s 
access because the financial sector would no longer need to lobby politicians but could 
approach the central bank directly. 
Other scholars confirm the influence of the financial sector. A large financial sector might 
affect the average level of aversion to inflation directly through people working in the sector 
and indirectly through the sector’s clout with the media (Scheve 2004; Dreher et al. 2010). In 
addition, because of similar academic qualifications, staff can easily flow between the 
financial sector and central banks (Dreher et al. 2010). However, not all scholars accept the 
explanatory power of the financial opposition argument, arguing that it does not explain much 




This section will outline the methodology used to assess the dissertation’s core hypothesis and 
outlines the choice of audience groups, variables, and data sources. 
Empirically identifying central banks’ policy-making autonomy and control by politicians is 
difficult because of the issue of observational equivalence—that is, principals may have an 
incentive to conceal whether agents follow their preferences, and agents may appear 
independent because no sanctions are observable. However, the lack of sanctions may only be 
the result of an agent’s rationally anticipating the principal’s preferences, making sanctions 
unnecessary (Thatcher 2005). The literature identifies a number of possible pressure groups or 
audience groups that might influence a central bank’s decision-making process, including the 
government, the financial sector, employers, trade unions, academia, and the general public 
(Gersl 2006; Sturm/De Haan 2001). Three of these broad core groups are the focus of this 
dissertation, as outlined in the previous chapter: the general public, political actors, and 
economic actors. 
The preferences of the three core groups are assessed using variables that are generally 
accepted in the literature as indicators of monetary policy preferences. The sources for 
economic data are the IMF World Economic Outlook Database of October 2014, the EU 
Commission’s Annual macro-economic database, and Eurostat. Only one data source is used 
for each variable across all countries to ensure comparability. For non-economic data, the 
dissertation uses a range of web-based resources, including Eurobarometer and governmental 
websites. The time period assessed covers, when possible, 2007 to 2014. The years 2000-2005 
is the time horizon for the unemployment and disposable national income variables to ensure 
that the data does not include signs of the beginning of the crisis or the climax of the pre-crisis 
boom. 
Several variables are used to identify the general public’s monetary policy preferences in each 
member state of the Eurozone: the unemployment rate, inflation, disposable income, culture, 
and ideology and elite communication. The country’s unemployment and inflation levels and 
the short- to medium-term outlook for both are used to assess the cost-benefit explanation, 
which assumes that the public’s preferences are shaped by personal and national economic 
well-being. In line with the relevant literature, the public will support loose monetary policy if 
unemployment rates are rising and/or are above their 2005 levels, while unemployment  levels 
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exactly at the 2005 levels or lower and falling will lead the public to demand no change to 
current policies, as current policies have steered the variable in an acceptable direction. With 
regard to inflation, the assumption is that the public will support loose monetary policy if 
inflation is below 2 percent and that it will support tight monetary policy if inflation is   above 
2 percent, while inflation of exactly 2 percent will cause the public to be indifferent. 
Politicians, central bankers, and academia have promoted the 2 percent mark as the  
watershed, and the media has reinforced its importance, so it seems likely that the general 
public would accept it as “correct” monetary politics. As for the variable of the gross national 
disposable income, the public will demand loose monetary policy if disposable income is 
lower than its 2005 level or if it has grown at only half or less than half the speed per year  
than the growth rate between 2000 and 2005. If disposable income is higher than its 2005 
levels or is rising at a speed faster than half its previous yearly growth rate, the public will 
support current policies. The country’s positioning along Hofstede’s Power Distance and 
Uncertainty Avoidance variables is used to assess the cultural explanation for the general 
public’s preferences in monetary policy. The cultural explanation posits that the economic 
culture based on history and experience shapes deep-seated preferences such that, the higher a 
country’s score on the Power Distance dimension, the more emphasis it puts on the  
supremacy of politics and a dependent central bank, and the higher its score on the 
Uncertainty Avoidance dimension, the stronger its preference for price stability and an 
independent central bank. Finally, Eurobarometer data for overall trust in the ECB and for 
opinion on the European economic and monetary union and the Euro in general are used to 
assess the explanation based on ideology and elite communication. The ideology and elite 
communication explanation assumes that preferences are shaped by how elites position 
themselves toward topics and organizations, as when they voice their positions, they influence 
the public’s preferences. Therefore, the dissertation assess to what extent the public trusts the 
ECB and supports the EMU and the Euro and to what extent trust and support levels have 
been affected by the crisis. 
The partisan preferences of each country’s government and its chambers of parliament are 
assessed using ideology, real GDP growth, and country’s overall debt level, its deficit 
spending and the share of welfare spending of total spending in order to identify the political 
actors’ monetary policy preferences. The ideology explanation assumes that political ideology 
dictates political actors’ preferences. In the case of monetary policy, the explanation   predicts 
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that right-leaning actors prioritize price stability, while left-leaning actors focus on 
employment and growth. If most political entities are right-leaning, the political establishment 
will support restrictive monetary policy, and if most are left-leaning, it will support loose 
monetary policy. The electoral motive explanation is assessed by looking at the core 
macroeconomic variable available, which is real GDP growth. According to the electoral 
motive explanation, politicians need to mirror or at least tacitly support their constituents’ 
preferences in order to remain in power. As the public emphasizes personal and national 
economic well-being, politicians should be especially concerned with growth. Therefore, if 
real GDP growth has been half or below half its 2000-2007 average yearly growth rate, 
political actors will support loose monetary policy in order to kick-start growth and enhance 
their election chances. However, if real GDP growth has been higher than half of its previous 
average yearly rate, political actors will demand no change in policies. Finally, the country’s 
overall debt level, its deficit spending and the share of welfare spending of total spending are 
used to evaluate the external constraint explanation, which posits that political actors’ 
preferences are shaped by the economic reality of state finances. If gross debt levels rise 
above 60 percent of GDP, political actors will demand loose monetary policy in order to 
reduce the ratio. To reflect the great importance of debt-to-GDP ratios, this variable’s weight 
is doubled if debt levels exceed 100 percent of GDP. While clearly an arbitrary decision, such 
high ratios are generally unsustainable in the long run, they greatly limit the room for political 
actors to maneuver, and they signal financial markets and the public that debt levels have 
gotten out of hand. Similarly, a net deficit spending of above 3 percent or welfare spending 
that surpasses 65 percent of total spending also leads to pressure for loose monetary policy. 
However, if most of these psychological and partially legally defined boundaries are not 
crossed, political actors will support monetary politics in line with their ideological beliefs. 
The national economy’s composition in terms of financial and non-financial sectors is 
evaluated to identify economic actors’ monetary preferences by assessing the share of both 
sectors’ total gross value added (GVA), as the financial sector’s stance on monetary policy 
depends on the current inflation rate. As explained above, financial actors rely on central 
banks to safeguard price stability, as inflation hurts their business prospects. Should inflation 
be above 2 percent, the financial sector should favor restrictive monetary policy, and should 
inflation be below 2 percent, it will support monetary loosening. The financial sector’s 
influence depends heavily on its size in terms of GVA and to what degree the tradable or non- 
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tradable sector dominates the non-financial sector. Total GDP of the non-financial sector is 
broken into GDP of the tradable and non-tradable subsectors, assuming in line with economic 
theory that the tradable subsector favors loose monetary policy because it is export-oriented, 
while the non-tradable subsector prefers restrictive policy because it focuses on the domestic 
market. 
To simplify the analysis and to make the indication of monetary policy applicable to the wide 
range of measures summarized under the term “unconventional monetary policy,” only three 
values for the variable “monetary policy preference” are used: loose, unchanged, and 
restrictive. Instead of attaching arbitrary weights to audience groups, the analysis assumes that 
every core groups carries the same weight in national monetary policy decision-making. The 
ECB’s monetary policy is assessed between 2007 and 2014 in order to determine whether the 
policy enacted has been loose or restrictive based on interest rate decisions. The optimal 
interest rates are calculated according to the Taylor rule, as a control variable in order to 
compare the average monetary policy preference in the Eurozone countries with the actual 
decisions made by the ECB, providing an indication of the extent to which the Political 
Audience Cost Theory might prove helpful in explaining the ECB’s decision-making. 
Calculating the control variable, the Taylor rule recommendation for the Eurozone, relies on a 
version of the rule put forward by Rudebusch (2010), where the central bank’s interest rate 
should respond to the inflation rate’s deviations from its target rate and to the unemployment 
rate’s deviations from its natural rate. The core inflation rate is used in line with the research 
conducted by scholars like Nechio (2011) and is defined as Eurostat’s HICP inflation rate, 
excluding energy and prices of unprocessed food. The unemployment gap is calculated as the 
difference between the real unemployment rate and the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU), as reported by the EU Commission. As NAIRU rates are available 
only on an annual basis, I assume that they remain stable across each year and calculate the 
gap on the basis of annual real unemployment rates. All countries’ Taylor rule 
recommendations are weighted according to the countries’ individual real GDP. The 
calculation formula used for the Taylor rule (Rudebusch 2010) is: 
Taylor rule = 1 + 1.5 * HICP inflation rate – 1 * Unemployment gap 
 
Finally, case studies—the suspension of the collateral requirements for Greece’s debt on May 
3, 2010 the purchase of private and public debt on May 10, 2010 the excessive use of ELA 
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credits during the heights of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in 2015, the launch of QE in 2015, 
and the Trichet/Draghi letter to Italy’s government in 2011—are used to identify the 
influences that led to some of the ECB’s most controversial decisions. Understanding the  
ECB decision-making process and the external pressures that may have influenced these 
particular decisions will shed light on the question concerning the extent to which non- 
economic variables played a role in these decisions. 
This approach has a number of disadvantages. Among the most important of these 
disadvantages is that, unlike other papers that follow a similar approach, this dissertation does 
not include academia and international organizations in its analysis. There are three primary 
reasons for this exclusion. First, while both groups are influential, their influence is less direct 
and less compelling compared to the three core groups. Both groups have only  limited 
sanction power and only limited direct influence on either the central bank or the opinions of 
the other three groups. Instead, their power rests primarily on intellectual closeness with 
central bankers and (perhaps) members of the administration. Second, their preferences are 
difficult to observe because of the sheer number of individuals, the high level of heterogeneity 
in the two groups’ preferences, and the lack of useful aggregation proxies. Third, these  
groups’ statements can only be correctly and wholly understood if analyzed in context, a deep 
analysis of sources that is beyond the scope of this dissertation and that would be more 
appropriate for single-country case studies. The second main disadvantage of my approach is 
that allowing only for the values of loose, unchanged, or restrictive monetary policy risks 
oversimplifying monetary policy preferences. However, a more differentiated picture of 
monetary policy preferences based on more detailed analyses of the audience groups’ 
preferences would not change the results’ implications. Without the ECB’s voting and 
discussion records, the core question will remain concerning the extent to which the ECB as a 
whole acts in line with the preferences of audience groups across the Eurozone. With a high 
level of this analysis in mind, it is more sensible to focus on the most basic analysis of 
monetary policy preferences—that is, the question of support for loose or restrictive monetary 
policy. The third disadvantage of this approach is the weighting of audience opinions and 
variables in national monetary policy decision-making. Clearly, not all audience groups and 
variables have the same influence on decisions, but the attachment of weights in any sensible 
manner would require a profound analysis of national cultures, political systems, and  
contexts. The assumption here, in line with the reviewed literature, is that the weight of any 
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audience group varies across time and countries. As the goal of this dissertation is not a 
detailed analysis of countries’ power structures but identifying whether Political Audience 
Cost Theory can help to explain the ECB’s policy-making, I leave a more in-depth analysis to 
future country-specific research. 
A core assumption in the analysis is that national central banks’ governors do not participate 
in the Governing Council ad personam but as representatives of their respective national 
central banks and countries. Therefore, the possibility that governors’ voting preferences 
depend on Europe-wide aggregates is not considered. I focus on the Governing Council and  
its rules before the rotating voting system came into effect, as most decisions regarding 
unconventional monetary policy were made under the old rules. 
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7. Testing the audience hypothesis: how strong is support for the ECB? 
 
This section tests the audience hypothesis to identify the extent to which the national audience 
groups defined in chapter 4 support loose, unchanged, or restrictive monetary policy. The 
section also assesses the extent to which institutional setups like central bank independence, 
and policy goals like price stability are part of national economic culture. 
 
7.1. The general public 
 
The preferences of the general public regarding monetary policy can be examined using three 
explanations: the cost-benefit explanation, the cultural explanation, and the ideology and elite 
communication explanation. 
7.1.1. Cost-benefit explanation 
The cost-benefit explanation is based on the assumption that the general public lends support 
to a central bank based on the economic costs and benefits of its policies. The variables 
unemployment, inflation, and available gross national disposable income are used to assess 
these costs and benefits. 
The public assesses monetary policy in light of its own economic well-being. The higher the 
unemployment level and the higher the short-term forecast for it, the stronger the public 
support for lax monetary policy. Unemployment increased in the Eurozone countries by an 
average of 10.4 percent per annum (p.a.) between 2007 and 2014 (Figure 1). It now stands   at 
11.3 percent across the Eurozone. However, rising unemployment has not been universal, as 
Germany and Malta reduced their unemployment levels by 5.1 percent p.a. and 1.2 percent 
p.a., respectively, between 2007 and 2014. All other member states face a strong increase in 
unemployment. Especially hard hit are the crisis countries: Cyprus with a 39.1 percent p.a. 
increase, Greece with a 26.9 percent p.a. increase, Spain with a 24.8 percent p.a. increase, and 
Ireland with a 17.6 percent p.a. increase. Among the non-crisis countries, Lithuania’s 
unemployment rate is also high, with an 18.6 percent p.a. increase. This development  
contrasts sharply with the pre-crisis years, during which most countries saw their 
unemployment levels decline. On average, unemployment in the Eurozone decreased by 1.2 
percent p.a. before the crisis. As for the near future, a moderate decline in unemployment of 
2.6 percent p.a. is forecasted through 2016. All member states except for Austria, Finland, and 
France  will  see  their  unemployment  rates  fall,  although  this  decrease  will  not  be strong 
enough to bring down today’s high unemployment numbers meaningfully. Therefore, for   the 
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foreseeable future, the general public in most member states should be firmly in favor of very 
lax monetary policy, hoping to revive job growth. 
Figure 1 – Unemployment in the Eurozone (% of total labor force) 
 
 Unemployment  
Historic   Actual Growth rate p.a.   





















Source: European Commission annual macro-economic database; own calculations 
 
As for inflation, if inflation is low and no substantial increase is on the horizon, the general 
public will generally favor loose monetary policy (Figure 2). Since the outbreak of the crisis, 
inflation has decreased strongly—by almost 9 percent p.a. in the Eurozone—and it stands now 
at 0.5 percent, far from the ECB’s postulated 2 percent goal. The possibility of deflation was 
even discussed during summer 2014. While the decrease in inflation has been almost  
universal in the Eurozone, it has been especially strong in the crisis countries, which are 
historically the countries with higher inflation rates. The lowest inflation rates were recorded 
in Greece, where the inflation rate now stands at -0.8 percent, followed by Spain and Portugal, 
where the inflation rate stands at 0. In the Eurozone only Austria, with an inflation rate of 1.7 
percent, has a rate that comes close to the ECB’s goal. However, the forecast for the 
immediate future shows the potential for a strong increase. By 2016, inflation rates should 
average 1.5 percent in the Eurozone. While such a strong increase should shift public opinion 
toward tightening monetary policy, it is unclear whether—and when—the forecast will affect 
public opinion. The forecast is that inflation will still remain below the 2 percent goal, with 
Austria 4,9% 5,6% 3,2% 1,8% 3,0% 
Belgium 7,5% 8,5% 1,1% 1,7% -0,4% 
Cyprus 3,9% 16,1% -2,3% 39,1% -3,1% 
Estonia 4,6% 7,4% -8,6% 7,6% -4,1% 
Finland 6,9% 8,7% -3,7% 3,3% 3,1% 
France 8,0% 10,3% -0,9% 3,6% 0,3% 
Germany 8,5% 5,0% 0,9% -5,1% -0,7% 
Greece 8,4% 26,5% -3,1% 26,9% -0,9% 
Ireland 4,7% 11,3% 1,2% 17,6% -7,7% 
Italy 6,1% 12,7% -4,9% 13,5% -2,4% 
Latvia 6,1% 10,8% -7,2% 9,6% -4,0% 
Lithuania 4,3% 10,7% -9,2% 18,6% -6,5% 
Luxembourg 4,2% 6,0% 11,4% 5,4% -1,1% 
Malta 6,5% 5,9% -0,4% -1,2% -1,1% 
Netherlands 4,2% 7,4% 1,7% 9,5% -3,6% 
Portugal 9,1% 14% 9,8% 6,9% -5,7% 
Slovak Republic 11,2% 13,2% -5,1% 2,2% -6,8% 
Slovenia 4,9% 9,7% -3,4% 12,2% -1,7% 
Spain 8,2% 24,5% -3,9% 24,8% -5,4% 
Average 6,4% 11,3% -1,2% 10,4% -2,6% 
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the exception of Lithuania and Estonia, where inflation will increase to 2 percent and 2.1 
percent, respectively. Inflation rates have in the recent past regularly surprised forecasters by 
being lower than expected, driven mostly by a decline in energy prices.  Therefore,  
preferences regarding monetary policy are not likely to change until the public actually sees 
higher inflation rates. 
Figure 2 – Inflation in the Eurozone (% change in average consumer prices) 
 
 Inflation  
Actual Forecast Growth rate p.a.  
 2014 2016  2007-2014 2014-2016 
Austria 1,7%  1,7% -2,6% -0,8% 
Belgium 0,7%  1,3% -7,4% 24,1% 
Cyprus 0,0%  1,3% -12,5% 42,9% 
Estonia 0,8%  2,1% -11,0% 52,1% 
Finland 1,2%  1,7% -2,8% 12,8% 
France 0,7%  1,0% -7,1% 14,3% 
Germany 0,9%  1,5% -7,6% 22,5% 
Greece -0,8%  1,1% -16,0% 77,3% 
Ireland 0,6%  1,2% -10,0% 36,8% 
Italy 0,1%  1,1% -11,9% 352,6% 
Latvia 0,7%  1,9% -11,6% 51,6% 
Lithuania 0,3%  2,0% -11,9% 217,6% 
Luxembourg 1,1%  1,8% -7,4% 23,6% 
Malta 1,0%  1,4% 5,9% 11,2% 
Netherlands 0,5%  1,0% -8,4% 32,9% 
Portugal 0,0%  1,5% -12,3% 1360,0% 
Slovak Republic 0,1%  1,5% -11,8% 414,2% 
Slovenia 0,5%  1,7% -10,7% 77,6% 
Spain 0,0%  0,9% -12,6% 24,3% 
Average 0,5%  1,5% -8,9% 149,9% 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2014; own calculations 
 
As for the final variable, disposable income grew moderately between 2007 and 2014, by 1.1 
percent p.a., driven largely by increases in the eastern European member states that still have  
a large economic catch-up potential (Figure 3). It decreased slightly—by 0.4–2.5 percent 
p.a.—in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Between 2000 and 2007, disposable  
income grew an average of 7.6 percent p.a., with no member country growing more slowly 
than 3.1 percent p.a.. The near future offers little comfort, as disposable income is predicted to 
increase to only 2.2 percent p.a. until 2016, indicating only a slight pick-up in growth rate. In 
2014, only Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal saw income growth that  
was comparable to their growth rates before the crisis, so the general public should place less 
emphasis on income growth fuelled by cheap money. Overall, the general public in all but 
67  
five member states should favor loose monetary policy in order to revive the growth of 
disposable income. 
Figure 3 – Gross national disposable income per head of population in the Eurozone (in thousand EUR) 
 
 Gross national disposable income per head of population  
Historic   Actual Growth rate p.a.   























Source: European Commission annual macro-economic database; own calculations 
 
To sum up, based on the cost-benefit explanation, the general public should favor lax 
monetary policy (Figure 4). All of the three variables—unemployment, inflation and 
disposable income—currently point to a preference for loose monetary policy, as in  no 
country in the Eurozone should the general public currently favor an unchanged or an even 
more restrictive monetary policy. In a number of countries, including Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal, a minimum of one of the variables would warrant an 
unchanged policy; only in Germany and Malta would two variables, unemployment and 
disposable income, suggest an unchanged monetary policy. However, it is clear that a 
tightening of monetary policy is currently not in the interests of most of the Eurozone member 
countries’ general publics. Across the Eurozone, unemployment is high, inflation is low, and 
disposable income is growing at a disappointing speed. While the forecasts for unemployment 
and disposable income indicate little likelihood of a reversal in these preferences, inflation 
might change the publics’ preferences in the medium term because the predicted average  150 
Austria 33,7 38,2 3,7% 1,6% 1,9% 
Belgium 32,5 35,3 3,5% 1,1% 0,8% 
Cyprus 21,3 19,3 6,0% -1,2% 0,9% 
Estonia 11,3 14,2 20,2% 3,3% 3,8% 
Finland 35,0 36,8 4,4% 0,6% 1,3% 
France 30,5 32,1 3,1% 0,6% 1,1% 
Germany 30,6 35,5 2,7% 2,0% 2,1% 
Greece 20,2 16,2 6,4% -2,5% 2,4% 
Ireland 38,0 33,0 6,9% -1,7% 2,7% 
Italy 27,1 26,1 3,2% -0,5% 1,0% 
Latvia 10,1 12,2 21,6% 2,7% 4,3% 
Lithuania 8,8 12,5 18,5% 5,1% 3,7% 
Luxembourg 58,4 59,0 3,6% 0,1% 2,3% 
Malta 13,5 17,9 3,3% 4,1% 2,7% 
Netherlands 36,7 37,9 3,8% 0,4% 1,7% 
Portugal 16,2 16,6 3,8% 0,3% 2,4% 
Slovak Republic 9,9 13,5 17,5% 4,4% 2,3% 
Slovenia 16,9 17,7 6,8% 0,6% 1,5% 
Spain 23,2 22,5 5,8% -0,4% 2,4% 
Average 25,0 26,1 7,6% 1,1% 2,2% 
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percent p.a. increase in inflation is strong and because a large part of the current decrease in 
inflation can be attributed to low energy prices. While a reversal is always possible and is, in 
fact, likely as a result, until an actual increase in inflation rates is recorded, the forecast is not 
likely to have a significant impact on public opinion or to force a more restrictive monetary 
policy in the near future. 
Figure 4 – Overview of cost-benefit explanation 
 
























Unemployment  Inflation Gross national disposable income per head of population Overall 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
7.1.2. Cultural explanation 
The second possible explanation for public monetary preferences is the cultural explanation, 
which suggests that different economic cultures have developed in different countries, so 
monetary policy preferences depend not only on today’s economic cost-benefit calculations 
but also on deep-seated cultural preferences. In line with the majority of the literature, I use 
Hofstede’s Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance variables to identify these preferences. 
According to Hofstede, a high score on Power Distance indicates a preference for supremacy 
of politics and, therefore, a dependent central bank. In a country with a high Power Distance 
score, political actors are not expected to respect the de-jure independence of a central bank 
but, according to theory, to define policies in all possible policy fields and to have institutions 
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like the central bank execute these policies. A high score on Uncertainty Avoidance indicates 
a preference for price stability and central bank independence. Because Cyprus has not yet 
been classified along Hofstede’s dimensions, I assume a neutral position for Cyprus with 
regard to both variables to simplify the analysis. The rest of the Eurozone is deeply divided in 
terms of Power Distance (Figure 5), with half of the member states favoring a dependent 
central bank under politicians’ control, and the other half favoring an independent central 
bank. Nevertheless, while countries are split almost evenly almost half of the member states 
have Power Distance scores close to 50 (out of 100), indicating that Power Distance is not 
strongly pronounced in either direction. Outliers are only Austria, with a score of 11 and 
Slovakia with a score of 100. In line with expectations, all southern European states score 
above 50 on the Power Distance dimension, indicating their preference for a strong role for  
the state, but there is rift among the eastern European member states: While the Baltic states 
have lower scores on Power Distance, the new member states, Slovakia and Slovenia, score 
high, with 100 and 71, respectively. The picture with regard to price stability is a lot clearer,  
as most of the countries in the Eurozone score high on Uncertainty Avoidance, indicating a 
strong preference for price stability. The only country that is not in line with this preference is 
Ireland. This result shows that a number of countries neither resemble the textbook Anglo- 
Saxon tradition, which has a low Power Distance score and a high Uncertainty Avoidance 
score, nor the textbook southern European tradition, which has a high Power Distance score 
and low Uncertainty Avoidance score. Instead, some EMU countries, such as Slovenia, score 
high across both dimensions. One possible explanation for this unexpected result is that high 
scores on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension indicate a preference for price stability rather 
than a true declaration of belief in central bank independence. The fact that a number of 
countries with historically high inflation rates have high scores on both dimensions supports 
this explanation. Overall, it can be concluded that, while the primary goal of price stability 
rests well within the member states’ economic cultures, the idea that the central bank should 
be independent, rather than directed by politicians, has no cultural root in more than half of all 
member states. This result is important for two reasons: First, it suggests that the inflation 
culture of the southern member states has changed, and today price stability is the accepted 
goal. This change can be at least partly attributed to the common experience in the EMU. The 
acceptance of price stability as a goal shows that inflation remains a closely watched and 
important variable with regard to the cost-benefit calculation. At the same time, the ECB can 
likely  derive  legitimacy  from  successfully  guaranteeing  price  stability  in  the   Eurozone. 
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Second, despite fifteen years of common experience with price stability and central bank 
independence, beliefs regarding central banks’ organizational status have changed less than 
those about inflation. In a large number of founding member states, beliefs that favor a 
dependent central bank and the supremacy of politics have persisted, despite living with an 
independent central bank, the idea has not been incorporated into their economic culture. 
From a practical point of view, then, whatever the de-jure position of the central bank, 
politicians are unlikely to respect the institution’s independence fully. 
Figure 5 – EMU member countries’ economic cultures (scale: 0-100) 
 
  Hofstede Power Distance   Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance    Independent central bank   Price stability 
Austria 11 70 
Belgium 65 94 
Cyprus - - 
Estonia 40 60 
Finland 33 59 
France 68 86 
Germany 35 65 
Greece 60 100 
Ireland 28 35 
Italy 50 75 
Latvia 44 63 
Lithuania 42 65 
Luxembourg 40 70 
Malta 56 96 
Netherlands 38 53 
Portugal 63 99 
Slovakia 100 51 
Slovenia 71 88 
Spain 57 86 
Average 50 73 
 
Source: Hofstede, own calculations 
 
7.1.3. Ideology and elite communication explanation 
The final explanation for the public’s monetary policy preferences is ideology and elite 
communication. Institutions need popular support to survive and guard their independence, so 
they depend on widespread consensus regarding their success and merits—or at least the 
perception of their success and merits. A breakdown in the interpretation of and conflict about 
the “right” monetary policy may seriously damage the public’s trust and support for an 
institution like the ECB. 
The two variables examined for the ideology and elite communication explanation are the 
degree of trust in the ECB and the degree of approval of the EMU and the Euro. Trust in the 
ECB fell sharply during the crisis (Figure 6) and decreased in all member states except 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Malta. Trust, which fell by an average of 3 percent p.a. across the 
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whole Eurozone, now stands at 39 percent. At the same time, distrust in the ECB has grown 
by 2 percent p.a. to 23 percent. Almost 40 percent of all participants in the Eurobarometer poll 
did not know whether to trust the ECB or not. While trust has fallen to a similar degree across 
most member states, the increase in distrust has differed: while distrust has decreased in some 
countries, including such unlikely candidates as Spain, it has skyrocketed in Belgium, Cyprus, 
and Greece by 11–44 percent p.a. Although the expectation may have been that all crisis 
countries would have a strong increase in distrust, countries like Spain (-9% p.a.) and Portugal 
(-8% p.a.) have had the greatest yearly decrease in distrust in the Eurozone. One possible 
explanation is that, despite some political voices especially on the left of the political 
spectrum, many citizens in both countries have realized that the ECB did what it could to ease 
their economic pain—or at least did nothing to increase it. 
Figure 6 – Trust in the ECB (% of respondents in 2014, % growth rate p.a. 2007- 2014) 
 
 
 Actual  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus       Estonia      Finland     France       Germany  Greece     Ireland     Italy Latvia         Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta         Netherlands  Portugal    Slovak Republic  Slovenia   Spain         Average  
Trust in ECB Tend to trust; % 46% 44% 24% 47% 61% 29% 37% 20% 31% 25% 40% 52% 47% 53% 56% 33% 45% 32% 17% 39% 
Tend not to trust; % 44% 43% 65% 32% 13% 23% 13% 5% 17% 24% 26% 25% 20% 31% 15% 11% 13% 12% 11% 23% 
 Growth rate p.a.  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus       Estonia      Finland     France       Germany  Greece     Ireland     Italy Latvia         Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta         Netherlands  Portugal    Slovak Republic  Slovenia   Spain         Average  
Trust in ECB Tend to trust; % -2% -4% -7% -1% -1% -4% -5% -8% -5% -5% 1% 1% -3% 0% -3% -4% -2% -6% -7% -3% 
 
Source: European Commission Eurobarometer; own calculations 
 
As for the second variable, it is clear that the EMU and the Euro are still enjoying strong 
approval rates among the European public and that the crisis has done little to change that 
(Figure 7). An average or 70 percent of the European public are in favor of the EMU and the 
Euro, and only 25 percent are against them. Between 2007 and 2014, support grew by 1 
percent p.a., and disapproval fell by the same amount. Only in Cyprus are approval rates 
comparatively low (52%) and disapproval rates comparatively high (44%). Analysis of the 
annual change in sentiment in the member states makes clear that it is driven mainly by 
Estonia and Latvia, where disapproval rates have decreased by up to 7 percent p.a. and 
approval rates have increased by up to 6 percent p.a. 
Figure 7 – Support for the EMU and the Euro (% of respondents in 2014, % growth rate p.a. 2011- 2014) 
 
 
 Actual  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus       Estonia      Finland    France       Germany   Greece      Ireland      Italy           Latvia        Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta         Netherlands  Portugal    Slovak Republic  Slovenia   Spain         Average  
A European economic and monetary union Against; % 27% 21% 44% 12% 20% 27% 22% 32% 17% 31% 22% 36% 17% 20% 21% 35% 19% 18% 31% 25% 
 
 
 Growth rate p.a.  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus       Estonia      Finland    France       Germany   Greece      Ireland      Italy           Latvia        Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta         Netherlands  Portugal    Slovak Republic  Slovenia   Spain         Average  
A European economic and monetary union Against; % -3% 1% 1% -7% -2% -1% -3% 2% 3% 1% -6% -2% 0% -3% -2% 0% 1% 0% 1% -1% 
 
Source: European Commission Eurobarometer; own calculations 
       Tend not to trust; % 6% 11% 26% -2% 1% -1% -4% 44% -6% -4% -6% -5% -2% -1% 0% -8% -5% -3% -9% 2% 
 
     with one single currency, the euro For; % 68% 77% 52% 82% 76% 68% 75% 66% 75% 54% 71% 57% 79% 75% 76% 59% 77% 77% 63% 70% 
 
     with one single currency, the euro For; % 2% -1% -1% 3% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% -2% 6% 3% 0% 2% 1% 2% -1% -1% 0% 1% 
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To sum up, the ideology and elite communication explanation makes clear that, while the 
popularity of the EMU and the Euro increased during the crisis, the opposite holds true for the 
ECB as an institution. While the EMU and the Euro enjoy strong support ratings that average 
70 percent across the Eurozone, only 39 percent of the European public say they trust the 
ECB. In Cyprus more people distrust than trust the ECB, but this is not only a crisis-country 
phenomenon, as the ECB is losing trust across the whole of Europe. More than 60 percent of 
all participants in the European Commission Eurobarometer poll either distrust the ECB or do 
not know whether they trust it or not. For an institution whose authority and independence 
rests to a considerable degree on trust, these results are daunting. 
7.1.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, the general public as an audience group shows a clear preference for prolonged 
lax monetary policy across all countries. While the general public in all member states might 
prefer tighter monetary policy in the medium term, inflation, high unemployment rates, and 
low disposable income growth demand continued monetary stimulus. Most countries’ public 
opinion indicates favoring the EMU and the Euro in general but distrusting or at least not 
trusting the ECB as an institution. This observation holds true across the whole Eurozone, 
irrespective of economic culture and current economic distress. This general mistrust is even 
more worrisome considering that more than half of the member countries’ publics favor 
political supremacy over a de-facto independent central bank. While it is difficult to pinpoint 
the reason for this mistrust, as the question in the European Commission Eurobarometer poll 
is not very specific, not only has distrust risen and trust fallen but the number of people who 
had no opinion has risen. One possible explanation for this development is the very strong 
dissent among academics, central bankers, and politicians concerning how to respond to the 
crisis. Therefore, along with the breakdown of the traditional laws and rights and wrongs of 
monetary policy-making, it has become increasingly difficult for the general public to judge 
monetary policy. 
 
7.2. Political actors 
 
Any or all of three explanations may explain the monetary policy stance of political audience 
groups: ideology, electoral motives, and external constraints. 
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7.2.1. Ideology 
As detailed in chapter 4 and in line with the literature, left-leaning governments put a much 
greater emphasis on employment and growth than on price stability. Governments on the right 
focus more on price stability. The ideological positioning of each member state’s parliament 
and its government can help to identify the positioning of each member state’s political actors. 
Most of the governments in the Eurozone are today either grand coalitions or left-leaning 
governments (Figure 8), but right-leaning parties dominate the chambers of parliament. 
Overall, the political establishment in most of the Eurozone countries in 2014 leaned right. 
Therefore, according to the literature, the political establishment in most of these countries 
should favor tighter monetary policy, especially considering the predicted 150 percent p.a. 
increase in inflation until 2016. In addition, with the exception of Italy, all other crisis states—
that is, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece—are currently governed by conservative 
governments. In most of these countries conservative governments took over from left- 
leaning ones only after the crisis erupted. These changes of governments emphasize that right- 
leaning governments are more trusted to be able to overcome economic turmoil, trimming 
state finances, and safeguarding price stability and that the electorate cares a great deal about 
economic well-being. A party that presides over a downturn will be voted out of office. 
Figure 8 – Partisanship of Government and Parliament 
 
(Preferences: 0 = grand coalition, 1 = right-leaning, 2 = left-leaning) 
 
 Actual  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus      Estonia     Finland     France       Germany  Greece     Ireland     Italy Latvia        Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta        Netherlands    Portugal    Slovak Republic   Slovenia   Spain       Average  
Partisanship         Government 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 0/2 
 
 
Definition: 1 = Right, 2 = Left, 0  = Grand Coalition 
 
Source: Nordsieck; Norwegian Social Science Data Services; own calculations 
 
In addition, acroos the whole Euroarea the political establishment has been leaning toward the 
right for the 62 percent of the years since 2007 and toward the left for only approximately two 
years since 2007 (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 – Partisanship of Government and Parliament between 2007 and 2014 
 
 
 Historical (2007-2014)  
  Austria      Belgium    Cyprus      Estonia     Finland     France       Germany  Greece     Ireland     Italy Latvia        Lithuania  Luxembourg  Malta        Netherlands    Portugal    Slovak Republic   Slovenia   Spain       Average  
Partisanship         Right; % 60%          100% 0% 50% 50% 63% 38% 63%          100% 63%          100% 50% 88% 75% 100% 50% 63% 38% 38% 62% 
Left; % 0% 0% 75% 0% 50% 37% 25% 38% 0% 38% 0% 50% 0% 25% 0% 50% 38% 38% 63% 28% 
Anomalies  caused by rounding up/down,  remaining percentage  grand   coalition 
 
Source: own calculations 
                     Parliament (1. Chamber) 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Parliament (2. Chamber) 1 1 - - - 2 2 - 1 2 - - - - 1 - - - 1 1 
Overall 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 
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Therefore, from an ideological point of view, the political actors in most countries should 
favor a strong focus on price stability right now and for most of the past eight years. While 
price stability concerns are currently limited, inflation forecasts should have actors in most 
countries favoring gradual monetary tightening. 
7.2.2. Electoral motives 
The second possible explanation for political actors’ monetary policy preferences refers to 
electoral motives, that is, that politicians are forced to take their voters preferences into 
account in order to stay in power. According to the cost-benefit explanation, voters care about 
personal and national economic well-being; however, they rarely have the expert knowledge 
to understand the state of an economy. Therefore, the most basic but meaningful variable for 
electoral motives is real GDP growth per capita (in current USD). 
The results of the GDP growth per capita analysis are clear (Figure 10). Average GDP per 
capita grew by only 1 percent p.a. between 2007 and 2014 across the Eurozone. While growth 
was stronger in some countries, most of the growth stemmed from the eastern European 
member states. In the eastern European member states, strong growth rates are not surprising 
since their economies are less developed than those of other countries. Among the older 
member states, only Germany, Austria, and Malta had growth rates above 1.5 percent p.a. In 
the crisis countries of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Italy, GDP per capita declined between 
2007 and 2014. The pre-crisis growth rates underscore the politicians’ problem. Before the 
crisis, between 2000 and 2007, GDP per capita grew by an average of 6.5 percent p.a. across 
the Eurozone, with the eastern European member states reaching growth rates above 10 
percent p.a. Keeping in mind the electoral motive explanation, politicians in most Eurozone 
countries should favor loose monetary policy in order to kick-start growth again and increase 
their electoral appeal to voters. The fate of left-leaning governments in crisis countries makes 
clear the need to shore up the economy to protect re-election chances. Only in Germany, 
Malta, Portugal, and Spain were GDP growth rates in 2014 comparable to those before the 
crisis. 
75  
Figure 10 – Real GDP per capita (PPP, in current USD) 
 
 Real GDP per capita (PPP)  
Actual Growth rate p.a.  
  2014 2000-2007  2007-2014 
Austria 45411,3 4,3% 1,7% 
Belgium 41740,7 3,9% 1,1% 
Cyprus 27985,7 4,6% -1,3% 
Estonia 26555,5 13,6% 1,0% 
Finland 40455,2 5,6% 0,3% 
France 40445,4 3,6% 1,3% 
Germany 44741,0 3,9% 2,5% 
Greece 25752,5 6,9% -1,7% 
Ireland 46769,5 5,6% -0,2% 
Italy 34455,3 3,4% -0,1% 
Latvia 23903,9 16,5% 1,7% 
Lithuania 26700,1 15,2% 3,3% 
Luxembourg 92506,6 5,5% 0,1% 
Malta 31716,9 3,3% 2,7% 
Netherlands 47365,3 4,1% 1,0% 
Portugal 26306,5 3,0% 0,8% 
Slovak Republik 27664,6 10,0% 3,3% 
Slovenia 29358,6 7,3% 0,4% 
Spain 32975,4 4,2% 0,4% 
Average 37516,3 6,5% 1,0% 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2014; own calculations 
 
7.2.3. External constraints 
The final explanation for politicians’ monetary preferences is external constraints. The 
explanation argues that constraints like the need for state financing bind the hands of political 
actors and push them toward a preference for high rates of growth. The indicators used here 
for external constraints are overall debt levels, deficit spending, and share of welfare spending 
in overall spending. 
Debt levels in the Eurozone have increased significantly since 2007 (Figure 11), standing 
today at 82 percent, which is considerably higher than the 60 percent defined in the  
Maastricht Treaty. In fact, only six member states currently satisfy the Maastricht criteria, and 
six have debt levels that exceed 100 percent of GDP. While it is no surprise that all of the 
crisis countries are among these last six, with the exception of Luxembourg, all founding 
member states have debt levels that do not satisfy the Maastricht criteria. Even countries that 
fared  comparatively  well  during  the  crisis  have  debt  levels  that  are  slowly  approaching 
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unsustainable levels, in part because of the problem of budget balancing that is common 
among many countries. While the worsening debt ratios can largely be attributed to the crisis, 
especially the need to bail out the financial sector while shoring up aggregate demand,  the 
base from which most Eurozone member states started was already high. Average gross debt 
across the Eurozone stood at 47 percent in 2007 and grew by an average of 15.6 percent p.a. 
between 2007 and 2014, with Ireland in the lead with an increase of 46.1 percent p.a. The  
high growth rates in the Baltic states and Luxembourg, countries that are among the last 
countries that still satisfy the Maastricht criteria, indicate that they will soon have debt 
problems similar to those of the other member states. While the increase in debt has slowed 
since 2012, at 2.9 percent p.a., it remains high. Since 2012, only three member states have 
reduced their gross debt levels, and only Germany has managed a yearly debt-reduction rate 
above 2 percent. 
Considering the high growth rates, the large majority of Eurozone countries should favor 
loose monetary policy to increase GDP and reduce debt ratios, as a slowing GDP could 
quickly bring a number of member states into a position where further debt will be difficult to 
obtain and only at an interest rate premium. 
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Figure 11 – Gross debt (% of GDP) 
 
 Gross debt (% of GDP)  
Actual Growth rate p.a.   



























Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2014; own calculations 
 
The picture of the Eurozone countries’ governments’ primary deficit or surplus is similar to 
that of overall debt (Figure 12). Since 2007, these governments’ primary net deficit has 
averaged 1.8 percent of GDP. Only the governments of Belgium, Germany, Italy, and 
Luxembourg achieved an average primary net surplus between 2007 and 2014. Since 2012, 
primary net deficits have fallen to an average of 1.1 percent of GDP, and today’sprimary net 
deficits stand at 0.5 percent. At least in part because of harsh austerity measures, countries  
like Greece and Portugal now have a primary net surplus, but other countries have seen their 
surpluses shrink or deficits grow over the past two years. In fact, ten of nineteen countries are 
still running a deficit, with Spain, France, and Finland running deficits of up to 2.7 percent of 
GDP. The risk of political pressure in favor of loose monetary policy will quickly resurface 
should GDP growth rates dip again, but as long as the deficits stay well below the 3 percent 
mark, the pressure for increasingly loose monetary policy is likely to be subdued. Only  when 
deficits are above 3 percent of GDP is public pressure on politicians likely to increase and 
Austria 80% 4,1% 2,5% 
Belgium 102% 2,7% 0,3% 
Cyprus 117% 12,5% 11,8% 
Estonia 10% 22,4% 1,6% 
Finland 58% 8,9% 3,9% 
France 95% 6,3% 2,4% 
Germany 76% 2,0% -2,3% 
Greece 174% 7,8% 3,6% 
Ireland 112% 46,1% 0,3% 
Italy 137% 4,0% 2,6% 
Latvia 36% 45,2% -0,4% 
Lithuania 40% 17,2% -0,8% 
Luxembourg 24% 32,8% 3,8% 
Malta 72% 2,3% 0,7% 
Netherlands 69% 7,9% 1,5% 
Portugal 131% 11,5% 1,9% 
Slovak Republic 56% 11,2% 1,9% 
Slovenia 77% 30,1% 15,0% 
Spain 99% 21,5% 4,9% 
Average 82% 15,6% 2,9% 
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motivate them to look to monetary policy as the least painful way to get the deficit back into 
an acceptable range. 
Figure 12 – General government primary net lending/borrowing (% of GDP) 
 
 General government primary net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)  
Actual Average Deficit/Surplus 



























Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2014; own calculations 
 
Finally, the welfare spending indicator shows that all member states spend a high share of  
total government expenditures on public welfare as defined by the European Commission 
(Figure 13), ranging from 54.5 percent in Latvia to 69 percent in the Netherlands and 
averaging 64.5 percent. The share increased by 0.3 percent p.a. between 2007 and 2014, 
despite—or, more accurately, because of—the global economic crisis. Growth in welfare 
spending as a share of total spending was especially strong in two of the countries hardest hit 
by the crisis: average welfare spending increased by 1.8 percent p.a. in Cyprus and 1.2 percent 
p.a. in Greece. While such increases can be viewed as the system’s natural response to a  
larger number of people needing to rely on support during an economic crisis, it increases the 
burden on already strained budgets. Since 2012, the average welfare spending has stopped 
Austria -0,9% -0,4% -0,2% 
Belgium 0,3% 0,3% -0,1% 
Cyprus -1,0% -1,1% -2,1% 
Estonia -0,3% -0,4% -0,3% 
Finland -2,5% -0,8% -2,4% 
France -2,3% -2,4% -2,3% 
Germany 1,5% 1,1% 1,7% 
Greece 1,5% -3,0% 0,3% 
Ireland -0,3% -7,8% -2,6% 
Italy 1,9% 1,4% 2,1% 
Latvia -0,8% -3,4% -0,6% 
Lithuania -0,3% -2,9% -0,7% 
Luxembourg 0,2% 0,3% 0,0% 
Malta 0,4% -0,1% 0,1% 
Netherlands -1,4% -1,4% -1,8% 
Portugal 0,3% -2,5% -1,0% 
Slovak Republic -1,2% -3,0% -1,7% 
Slovenia -1,6% -3,2% -4,9% 
Spain -2,7% -5,1% -5,0% 
Average -0,5% -1,8% -1,1% 
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increasing because of welfare cuts in eight member states. The high share of welfare spending 
and the fact that its share of total spending continued to increase between 2007 and 2012 
suggest that politicians’ hands are tied to the extent that more than half of their general 
expenditures are difficult to reduce. As its recipients feel cuts in welfare spending directly, 
and welfare spending is generally seen as a “civilizational” achievement in many European 
states, political resistance is usually high. While this observation holds true across the political 
spectrum, left-leaning parties and their working class constituencies in particular struggle with 
this issue. As a result, political actors in member states with welfare spending above the 
average should favor loose monetary policy in order to support growth and shift adjustment 
costs to the future without spending political capital. 
Figure 13 – Welfare spending (% of total government expenditure) 
 
 Welfare spending (% of total government expenditure)  
Actual Growth rate p.a.   



























Source: European Commission Annual macro-economic database; own calculations 
 
To sum up, following the external constraint explanation, political actors in almost half of the 
member states should favor loose monetary policy (Figure 14). In most countries, political 
Austria 67,2% 0,4% 0,3% 
Belgium 65,4% 0,4% 0,7% 
Cyprus 58,6% 1,8% 1,7% 
Estonia 64,4% -0,8% -0,3% 
Finland 67,3% 0,3% 0,4% 
France 67,7% 0,1% 0,0% 
Germany 68,2% 0,0% 0,3% 
Greece 65,1% 1,2% 0,5% 
Ireland 67,1% -0,1% 0,0% 
Italy 66,9% 0,3% 0,7% 
Latvia 54,5% 0,7% -0,7% 
Lithuania 67,1% 0,3% -0,5% 
Luxembourg 68,7% -0,1% 0,1% 
Malta 58,9% 0,8% -0,7% 
Netherlands 69,0% 0,9% 0,6% 
Portugal 60,6% -0,2% -0,2% 
Slovak Republic 60,3% 0,0% -0,9% 
Slovenia 63,2% -0,5% -1,6% 
Spain 65,7% 0,1% -0,5% 
Average 64,5% 0,3% 0,0% 
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actors face high and still rising debt levels coupled with a primary net deficit. While this 
combination has reduced the political actors’ room to maneuver by increasing the cost of 
funding and risking access to funding altogether, the high level of welfare spending and the 
apparent difficulty in reducing it push an increasing number of political actors toward a 
preference for loose monetary policy. Politicians can simply no longer risk further 
deterioration of growth by tightening monetary policy. 
Figure 14 – Overview of external constraints explanation 
 
Gross debt General government primary net lending/borrowing Welfare spending Overall 
 
      
 
Source: own calculations 
 
7.2.4. Conclusion 
Political actors in most Eurozone member countries should support the ECB’s current loose 
monetary policy. While most of the political establishment is right-leaning and should, 
therefore, support restrictive monetary policy in light of predicted increases in inflation, 
electoral motives and external constraints should override ideological preferences. Politicians 
across the Eurozone are struggling with low per capita GDP growth’s undermining their 
chances of electoral success, and they are facing high gross debt levels, small primary net 
deficits, and welfare states, all of which resist change. Their room to maneuver is increasingly 
restricted as financing becomes more difficult and expensive. Under these conditions, it is 
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growth by returning to orthodox monetary policy-making. Instead, politicians will try to shift 
the costs of adjustment into the future and rely on cheap central bank money to guarantee  
state financing. This approach seems even more likely considering the fate of Greece’s two 
traditional political parties; after seven years of austerity and internal adjustments, both 
parties—the conservatives and the social democrats—are shadows of their former selves. In 
addition to the argument for choosing the politically less painful way, from an economic point 
of view, low GDP growth and high debt and deficit levels also speak for continued loose 
monetary policy. A switch of a majority of member states to austerity in a bid to balance 
budgets and reduce debt would be likely to reduce growth significantly, as private actors 
would not be able to replace state-generated demand quickly, and governments would be 
forced to initiate even more ambitious austerity programs. 
 
7.3. Economic actors 
 
Economic actors’ preferences for monetary policy are divided into those of the financial and 
the non-financial sectors and, within the non-financial sector, those of the tradable and the 
non-tradable sectors. It is likely that members of both the financial and the tradable sector will 
generally favor loose monetary policy. Since the financial sector values price stability, as 
rising inflation damages its business model, it will support monetary policy that leads to an 
inflation rate of about 2 percent, while the tradable sector tends to profit from low interest 
rates’ effect on the exchange rate, so the cheaper one’s own currency, the better. 
7.3.1. Financial sector vs. non-financial sector 
The non-financial sector is dominant in all of the Eurozone countries (Figure 15). Since no 
data is available for Ireland and Finland, the following calculations exclude Ireland and 
Finland. In addition, data for Portugal is available only until 2011. The non-financial sector 
made up an average of 94 percent of total GVA in 2013, which has grown during the crisis by 
an average of 0.3 percent, possibly in reaction to the turbulence that hit the financial sector. 
Therefore, because of its limited growth and small size in terms of GVA, the financial sector 
should have only limited influence on monetary policy. The financial sector’s influence 
depends on whether the non-financial sector is dominated by the tradable or the non-tradable 
sector, as if neither is dominant, the financial sector can tip the scale. Because of the currently 
low inflation rates in all states, the financial sector currently supports loose monetary policy. 
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Figure 15 – Non-financial sector (% of GVA) 
 
 Non-financial sector (% of GVA)  
Actual Growth  
  2013 2007-2013  
Austria 95% 0,6% 
Belgium 94% -0,9% 
Cyprus 91% -2,2% 
Estonia 97% 1,5% 
Finland - - 
France 96% -0,6% 
Germany 96% 0,5% 
Greece 95% -0,3% 
Ireland - - 
Italy 95% 0,2% 
Latvia 96% 1,1% 
Lithuania 98% 1,4% 
Luxembourg 73% 4,9% 
Malta 92% -0,3% 
Netherlands 92% -2,9% 
Portugal 93% 0,7% 
Slovak Republic 96% -0,2% 
Slovenia 96% 0,7% 
Spain 97% 1,5% 
Average 94% 0,3% 
Data for Portugal available only utntil  2011 
     
 
Source: Eurostat; own calculations 
 
7.3.2. Tradable sector vs. non-tradable sector 
The economies of ten of nineteen countries in the Eurozone are dominated by the tradable 
sector (Figure 16). Since no data is available for Ireland and Finland, the following 
calculations exclude these countries. Of the seventeen remaining countries, only in Austria 
and Germany should the financial sector be able to tip the scales in terms of monetary policy, 
as the split between the tradable and the non-tradable part of their economies is comparatively 
even. The financial sector should have no direct influence in any other EMU country. The 
degree to which economies rely on the non-financial tradable sector range from 27.4 percent 
of GDP in Greece to up to 89.8 percent of GDP in Malta. Across the Eurozone, an average  of 
59.3 percent of GDP was non-financial exports in 2013, a rate that has grown by an average  
of 2.6 percent since 2007. Among the countries with the highest growth rates are the crisis 
countries of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. As all three of these countries’ non-financial exports 
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started from a low base, the growth in the tradable sector points to an increase in 
competitiveness since the start of the austerity programs. To sum up, the economy in most of 
the Eurozone countries should favor loose monetary policy in order to boost exports through 
the exchange-rate mechanism. 
Figure 16 – Non-financial exports (% of GDP) 
 
 Non-financial exports (% of GDP)  
Actual Growth rate p.a. 
  2013 2007-2013  
Austria 55,7% -0,3% 
Belgium 84,9% 0,9% 
Cyprus 41,8% -0,4% 
Estonia 41,8% 4,0% 
Finland NA NA 
France 29,3% 1,3% 
Germany 50,5% 1,1% 
Greece 27,4% 3,9% 
Ireland NA NA 
Italy 30,1% 0,8% 
Latvia 57,8% 6,1% 
Lithuania 86,8% 8,8% 
Luxembourg 85,2% 3,2% 
Malta 89,8% 1,0% 
Netherlands 83,6% 2,5% 
Portugal 36,2% 3,6% 
Slovak Republic 96,9% 1,8% 
Slovenia 77,3% 1,6% 
Spain 33,5% 3,7% 
Average 59,3% 2,6% 
 
Source: Eurostat; own calculations 
 
7.3.3. Conclusion 
To conclude, the composition of the economy in most of the Eurozone member states  
supports a preference for loose monetary policy. While all countries have comparatively small 
financial sectors in terms of share of GVA, most of them export more than half of their non- 
financial GDP. As a result, economic actors are likely to push for loose monetary policy, as 
they can expect to benefit from favorable exchange rate effects. 
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7.4. How strong is the support for the ECB in the Eurozone? 
 
From an economic point of view, national central banks can rely on the support of a majority 
of audience groups in almost all Eurozone member states for the execution of loose monetary 
policy in the Eurozone (Figure 17). The general publics especially favor loose monetary 
policy. Because of their low unemployment levels and high growth in disposable income,  
only in Germany and Malta could the general publics quickly change their preference if 
inflation rates rise. Political actors in most of the countries also support loose monetary  
policy, a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future. While most of the Eurozone 
countries have reduced their primary deficits, only a few countries have a primary surplus. In 
addition, gross debt levels have risen sharply and stand above the 60 percent threshold in 
many countries, making a preference for restrictive monetary policy unlikely.  Economic 
actors will continue to focus on loose monetary policy because of their strong focus on  
foreign markets. To sum up, while some audience groups in some of the Eurozone countries 
favor a more restrictive policy, in no member country are most of the audience groups against 
loose monetary policy. 























General public Political actors Economic actors Overall 
 
Source: own calculations 
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The picture on the political side is fuzzier. A number of countries hold neither the Anglo- 
Saxon nor the southern European view with regard to price stability and governmental 
intervention in policy. While the general public in most of the countries in the Eurozone 
support price stability and has overcome their inflation culture, more than half of the countries 
have general publics that place no value on a de-facto independent central bank,  being 
satisfied with the supremacy of politics. This situation is surprising, considering that at least 
the founding EU members can look back at more than fifteen years of experience with an 
independent ECB guarding price stability. In addition, beliefs regarding institutional settings 
appear to be more persistent than beliefs regarding policy goals. Otherwise, for an 
independent central bank, that more than 60 percent of the general publics in the Eurozone 
either distrust the ECB or do not have an opinion on it is worrying. Only 39 percent say that 
they trust the ECB. Trust that was already low before the crisis has fallen farther across the 
Eurozone, while the number of people who distrust the ECB has risen. However, not only do 
“the usual suspects”—the crisis-hit publics—oppose the ECB but countries in which almost  
as many people oppose as support the ECB include comparably well-off-countries like 
Austria, Belgium and France. Distrust is not universal across the countries hit by the crisis,  
nor has it developed in the same way in all countries. For example, while trust is low in Spain, 
so is distrust, and distrust fell more rapidly in Spain during the crisis than trust did, perhaps 
because citizens realized that the ECB is stretching its legal boundaries in order to support 
countries with low growth and high debt levels. Overall, in only two countries—Malta and 
Lithuania—does the majority of the population trust the ECB, and only in Cyprus do more 
people distrust than trust the ECB. 
The strong rejection of the ECB as an institution is impeded by general support of the Euro 
and the EMU in general. Across the Eurozone, 70 percent of all respondents to the 
Eurobarometer poll favor the Euro and the EMU, and this support grew even during the crisis. 
In crisis countries like Spain and Greece, support remains high (at 63 percent and 66 percent, 
respectively), and disapproval rates have increased slowly since 2007. The countries with the 
highest approval rates are Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
To sum up, national central banks enjoy the unequivocal support of most audience groups 
because of their loose monetary policy. In addition, the general public in all member states 
seem to support the Euro and EMU in general, despite the economic upheaval in some 
member states. However, central bank independence is not anchored culturally in more than 
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half of the Eurozone member states, and even more troublesome is the low trust in the ECB in 
almost all member states. Therefore, both national central banks and the ECB need to be on 
the lookout to defend their independence, probably by satisfying the publics’ preferences for 
monetary policy. 
 
7.5. Have audience groups’ preferences influenced the ECB’s policies? 
 
The ECB’s current monetary policy is in line with the preferences of a majority of audience 
groups in almost all Eurozone member states, but there are several reasons that national 
central banks and the ECB should be deeply concerned with those preferences. Most 
important among them is that a majority of citizens do not trust the central banks. Especially 
now, ensuring the core audience groups’ perception of the banks’ success should be at the 
forefront of all of the central banks’ actions, as the pre-crisis consensus has broken down, and 
both the structure and the mandate of independent central banks are being hotly debated  
again. 
The secrecy of the decision-making process in a body like the ECB makes proving that these 
concerns have actually influenced decision-making difficult, so one must rely on indirect 
measures. The ECB’s refinancing rate can help in assessing whether there is a positive 
relationship between audience groups’ preferences and the ECB’s monetary policy, as when a 
majority of member countries favor restrictive, unchanged, or loose monetary policy, this 
preference will be mirrored in the refinancing rate. 
Figure 18 shows that monetary policy preferences shifted sharply between 2007 and 2014  
with an average score of 1.0 representing a preference for restrictive monetary policy and a 
2.0 a preference for loose monetary policy. While in 2007 most of the audience groups in 
most of the member states favored restrictive monetary policy, in 2014 not a single country 
supported a more restrictive monetary policy. During 2010 and 2011, preferences changed 
from loose to restrictive monetary policy because of an easing of the crisis, but preferences 
rapidly changed back in 2012. 
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Figure 18 – Monetary policy preferences in the EMU between 2007 and 2014 
 
 Monetary Policy Preferences 2007-2014  
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Loose Monetary Policy # of countries 6 5 18 14 8 14 17 15 
Unchanged Monetary Policy # of countries 2 3 0 4 3 2 2 4 
Restrictive Monetary Policy # of countries 11 11 1 1 8 3 0 0 
Average Monetary Policy Preferences 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Figure 19, which depicts the ECB’s refinancing rate and the average monetary policy 
preferences in the Eurozone, shows that the ECB’s rate moves in line with Eurozone 
preferences, as movements in preferences, with only a few months’ lag, coincide almost 
perfectly with rate changes. This alignment is even more impressive considering that, unlike 
rate decisions, preferences are tracked only yearly. Figure 19 also suggests that the ECB uses 
the room given by simple majority rule in the Governing Council to maneuver. Since the 
beginning of 2014, the number of countries that favor loose monetary policy has declined, 
although more than half still favored it until the end of 2014. Therefore, because of the 
majority rule, the ECB’s refinancing rate does not mirror the shift toward more restrictive 
monetary policy; instead, the central bank has continued to lower refinancing rates since 
January 2014. Despite the discrepancy between the ECB’s policy and preferences in 2014  
(and despite the crude character of the explanatory variable), the average monetary policy 
preferences of Eurozone audience groups have a solid predictive value. 
The optimal Eurozone interest rate, as indicated by the Taylor rule, is used as a control 
variable in order to determine whether changes in the interest rate have been necessary from 
an orthodox monetary policy point of view. The Taylor rule is a widely used guideline that 
generates interest rate recommendations based on inflation and economic activity (Taylor 
1993). While the Taylor rule does not necessarily point to optimal monetary policy, it has 
proven useful as a rule of thumb. The literature shows that the Taylor rule (or minor variations 
of it) does a good job of modeling many major central banks’ decisions (Taylor 1993; 
Peersman/Smets 1999). Across the whole period observed, the Taylor rule’s  
recommendations have been generally consistent with the ECB’s monetary policy. However, 
while the ECB’s refinancing rate generally mirrors the Taylor rule in direction and magnitude 
of change, the Taylor rule would have recommended a more restrictive monetary policy  
across the entire period, perhaps because the ECB does not weight individual member states’ 
Taylor rule recommendations according to the size of the country’s real GDP. Other factors 
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that are not necessarily only economic in nature may influence decision-making about 
monetary policy. 
Figure 19 – ECB Refi Rate, average monetary policy preferences, and the Taylor Rule, 2007-2014 
 
 
Source: ECB; European Commission Annual macro-economic database; Eurostat; own calculations 
 
To support the conclusion that it is not solely economic necessities that shape the ECB’s 
policy-making behavior, the following case studies analyze in depth some of the most 
controversial ECB decisions of the recent past. 
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8. Case studies – Do audience groups influence the ECB’s decision-making? 
 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, the ECB adopted a number of  
highly controversial measures to preserve the Eurozone’s stability. The decisions to accept 
Greece’s debt instruments regardless of their credit rating as collateral and the decision to 
launch the Securities Market Program (SMP) to purchase public and private bonds on 
secondary markets were met with widespread criticism in the media, in academia, and by 
some central bankers. For many scholars, these decisions marked the ECB’s departure from  
its previous role as an independent, neutral monetary policy authority and turned the ECB into 
a political player (Kaiser 2011). Especially for Germany’s commentators, the ECB crossed  
the Rubicon with its May 2010 decisions and moved deep into the fiscal space (Engelen  
2011), paving the way for numerous other controversial decisions, including the 
Trichet/Draghi letter to Italy’s government, the excessive use of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA) during the height of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in 2015, and the launch 
of Eurozone quantitative easing (QE) in 2015. The key question surrounding each of these 
decisions is whether the ECB caved to external pressures and sacrificed its independence.  
This chapter does not judge the virtues of the policies themselves but analyzes the economic 
and political explanations for the decisions in order to develop possible explanations for them 
and answer the question concerning whether social and political factors via audience group 
pressure influenced the ECB’s decision-making. Political Audience Cost Theory suggests that 
not only the economically relevant factors but also pressure from audience groups played a 
role in the ECB’s decision-making process. The focus of the chapter is on the decisions in 
May 2010 as, according to many commentators, they represent the metaphorical breach in the 
dam. In addition, these decisions marked the first time that a deep public rift appeared in the 
ECB Governing Council, wherein the governors of the national central banks in northern 
European countries were pitted against those from southern European countries. Finally, other 
controversial decisions are discussed. 
 
8.1. Greece’s debt crisis unfolds 
 
After the election victory of the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in autumn 
2009, the new government under Prime Minister Papandreou restated Greece’s accounts and 
sent revised data to Eurostat, the European statistics agency. In his first parliamentary speech 
on October 16, 2009, Papandreou disclosed that his country was facing considerable financial 
problems (De Santis 2012). The new data showed that, contrary to previously reported data, 
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the 2008 deficit would be 7.7 percent of GDP instead of 5 percent, and the 2009 deficit 
predictions were raised from 3.7 percent of GDP to 12.5 percent. The change in data was not 
so much a result of misestimating GDP but of misreporting fiscal data. Although Eurostat 
indicated in a press release that it had reservations about Greece’s numbers, interest rates on 
Greece’s long-term debt remained relatively stable. Bad accounting habits were not new with 
regard to Greece, so it was not a surprise for markets that Greece had to restate accounts once 
again. However, markets did take a closer look on how political leaders in the Eurozone  
would react. After all, markets never fully believed in the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty but expected that countries would be bailed out if needed, which explains why spreads 
among the government bonds of Eurozone member states were virtually non-existent between 
2000 and 2007 (European Union Centers of Excellence 2010; Tagesschau 2015; Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung 2015). 
 
Politicians did not react in the way markets had hoped but, instead of supporting Greece, 
voiced criticism during November and early December 2009. While it was not on the agenda 
of the European Council meeting in early December, the heads of state discussed Greece’s 
debt problem, and Germany’s Chancellor Merkel and others declared afterward that  
assistance to Greece was out of the question and that Greece’s government had to solve its 
budget deficit problem on its own by implementing far-reaching reforms (European Union 
Centers of Excellence 2010; Zeit Online 2009). 
On December 16, 2009, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Greece from A- to BBB+ 
following a similar move by Fitch, resulting in further pressure on Greece’s bond markets 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2009; Tagesschau 2015). In January 2010, interest rates on 
Greece’s debt rose to 7.26 percent, increasing the spread to German Bunds. On February 11, 
2010, the European Council declared that the EU would support Greece if doing so was 
necessary to guarantee the stability of the Eurozone (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2015; 
Tagesschau 2015). Apart from this political declaration of intention, there were no specifics. 
Again, markets had hoped for more, and average interest rates for Greece’s debt stayed above 
6 percent (Panico/Purificato 2013). While confusion persisted about how much other member 
states were actually willing to help Greece across February and into March, 2010, the 
relatively stable bond prices suggested that investors were overall reassured. However, the 
situation changed as solidarity with Greece unraveled and Germany’s Chancellor Merkel 
outlined the conditions under which assistance to Greece would be acceptable for Germany: 
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Greece would receive support only in the event that access to financial markets ceased and if 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) participated in the rescue measures. By the end of 
March 2010, the majority of Eurozone countries had fallen in line with these conditions, 
against the fierce criticism of the ECB directorate and the EU commission, both of which 
objected to the inclusion of the IMF (Frankfurter Rundschau Online 2010; Haas/Pak 2010). 
These conditions shocked markets because giving Greece help only when its market access 
had ceased meant that bond prices still had considerable downside potential and because the 
inclusion of the IMF in the conditions increased the chance of a partial default. In response to 
market participants’ reassessment of assistance, Greece’s interest rates rocketed in April 2010, 
despite the passing of a first assistance package of EUR 110 billion in bilateral credits from 
Eurozone member states and the IMF. On April 27, 2010, S&P sent the next shockwave 
through markets when it downgraded Greece’s bonds to junk (BB+). While Greece’s 
government said it did not understand the decision, S&P went even farther and warned debt 
holders that their chances of getting their money back in the case of default were below 50 
percent (Focus Online 2010a). Markets panicked and interest rates on Greece’s bonds went 
into the double digits. The interest rates of other Eurozone countries, including Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, rose as well and market observers began discussing the risk of 
contagion. The downgrade of Greece’s bonds was important because, according to the ECB’s 
policies, central bank money was available to commercial banks only with collateral that had  
a minimum credit rating of BBB-. Therefore, the downgrade introduced the possibility that 
Greece’s commercial banks would be cut off from central bank liquidity. The ECB reacted to 
the increase in spreads on May 3, 2010, by suspending credit rating requirements for all debt 
and other financial instruments guaranteed by the Greek state to ensure that Greece’s 
commercial banks could use the country’s debt as collateral at the ECB (Spiegel Online 
2010b; Focus Online 2010b; Manager Magazin 2010). This decision came despite the ECB’s 
prior assurance that it would neither grant Greece special status nor accept its securities as 
collateral. In fact, the ECB promised a return to the minimum credit rating of A- for collateral 
by the end of 2010 (Sinn 2010; Haas/Pak 2010; Greive 2010). Nevertheless, interest rates on 
Greece’s and other Eurozone countries’ debt kept rising until the morning of May 10 
(European Union Centers of Excellence 2010; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2015; Tagesschau 
2015). 
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To battle this dynamic, which was coupled with a sellout at the stock markets and signs of 
stress at the money markets, the European heads of state held an extraordinary European 
Council on the weekend of May 8–9, 2010, during which a compromise was struck and made 
public just before the stock markets opened in Tokyo. The offer consisted of EUR 500 billion 
in special assistance from the European Union member states and an additional EUR 250 
billion through the IMF’s usual facilities. In addition, on May 10 the ECB announced its 
Securities Market Program (SMP), which consisted of government bond purchases on 
secondary markets. These orchestrated actions impressed markets at first, as interest rates for 
Greece’s bonds fell to rates below 8 percent and money and stock markets calmed down 
(European Union Centers of Excellence 2010; Panico/Purificato 2013; Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung 2015; Tagesschau 2015). 
Public reaction to the measures taken by the ECB were mixed. Germany’s newspapers saw  
the outcome as a surrender of the ECB to political pressures and a breach in the dam against 
fiscal domiance. The consensus of Germans’ opinion was that the ECB was behaving contrary 
to the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty and that the purchase of government bonds was 
essentially deficit financing via the printing press. While this reaction was to be expected  
from Germany’s newspapers, that the ECB’s actions also sparked criticism and surprise by 
banking analysts was more surprising. While the majority of analysts quoted from Deka, 
Unicredit, Barclays Capital, Commerzbank, LBBW, and Royal Bank of Scotland saw both 
instruments as helpful in principle, they also voiced concerns. They believed that the decision 
to suspend collateral requirements only for Greece contradicted the ECB’s statements, 
especially because as at that stage only two major rating agencies had downgraded Greece to 
junk. In addition, many analysts considered the purchase of government debt premature and 
possibly damaging to the ECB’s reputation, putting in question the bank’s mandate and 
independence. The analysts were clearly surprised that the ECB had not waited for the 
market’s reaction to the newly announced rescue and austerity package before breaking a 
monetary policy taboo (Spiegel Online 2010b; Focus Online 2010b; Greive 2010; Haas/Pak 
2010). 
The next section assesses the various economic explanations for the ECB’s bold moves. 
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8.1.1. Economic reasons for the May 2010 decisions 
The ECB defended its decision to change the eligibility of Greece’s debt instruments and the 
purchase of public and private debt through the SMP on economic grounds. Therefore, this 
analysis begins with the economic arguments brought forward before continuing to address 
political arguments. 
When the ECB announced its decision to suspend the credit-rating requirements for Greece’s 
debt, it based its argument on the economic and financial adjustment program to which 
Greece’s government had committed. The ECB argued that the program was appropriate and 
that, from a risk-management perspective, public debt and other debt from the Greek state’s 
guaranteed debt should once again be considered good collateral (European Central Bank 
2010b). This argument is problematic because, at the time of the ECB’s decision, the 
economic and financial adjustment program had not yet been fully implemented but was only 
a political promise. In addition, at the time of the decision, only two of the major credit rating 
agencies had downgraded Greece to junk, so the ECB’s decision already anticipated further 
downgrades, rendering unreliable its earlier statement about the quality of Greece’s collateral. 
Before the ECB’s decision, the central banks relied on the Eurosystem Credit Assessment 
Framework to judge collateral’s quality. The framework spelled out that the ECB would base 
its quality assessment on factors that included external credit rating agencies, internal analyses 
of national central banks, rating tools, and decisions by business partners and external 
providers; should an asset lose its quality, the central bank would force the recipient of central 
bank liquidity to provide additional collateral through a margin call, which the ECB would  
not accept if it concluded that the collateral could no longer be rated BBB+ (Käfer/Michaelis 
2012). This framework is based on economic and political reasons: From the economic point 
of view, it makes sense that the central bank does not duplicate external credit rating  
agencies’ resources, and from the political point of view, basing the credit rating on an  
internal assessment would open the central bank up to criticism, regardless of the quality of 
the data. Downgrades would be especially sensitive politically and would likely result in 
political indignation in the country affected (Käfer/Michaelis 2012). 
The framework indicates that the ECB was not forced to make its decision on economic  
terms. Since only Fitch and S&P had downgraded Greece’s bonds, the ECB could have 
pointed to the fact that half of the big credit rating agencies registered under its framework 
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had not yet considered Greece’s bonds junk. Instead, the ECB decided to stop relying on  
credit ratings altogether. While the decision to suspend credit rating requirements for Greece’s 
collateral might have been intended to calm markets, it increased suspicion that the ECB had 
not based the decision solely on economic terms. ECB President Trichet claimed that a 
possible exclusion of Greece’s debt as collateral meant that those of Greece’s banks that 
depend on Greece’s bonds to receive central bank money would be de-facto cut off from 
liquidity (Hayo et al. 2010). However, this argument is not entirely convincing from an 
economic point of view, as it is not the task of the central banks to protect banks from having 
to deleverage and reduce lending if their equity is reduce by bond write-offs (Sinn 2013). In 
addition, banks based in a default country would not necessarily have refinancing problems;  
as long the ECB’s “insurance policy” was not on the table and junk bonds were not accepted 
as collateral, sound banks in a defaulting country could rebalance their portfolios by 
increasing the percentage of bonds in their portfolios that were from countries with high   
levels of creditworthiness, thereby maintaining their access to central bank liquidity 
(Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). 
To sum up, the ECB’s decision to suspend collateral requirements for Greece’s debt was 
economically avoidable. While the decision stabilized Greece’s financial system, the core 
argument for the measure seems to have been to buy time for political actors to decide how to 
proceed with rescue measures. At the same time, the measure resembled a bank bailout; one 
Frankfurt banker allegedly called it a free lunch for banks and noted that whoever was not 
dumping securities had only themselves to blame (Reuter 2010). Banks were allowed to off- 
load collateral of dubious quality at face value at the central bank, resulting in a transfer of 
credit risk to the central bank and ultimately to taxpayers and raising suspicion that political 
factors played a substantial role in the ECB’s decision. 
The ECB’s decision on May 10, 2010, to activate the SMP was a decision to purchase public 
and private debt. In a press release, the ECB referred to “severe tensions in certain market 
segments which are hampering the monetary policy transmission mechanism” (European 
Central Bank 2010c). The ECB’s argument was that its bond purchases were a reaction to the 
tensions that had rendered transmission channels dysfunctional and that, therefore, bond 
purchases were necessary to facilitate the effective conduct of monetary policy 
(Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). 
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In the days prior to the ECB’s decision, the bond, stock, and money markets experienced 
considerable turbulence. As the ECB stated in its monthly report in June 2010, volatility 
increased and liquidity decreased significantly in the bond markets on May 6, and some 
market segments were no longer functioning properly. While spreads between Greece’s and 
Germany’s government bonds rose especially strongly, possible contagion to Portugal,  
Ireland, and Spain could no longer be ruled out. On May 7 a flight to safe havens that was 
comparable only to that in spring 2009 resulted in new bond-spread highs and increasing 
volatility. As a result, liquidity fell in the bond markets—and all but dried up in Greece’s 
bonds. The shortage in liquidity was mirrored in the interbank market, and access to US dollar 
refinancing became scarce. Indicators of systemic risk surpassed values that had been last 
observed before the downfall of Lehman Brothers. In addition, turbulence led to a sell-off 
wave that hit financial titles especially hard (European Central Bank 2010a). The ECB 
subsequently argued that the turbulence in the bond, stock, and money markets and 
dysfunctional transmission mechanisms reduced the central banks’ ability to influence interest 
rates. 
According to the ECB, the interest-rate channel was dysfunction because of the large spread 
between Germany’s and other governments’ bonds, the rise in interest rates, and the fact that 
companies in the affected countries had to pay higher interest on their debt. Dysfunctional 
transmission mechanisms would imply market failure. While the downgrading of a country 
usually increases the interest rates that public and private issuers have to pay—some rating 
agencies have the rule that no private issuer can have a better credit rating than the state in 
which it operates—and in the days preceding the decision bond markets from the weakest and 
most indebted countries almost dried up, it is doubtful that the rise in interest rates in the case 
of Greece can be considered a market failure (Sinn 2013; Belke 2010). The argument of 
Greece’s Prime Minister Papandreou that an interest rate of 7 percent was unbearable ignores 
the fact that Greece had to pay double-digit interest rates for most of the pre-EMU era (Meyer 
2010). In fact, the ECB relied on an argument first put forward by Italy’s national central  
bank that the spreads were indications of market failure, as they were based on the incorrect 
assumption that single countries would have to leave the Eurozone or the whole Eurozone 
would collapse (Sinn 2013). Given the events of April and May 2010, however, a scenario in 
which Greece would default and would have to leave the Euro was certainly possible. Greece 
was running a huge budget deficit, had a very high debt-to-GDP ratio, and had just been 
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downgraded to junk. In addition, Greece’s public had met austerity measures with fierce 
resistance, including general strikes, riots, and even the deaths of some protesters. At the same 
time, Eurozone solidarity with Greece was not a given, as politicians and the general public in 
a number of Eurozone countries remained wary. In such a situation, rising spreads resemble 
less market failure than a sensible market reaction to the fact that haircuts, if not default, and 
the possible end of the option to unload high risk debt at the ECB had become a real 
possibility. Even today, after six years of Eurozone rescue measures, the exit of a country is 
possible, because of very high unemployment rates, austerity fatigue, and the rise of extremist 
parties in some European countries (Sinn 2013; Belke 2010). Finally, if the transmission 
channels were hampered at spreads of about 1 percent in May 2010, it should have broken 
down completely in the following months as spreads rose (Sinn 2010;  Panico/Purificato 
2013). 
Considering the rising spread of Germany’s Bunds vis-à-vis those of other European states 
(excluding Greece), it is clear that the pricing of government debt reacted to a number of 
risks. Some countries that were affected by increasing spreads, such as Spain and Portugal, 
had similar, even if less serious, country-specific problems, with low economic 
competitiveness, structural deficits, and rapidly increasing debt levels, so they could have run 
into difficulties in placing new debt (Centrum für Europäische Politik 2013). Others, such as 
Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands, had sound fiscal fundamentals and no market 
participants claimed that their rising interest rates had anything to do with a market re- 
assessment of government credit risk. Their increase in spread can be explained by aggregate 
risk, that is, global uncertainty and risk aversion, which increased demand for Germany’s 
government debt instruments because of their reputation as a safe haven, which in turn 
influenced the pricing of all other European countries’ debt, including Austria, Finland, and 
the Netherlands. In addition to aggregate risk, some countries, such as Italy and France, also 
suffered from contagion; their spreads increased because of their weak fiscal fundamentals 
after S&P downgraded Greece (De Santis 2012). However, there would have been no 
contagion if everyone had known that there would be no bailout; contagion was self-inflicted, 
as the only information investors could have extracted from the handling of Greece’s debt 
problem with regard to other European sovereign debt was whether there would be a bailout 
(Cochrane 2010). As de Santis points out, central banks can intervene successfully only if 
problems are caused by liquidity or contagion. In cases of country-specific and aggregate risk, 
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the central bank has less room to maneuver (De Santis 2012), especially because, in a market 
economy, aggregate market demand, not institutional actors, should define interest rates on 
debt (Sinn 2013). In addition, the Centrum für Europäische Politik points out that sudden 
increases are not at all uncommon and are largely based on the difficulty of assessing a 
country’s solvency (Centrum für Europäische Politik 2013). Solvency depends on a country’s 
willingness and ability to pay and the inability to predict insolvency leads to sometimes 
sudden spread increases once the market has decided to reassess a government’s credit risk 
(Centrum für Europäische Politik 2013). 
Another argument used by ECB President Trichet at the extraordinary European Council 
meeting on May 8–9 was that there was possibility of distortions in the money markets that 
would be comparable to Lehman Brothers’ insolvency. A breakdown of the interbank market 
would seriously hamper the banking transmission channel of monetary policy decisions. If 
Greece had been allowed to default, banks would have to write down Greece’s and other 
Eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds. The resulting reduction in bank equity could have 
threatened the solvency of a number of banks and triggered a market panic (Hayo et al. 2010). 
The events that led to the weekend of May 8–9, including market turbulence and indecisive 
political leadership, did resemble the last days before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
However, the consequences of the two events were very different. 
When Lehman broke down in the fall of 2008, the panic that resulted was driven largely by 
the uncertainty concerning whether more banks could have similar problems and whether  
their respective countries would rescue them. It was the event of a systematically relevant 
bank’s going bankrupt, an event previously judged impossible, that unsettled the market. The 
fact that the US government had decided to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt shook the 
markets’ confidence in supportive government action. As a result, banks stopped trusting each 
other, rendering the interbank market de-facto defunct, as every bank preferred to hoard cash 
and reduce lending activities to a minimum, leading to a credit squeeze in the real economy. 
However, in May 2010 the situation was different. As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, 
states all over the world, including those in Europe, had guaranteed citizens’ savings and 
bailouts for their national commercial banks. In many countries these promises were 
institutionalized in the form of rescue funds, as was the case with Germany’s Soffin, that were 
ready to intervene at once. Therefore, had the interbank market collapsed on May 10, despite 
the announcement of the agreement regarding the special assistance fund, which was worth 
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EUR 750 billion (USD 250 billion more than the US Troubled Asset Relief Program at the 
height of the Lehman crisis), every country would have had to bail out their own commercial 
banks. Because they had already off-loaded large quantities of Greece’s debt at the ECB, the 
task was manageable (European Union Centers of Excellence 2010; Vaubel 2011; Sinn 2010). 
The final economic argument brought forward was the strong depreciation of the Euro prior to 
May 10, especially with regard to the US dollar. Politicians and some economists voiced 
worries about the devaluation, going so far as to claim that the Euro’s very existence was at 
stake. However, there was no currency crisis in spring 2010: Depreciation had begun in 2009, 
and while partly a result of the Greek debt problem, it was also seen as a normalization after 
the Euro had appreciated by 30 percent between 2005 and 2008. In addition, unlike the 
European economy, the American economy was growing strongly during the first two  
quarters of 2010 (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie 2011; Hayo et al. 2010). 
To sum up, from an economic point of view, it is doubtful that transmission mechanisms were 
dysfunctional because of rising spreads and interest rates, the possibility of an interbank 
market crash, and the Euro’s devaluation. While markets were turbulent in the early weeks of 
May 2010 and there was definitely some exaggeration in market movements, it is difficult to 
argue that the transmission mechanisms were dysfunctional instead of simply reacting to a 
reassessment of sovereign debt sustainability and beginning to reapply different risk  
premiums to different Eurozone countries, resulting in spreads. Money and stock  markets 
were clearly in a state of exaggerated panic, but after the announcement of the EUR 750 
billion European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and a reiteration of the Euro countries’ 
commitment to bailing out banks, markets may have calmed even without additional ECB 
measures (Mink/De Haan 2012). While many scholars agree with this assessment, some point 
out that at least part of the rise in spreads was unjustified, and the fact that many countries at 
risk of contagion points to dysfunctional transmission mechanisms (Demary and Matthes 
2013a, Bundesbank 2012). While, because of most states’ comparatively solid fiscal policies, 
most cases of contagion were unlikely to develop into real problems for the respective states. 
After all, Spain had a better GDP-to-debt ratio than Germany did, and market reaction and the 
case of Ireland showed that the possible mechanisms of contagion could have been a lot more 
difficult to fully understand than believed (Wissenschaftlicher  Beirat  beim 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). To dispel such fears and end the 
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risk of contagion, some limited support for endangered countries was advisable (Sinn 2010). 
With regard to the possibility of an interbank market crash, lessons learned from the financial 
crisis of 2008 and the resulting institutionalized bank rescue funds made a crash unlikely even 
if Greece defaulted, as the Eurozone banks would have been instantly recapitalized by their 
respective countries. Similarly clear is the case of the Euro’s devaluation against the US  
dollar, as devaluation was only partly driven by Greece’s debt crisis, and the Euro’s internal 
and external value was never endangered. 
The decisions of the ECB and the assessment of the economic arguments brought forward 
suggest that it was odd that the ECB came to the aid of troubled Eurozone countries in this 
principle-changing fashion. While decision-makers were under heavy pressure in May 2010, 
they appear to have used monetary-policy arguments as an excuse. Both policies seem to have 
been designed more to prevent write-offs on central and (especially) commercial banks’ 
balance sheets. If that was the true objective a direct purchase of toxic sovereign debt would 
have been the cheaper and more targeted approach. In addition, interest rates in the Eurozone 
had not reached the zero lower bound. Therefore, the ECB did not buy the bonds to  
implement monetary policy but to keep bond markets liquid and deep so that Eurozone 
member states could continue borrowing at low interest rates. Monetary policy arguments 
were used to window-dress another bailout for commercial banks in the Eurozone, give 
governments more time to reform, and reduce the adjustment costs (Centrum für Europäische 
Politik 2013; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie 2011). In addition, the ECB could have relied on emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA) to keep financial systems afloat. In contrast to the other two ECB measures, the ELA 
program already existed and all of the risks and costs of the granted credit lines would have 
remained on the respective national central banks’ balance sheets. Therefore, especially the 
ECB’s second decision, to purchase private and public debt, cannot credibly be defended on 
economic grounds. The argument that the program was intended to restore orderly markets is 
not convincing, especially as the ECB decided which market movements were justified and 
which were not (Belke 2010). The notion of a true Euro crisis was misleading; it was a crisis 
of over-indebtedness of some Eurozone member states. Only if a large number of member 
states had faced insolvency would the Euro have really be endangered (Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). 
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In light of this conclusion, the question arises concerning why the ECB’s Governing Council 
did not rest its decisions solely on economic arguments. To answer this question, the next 
section turns to the interests of political actors, financial actors and the general public in the 
Eurozone. 
8.1.2. Audience group pressure and the May 2010 decisions 
In order to assess the probability that external and especially political pressure was exerted on 
the ECB, one must understand the dynamics of the extraordinary European Council meeting 
on the weekend of May 8–9. The negotiations were intense, chaotic, and clearly driven by the 
impression of a crisis situation. An example of the chaotic nature of the meeting is Germany’s 
Chancellor Merkel’s absence from most parts of the meeting. As additional rescue measures 
for Greece in excess of the pre-arranged package had not been on the agenda, she was in 
Moscow. Nevertheless, the weekend bore the EUR 750 billion EFSF, and by the end of the 
meeting the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty was wastepaper. National interests 
seem to have played a considerable role in the meeting; in fact, solving Greece’s underlying 
problems seem to have been of only minor importance, despite President Sakrozy’s claims 
that he had rescued the Euro (Vaubel 2011). While the decision to suspend collateral credit 
rating requirements for Greece’s public and private bonds can be defended on the basis of 
concerns about the financial stability of Greece’s banking system and can be interpreted as an 
attempt to give political actors the chance to decide on the rescue package, the decision to  
start purchasing Greece’s government debt on May 10 raises questions, as it can hardly be 
justified economically. 
The assessment of political line of arguments begins with the interests of political actors. 
Although there is a low probability of a breakdown of the whole Eurozone, objective 
economic data indicates that the political world was in crisis mode in May 2010. Prior to  
May, the official version of the problem stressed that it was merely Greece’s debt crisis, but 
the language changed around the time of the extraordinary council meeting, when the phrase 
“systemic crisis” suddenly came into use. The new line of thinking stressed that the systemic 
character of the crisis no longer endangered only highly indebted countries but also threatened 
countries with sound financials and even the Euro itself. Politicians both claimed and seemed 
to believe that the Eurozone—and with it the European and worldwide financial markets— 
were on the brink of collapse. Eurogroup chair Juncker spoke of a “worldwide organized 
attack against the Euro,” and Germany’s Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy 
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stressed the need to “prevent speculators from endangering the adjustment efforts that have 
become necessary because of the recently overcome economic and financial crisis” (Sinn 
2010: 5). Even ECB President Trichet joined the chorus, stating that the Euro was facing a 
systemic crisis (Sinn 2010). As former high officials of Germany’s finance ministry and 
advisors to Germany’s government revealed ten years after the meeting in an article in Die 
Welt, it was fear of the unknown that dictated policy action (Dams et al. 2015), the shock of 
Greece’s near-default and the fear of contagion that led to dramatic political action 
(Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). 
Officials and advisors remember that there were two strands of argument. One was the 
economic strand, which was based on the fear that Greece could become the new Lehman 
Brothers. Although Greece was only 3 percent of the Eurozone’s economy, no one knew what 
would happen if it defaulted or could guarantee that there would not be a catastrophe the day 
after. There was never the feeling that one could just let Greece go. The second strand of 
argument was the political one, which revolved around German Chancellor Merkel’s  
statement that “if the Euro fails, […] Europe will fail, the idea of European integration will 
fail” (Merkel 2010). Merkel may have feared that she would be held responsible for the 
failure of the Euro and for the end of European integration, so the discussion took on a 
historical perspective that had nothing to do with economic analysis (Dams et al. 2015). It is 
likely that to varying degrees both arguments influenced political actors in the Eurozone 
countries and provided them with a strong incentive to prevent Greece’s default. However, 
specific national interests also shaped the Eurozone countries’ positions. 
As Spain’s Prime Minister Zapatero reported to his party after the meeting, French President 
Sarkozy allegedly threatened to leave the Eurozone and oppose Germany should Germany not 
be willing to participate in the rescue fund (Sinn 2010; The Guardian 2010). One reason for 
Sarkozy’s threat may have been that France’s banks were heavily burdened by government 
debt, including EUR 21 billion in Greece’s government bonds and EUR 52 billion in Spain’s, 
Portugal’s, and Ireland’s government bonds. France’s banks were by far the Eurozone banks 
with the greatest exposure. (In contrast, Germany’s banks held only EUR 16 billion in 
Greece’s bonds.) Therefore, a national solution would have had to include an expensive 
bailout of France’s commercial banks by the French state. Another pressing issue for France 
and other southern European countries was the rising spread between Germany’s Bunds and 
the  other  countries’  government  bonds  and  the  resulting  increase  in  interest  to  be paid. 
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Regardless of the economic reasons for the spread, the diminishing ability of southern 
European countries to finance their deficits cheaply alarmed them. One of the key reasons that 
some of these states had voted in favor of the Euro’s introduction was the risk premium they 
had had to pay beforehand and which they hoped not to have to pay after the introduction of 
the Euro. In the first years of the Eurozone—until 2008—these hopes were largely fulfilled,  
as countries like Spain, Italy, and Portugal had to pay negligible interest premiums over 
Germany’s Bunds. However, with the debt crisis, the previous circumstances were returning; 
while spreads were still lower than they were before the introduction of the Euro, the desire to 
reduce the spread again may have been why southern European states supported the EFSF 
(Sinn 2010). 
Germany’s national interests may also have played a role. Some scholars and commentators 
claim that the regional election on May 9 in the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia 
influenced Germany’s willingness to concede. According to their argument, Chancellor 
Merkel feared that further support for Greece would cost her an election victory, as support 
for Greece was widely unpopular in Germany (European Union Centers of Excellence 2010; 
Reuter 2010; Panico/Purificato 2013). Finally, Eurogroup President Juncker and EU 
Commission President Barroso may have seen the crisis as a chance to expand their influence, 
as both would have greatly benefitted from standing financial facilities under the roof of the 
EU (Vaubel 2011). 
In line with Political Audience Cost Theory, political pressure on the ECB rose in May 2010. 
After the flash crash of Wall Street on May 7, the Fed and the US government increased 
pressure on Eurozone governments and the ECB (Sinn 2015). Europe had only a few days to 
solve its problems (Dams et al. 2015). US President Obama pushed Eurozone leaders to find a 
solution to the debt crisis (Barber 2010). At the same time, during the extraordinary Council 
meeting, French President Sarkozy, Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi, Portuguese Prime 
Minister Sócrates, and other southern European prime ministers pressed Trichet to buy 
sovereign bonds. With the support of Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, Finnish Prime Minister 
Vanhanen, and Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and quoting the ECB’s independence, 
Trichet apparently refused such attempts to influence monetary policy-making  (Henning 
2015; Reuter 2010; Woodruff 2014; Barber 2010). While neither episodes can be verified and 
the extent to which the ECB had to bow to pressure is unclear, only three days after Trichet 
denied any intention to purchase debt, on May 9, the ECB Governing Council decided to 
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launch the SMP (Stark 2010; Dams et al. 2015). How the SMP was structured and announced 
raises questions and does little to refute suspicion about political pressure on the ECB (Meyer 
2010). The outcome on the morning of May 10 reflected President Sarkozy’s demands and 
looked very much like quid pro quo, even though the two decisions were not formally 
coupled. After the Eurozone governments announced their EFSF, the ECB announced its 
SMP. It remains unclear why the ECB did not await the market reaction to the ESFS before 
purchasing bonds (Henning 2015; Belke 2010; Woodruff 2014).The ECB also decided to 
purchase Greece’s government bonds and imposed no haircut, even though the EFSF had just 
been approved by the European heads of state. It was clear that Greece would not need to 
return to financial debt markets for financing for many years. In addition, that only Greece’s 
bonds were exempted from collateral requirements and that this exemption was upheld even 
after Greece was “rescued” invited monetary policy problems and the question of a selective 
advantage on behalf of Greece. Commercial banks used the ECB’s liquidity provisions to 
invest even more in Greece’s and other Eurozone countries’ government bonds that had been 
threatened by default. As long as credit rating requirements were suspended, these bonds were 
the most liquid of assets, as banks could always hand them over to the ECB in return for fresh 
liquidity (Sinn 2010; Sinn 2013; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). As a result, speculations about a “French bias” arose.  
Even some of Germany’s central bankers assumed that the ECB bought Greece’s bonds after 
May 10 only to allow France’s banks to sell down their holdings. Germany’s banks saw little 
advantage from the measure because they had voluntarily agreed with Germany’s Finance 
Minister not to sell their Greek bonds (Reuter 2010). Policymakers effectively broke all of the 
rules in order to save the Eurozone, as Christine Lagard, then France’s Finance Minister, put  
it (Sinn 2015). 
The second audience group with a strong interest in the negotiation was the financial sector.  
In the past the financial sector had not worried about the solidity of Eurozone governments’ 
debt; instead, all debt was judged to be more or less equally secure, and only small interest 
premiums were applied. With the outbreak of Greece’s debt crisis and the wavering Eurozone 
support for Greece’s government, the financial sector rapidly adjusted its expectations, and it 
is likely that the ECB was subject to intense pressure from the financial sector (Belke 2010). 
In fact, the financial sector assumed from the beginning that Greece would be bailed out, and 
the idea that the ECB could start buying bonds was raised by the markets but denied by   ECB 
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President Trichet (Dams et al. 2015; European Union Centers of Excellence 2010). Financial 
markets did not necessarily have to spell-out their demands, as by hinting at a possible panic 
because of disappointed expectations, they could already generate enough pressure. As 
Woodruff (2014) calls it, financial markets were “governing by panic.” According to the 
German magazine Spiegel Online, Germany’s government believed financial actors were also 
the source of the returning public speculation about a German bailout plan prior to the 
weekend of May 8–9 (Spiegel Online 2010a). It is plausible that the same pressure of 
expectations built within the ECB, leaving the central banks little room to maneuver should it 
not want to disappoint markets with unclear consequences. 
The third audience group was the general public. A poll fielded by the Financial Times and 
Harris in March 2010 found mixed sentiments with regard to whether the Eurozone had a 
responsibility to help members in need and whether Greece should be supported (Atkins 
2010). As Figure 20 shows, the general public in Germany denied a common responsibility to 
help other Eurozone countries, while the public in southern member states like France, Italy, 
and Spain supported it (Corso 2010). 
Figure 20 –EU members’ views regarding their responsibility to help other member countries 
 
Source: Corso (2010) 
 
The same division is apparent with regard to the question concerning whether national 
governments should support Greece (Figure 21). While in Germany 61 percent of the public 
opposed support for Greece, more people in Italy and Spain supported assistance to Greece 
than opposed it, and public opinion in France was split. However, an average of 20 percent of 



















Source: Corso (2010) 
 
A second survey, commissioned by the Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique and carried out 
by Ifop in March 2010, presented a similar picture (Figure 22). Asked whether their states 
should provide Greece with financial aid in the interest of European solidarity, the majority of 
respondents in Spain, Italy, and France said they should, while the majority in Germany said 
they should not (Ifop Institute 2010). 
Figure 22 – EU members’ view on whether Greece should be provided financial aid 
 
Source: Ifop Institute (2010) 
 
The Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique poll also indicates why the level of solidarity with 
Greece differed from country to country (Figure 23). Asked whether they thought that their 
states would face a similar situation as Greece within the next months or years, respondents 
from France, Spain, and Italy said they did, while in Germany most respondents said they did 
not (Ifop Institute 2010). 
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Figure 23 – EU members’ views on the likelihood of facing a situation similar to that of Greece within the next 
months or years 
 
Source: Ifop Institute (2010) 
 
Another reason for a difference in the willingness to support Greece could be the differing 
views on what caused the problems in Greece (Figure 24). Asked what factor was primarily 
responsible for Greece’s debt and deficit problem, in Germany more than two-thirds of the 
respondents saw Greece’s government’s inability to manage the country’s finances as the 
primary reason. While a majority in France and Spain also believed that it was primarily 
Greece’s government’s fault, only 44 percent of Italy’s respondents shared that belief. In 
contrast, while only 9 percent of Germany’s respondents saw financial speculation as the 
primary reason, an average of 20 percent of France’s, Italy’s, and Spain’s respondents saw it 
as the primary reason (Ifop Institute 2010). 
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Figure 24 – EU members’ views on the primary factor for Greece’s problems 
 
Source: Ifop Institute (2010) 
 
To sum up, public opinion in the four largest Eurozone countries was split prior to the 
extraordinary European Council meeting. While the public in Germany opposed support for 
other member states in general and Greece in particular, the public in the southern European 
countries supported assistance. Possible reasons for this divergence in opinion could have 
been the perceived likelihood of having to face the same situation in the future and the 
assessment of the primary reason for Greece’s debt problem. It is reasonable to assume that 
public opinion in other Eurozone countries mirrored this division: Publics that feared a similar 
fate as that of Greece and that not necessarily believed that governments were responsible for 
the debt drama favored assistance, while publics that believed they were at no risk and that 
saw governments as the primary reason for the debt crisis opposed assistance. Differing  
public opinions might have influenced the respective governors of the national central banks 
and affected their decision on SMP. 
Finally, ECB President Trichet played an important role during the negotiations. From the 
beginning of the crisis, the ECB participated in discussions on rescue packages and their 
conditions, not just in an advisory capacity but as an actor with its own agenda. The ECB was 
involved in strategic interaction with governments that tried to extract the most 
accommodative monetary policy and liquidity provisions possible for crisis countries 
(Henning 2015; Woodruff 2014). It was Trichet who, on the evening of May 7, warned the 
heads of state of the market panic that would occur if Greece were allowed to default. He also 
emphasized that it was no longer Greece’s problem but a European problem (Barber 2010; 
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Dams et al. 2015). Prior to this meeting, many heads of state judged the situation to be 
considerably less dangerous than Trichet did (Dams et al. 2015), but Trichet presented the 
situation in such drastic ways that Chancellor Merkel later spoke of an ultimo ratio decision 
(Vaubel 2011).Why did Trichet present the situation in the financial markets as so dire? Did 
he really believe that a “Lehman Brothers II”: scenario was likely? The Bundesbank and the 
Dutch national central bank did not support the subsequent decision to install the SMP, and 
the chief economist of the ECB, Jürgen Stark, was at least concerned about the program, and 
in 2011 both Stark and Bundesbank President Weber resigned, at least partly as a result of the 
SMP (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). This dissent among top European monetary personnel raises 
doubts that the ECB as an institution saw the situation to be as dire as it was presented (Sinn 
2010; Belke 2010; Alich/Häring 2010; Stark 2010; Panico/Purificato 2013). According to 
Henning (2015), Trichet saw the extraordinary meeting as a way to convince Eurozone 
member states to undertake fundamental adjustments and commit financial resources to the 
rescue plan. If such was the case, Trichet had a motive to overdramatize the economic 
situation in order to extract concessions from the heads of state. From a political point of 
view, such a move was both sensible—after all, it was essentially political indecisiveness that 
sparked market turbulence—and successful, as over the weekend political leaders approved a 
support package of unprecedented size. 
The question concerning the extent to which external pressure influenced the ECB’s decision- 
making is difficult to answer, as loosening monetary policy does not necessarily imply 
external pressure. The economic circumstances and audience groups’ pressure were pulling 
the ECB at least partly in the same direction (Henning 2015). That publicly the Bundesbank, 
the Dutch national central bank, and later the German chief economist of the ECB argued 
against the purchase of public and private debt, while French ECB President Trichet, Italy’s 
central bank Governor Draghi, and Irish central bank Governor Honohan came out in support 
of the SMP points to a re-nationalization of monetary policy-making (Alich/Häring 2010; 
Stark 2010; Vaubel 2011; Sinn 2010; Wyplosz 2011). Contrary to the ECB’s standard 
operating procedures, the decision in favor of the SMP was not made unanimously, as ECB 
President Trichet had to concede in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde (Belke 
2010; Trichet 2010). While the evidence points to a division between southern European 
countries plus Ireland and northern European countries, the true constellation of opinion will 
not be revealed until the ECB starts publishing meeting minutes. 
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What could lie at the heart of this division? One possibility is that national central banks had 
differing expectations regarding the possible economic effects of not taking action. While it is 
possible that the ECB blew the danger out of proportion in order to extract concessions from 
political actors, differing assessments of the strength of the economic arguments do not lie at 
the heart of division. After all, Bundesbank President Weber did not point to differing 
economic assessments when he publicly voiced his criticism of the decision (Alich/Häring 
2010). A second possibility has to do with opposing political and public pressure. It is likely 
that President Sarkozy tried to pressure the French national central bank’s governor Noyer. 
After all, why should he not attempt at home what he also allegedly attempted at the council 
meeting? The other national central banks’ governors from southern European countries and 
Ireland likely experienced similar pressures, as all national central banks faced a conflict of 
interest between the need for a European monetary policy and national demands to soften the 
blow. Public pressure may also have played a role. The general public in each of the Eurozone 
member states had widely diverging interests and opinions regarding rescue policies, but the 
fact of it is that monetary policy had been renationalized (Belke 2010). 
8.1.3. Conclusion 
While the signs of possible pressure on the ECB remain inconclusive and the understanding  
of the interactions between the ECB and the Eurozone’s heads of state and discussions of the 
measures in the ECB Governing Council remains vague, it is clear that the ECB’s credibility 
has been tarnished. Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the ECB’s decision, the 
perception of the bank’s action is that of low independence. Perception is an important part of 
central banks’ independence, and the relationship between de-jure independence and low 
inflation is not straightforward. Only if a central bank is also perceived as independent and 
supported by a societal consent can price stability be achieved (Hayo et al. 2010). The 
economic arguments for waiving the collateral requirement and the SMP remain 
unconvincing. Transmission channels were dysfunctional, not because of market failure but 
because markets sensibly re-estimated the probability of default in countries that had lived 
beyond their means for years, were running deficits, and had amassed huge piles of debt. In 
addition, the size of Greece’s outstanding debt was never big enough to bring the European 
financial system down, keeping in mind that national governments and institutionalized 
bailout funds stood ready to recapitalize banks when necessary. In addition, the ECB could 
have used the ELA program to support the financial system without transferring credit risk  to 
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the Eurozone. (ELA is granted by the national central bank, and any risks or costs arising  
from the provision are incurred by the respective national central bank.) While contagion was 
an issue, the EUR 750 billion EFSF would probably have brought it under control. Finally,  
the fact that the SMP started buying Greece’s debt in large quantities, even though the rescue 
package meant that Greece would not need to return to the financial markets for the 
foreseeable future, raises further doubts about the purely economic argumentation. In short, 
the ECB used monetary policy arguments as an excuse to bail out banks, keep highly indebted 
countries afloat, and buy political actors time. 
From a political point of view, the ECB’s decisions are understandable, as it had become a 
strategic actor in the game. ECB President Trichet’s argument that—because the ECB 
participated as an advisor in drafting Greece’s austerity program—it had to accept Greece’s 
bonds in order to be credible and consistent underlines this new understanding of the central 
bank’s role (Hayo et al. 2010). First, a dramatic presentation of the economic situation may 
well have been the reason that political actors, after six months of indecision, agreed on such  
a far-reaching program. Second, while the ECB was able to put pressure on political actors, 
political actors could return the favor. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that at least 
French President Sarkozy put considerable pressure on the ECB to support the ESFS with the 
purchase of debt. It is plausible that he was not the only head of state who, fearing turbulence 
at home, put pressure on the ECB and his or her respective national central bank. The fact that 
the ECB announced its program on May 10 without awaiting the market’s reactions to EFSF 
does little to disperse suspicion. In addition, the clear rift in the ECB’s decision-making body 
between representatives of the crisis countries and the Bundesbank indicates that monetary 
policy was renationalized. In line with audience cost theory, national central bank governors 
probably felt both political and public pressure at home. That poll respondents in  Italy, 
France, and Spain supported bailout mechanisms prior to May 2010, while respondents in 
Germany opposed them, indicates the direction of public pressure. Finally, financial actors 
also pressured the ECB into action, probably less through direct demands than by stoking 
expectations. 
 
8.2. Emergency Liquidity Assistance during Greece’s debt crisis 
 
The second case study analyzed here is the decision to allow the Bank of Greece to support 
Greece’s banking system with unprecedented amounts of ELA during the height of   Greece’s 
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debt crisis in 2015. The use and especially the sheer size of the assistance provided have been 
at the heart of discussions among researchers, politicians, and the public. 
ELA, a temporary central bank support mechanism for solvent but illiquid commercial banks, 
is decided upon by national central banks and can be suspended only by a two-thirds majority 
of the ECB Governing Council (European Central Bank 2013). As ELA is administered by  
the respective national central bank, the risks and benefits associated with the granting it are 
also on the national central bank’s balance sheet (European Central Bank 2013). 
Between January and August 2015, Greece’s commercial banks began to rely to an increasing 
extent on ELA provided by the Bank of Greece for two primary reasons. First, Greece’s 
commercial banks turned to ELA because their primary liquidity lifeline, the ECB’s liquidity, 
was cut in February 2015, when the ECB declared that it would no longer accept Greece’s 
government debt as collateral. As a result, Greece’s commercial banks had to find a new way 
to access central bank money (Speciale et al. 2015; Bibow 2015). In April 2015 Fitch 
downgraded Greece’s four biggest banks, the National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha 
Bank, and Eurobank Ergasias, to CCC in response to a downgrade of Greece, the banks’ 
liquidity constraints, and their declining solvency (Moss 2015). With Greece’s financial 
system basically cut off from markets and the ECB’s liquidity operations, ELA became the 
instrument with which to guarantee liquidity (Speciale et al. 2015). Second, access to liquidity 
became increasingly important in spring 2015 as customers’ withdrawals of their deposits 
from Greece’s banks accelerated in response to political uncertainty. In Greece’s January  
2015 national election, the left-wing political party Syriza won a clear victory on the promise 
of an end to austerity and foreign intervention (Speciale et al. 2015). With Greece’s future in 
the Eurozone unclear and a looming danger of default, private capital was fleeing the country. 
Moody’s estimated that approximately EUR 44 billion were withdrawn from Greece’s bank 
accounts after November 2014 (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 2015). This capital flight 
would not have been possible without ELA, as Greece’s banks would have rapidly faced a 
liquidity crisis, and capital controls would have had to be imposed to rescue the financial 
system (Sinn 2015). Instead, by July 2015 ELA had increased from close to zero to almost 
EUR 90 billion. The Eurosystem took the place of largest depositor in Greece with EUR 130 
billion, exceeding the EUR 120 billion in private-sector deposits (Draghi 2015). 
112  
On June 28, 2010, the Bank of Greece lost the support of the ECB’s Governing Council, so 
instead of raising the limit for ELA, it froze the funding line, a decision that quickly led to the 
exhaustion of funds of the ELA facility. On the same day, Greece had to announce capital 
controls that imposed a ban on cross-border transfers and set a cash withdrawal limit of EUR 
60 per day. On July 7, the ECB also tightened the collateral requirements Greece’s banks had 
to meet to access ELA credits (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 2015; The Economist 
2015). 
Critics have accused the ECB of delaying the bankruptcy of Greece’s already insolvent 
banking system during the crisis in order to buy politicians more time to solve the negotiation 
impasse between Greece and its creditors (Götz et al. 2015). ECB President Draghi refuted 
this claim by stating that Greece’s banks were illiquid but not insolvent (Draghi 2015). 
Assessing the ECB’s Governing Council’s decision requires analyzing the economic 
arguments surrounding the solvency of Greece’s banking sector and the political reasons for 
the ECB’s decision. 
8.2.1. Economic reasons for the use of ELA 
Researchers distinguish between two kinds of bank runs: the efficient runs that occur because 
of a worsening of a bank’s fundamentals and the inefficient runs that are caused by wrong 
assumptions about a bank’s financial well-being (Götz et al. 2015). Conventional wisdom 
draws a clear line in the allocation of responsibilities for responding to these two types of 
bank runs. The efficient bank run should not cause action by the central bank; solvency crises 
should be left to fiscal authorities, as the bank’s restructuring and the provision of financial  
aid is distributional and action by the central bank would blur the distinction between fiscal 
and monetary policy (Reichlin 2013; Pill 2013). Inefficient runs, on the other hand, can be 
overcome by granting an emergency loan along the lines of the ELA program. Central banks 
should be in charge of such liquidity crises, as they can create unlimited liquidity (Reichlin 
2013; Pill 2013; Götz et al. 2015). A central bank can determine whether it is facing a 
solvency (efficient run) or a liquidity (inefficient run) problem, but the fact that central banks 
can effectively eliminate any insolvency risk also points to potential moral hazard problems. 
Accommodating unsustainable government or bank behavior by providing liquidity can create 
problems in the future if no steps are taken to improve the recipient’s financial health (Pill 
2013). 
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According to the banking supervisors’ point-in-time assessment of the common equity Tier 1, 
total capital ratio, and Tier 1 capital ratio, Greece’s banks have sufficient equity (Draghi 
2015). As Greece’s banks are solvent but illiquid, the bank run was not caused by a worsening 
of the banks’ fundamentals. Not only have they received EUR 38 billion in re-capitalization 
aid from previous aid packages to Greece, they also passed the European banking stress test in 
autumn 2014. While some capital shortfalls were detected, those gaps were closed by  
Greece’s banks between the date of the data collection and the publication of the test results 
(Ruparel 2015). However, as Draghi (2015) points out, the point-in-time assessment of a  
stress test is not the only possible evaluation of the state of solvency of Greece’s banks. The 
second evaluation is based on a prospective assessment. 
While Greece’s banks’ solvency looks good on paper and analysts believe that Greece’s banks 
still have sufficient collateral, for several reasons their longer-term solvency is at least 
questionable. First, Greece’s banks are facing a deteriorating real economy that is likely to 
affect banks’ balance sheets. The number of bad loans on their books will probably increase, 
forcing the banks to write off loans and damaging the banks’ financial well-being (Giugliano 
2015). Second, the close connection between Greece’s banking sector and the Greek state has 
become a liability for the banks’ solvency. The solvency of a bank depends on the solvency of 
its borrowers, so the solvency of Greece’s banking system should be doubtful if the Greek 
state is bankrupt, as former Finance Minister Varoufakis claimed (Moss 2015). Third, the 
issue becomes more complicated when the solvency of the state depends on decisions and 
financial assistance on the supranational level. Despite a directive in March 2015 to Greece’s 
banks from the ECB that prohibited Greek banks any further increase in exposure to Greece’s 
sovereign debt, Greece’s banks have become the dominant holders of Greece’s short-term 
sovereign debt. In addition, about half of the Greece’s major banks’ reserves and equity are 
made up of deferred tax credits (DTCs), that is, cash claims on the Greek state (Moss 2015; 
Giugliano 2015; Ruparel 2015).the Greek state has also become a majority stakeholder in 
many of Greece’s banks because of the recapitalization that became  necessary  (Ruparel 
2015). As a result, the solidity of Greece’s banks depends on the economic well-being of 
Greece. When markets started to lose faith in Greece, the value of Greece’s sovereign bonds 
on banks’ balance sheet suffered. Banks, which are heavily dependent on the Greek state, are 
facing a disastrous loop. When the Greek state comes close to default, Greece’s banks are 
affected through their holdings of government bonds and DTCs. As a result, they need to be 
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re-capitalized by the state, which in turn worsens the government’s fiscal position and further 
reduces the value of its sovereign bonds (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). Referring to these 
interdependencies, the ECB’s Governing Council refused to increase the ceiling for Greece’s 
ELA further and toughened the collateral requirements at the end of June 2015 and beginning 
of July 2015 (Draghi 2015). 
There are a number of reasons for the shaky solvency of the Greek state. First, Greek state 
finances are being restructured. Greece repeatedly needs financial aid packages from its 
partners in the Eurozone and from the IMF. It lost access to financial markets in 2010 and has 
not been able to regain it, so it has relied on the ECB’s liquidity provision and ELA to gain 
access to liquidity. Therefore, it is important for Greece’s solvency that Greece can continue  
to count on the financial support of its partners. The payment suspension of the last 
installment of the aid package by the Troika that resulted from the slow execution and the 
incomplete nature of Greece’s austerity measures makes the stability of this support 
questionable. Second, the ECB decided in February 2015 to stop accepting Greece’s 
government bonds as collateral in its own liquidity operations, and in its function as banking 
supervisor, ordered Greece’s banks not to increase their exposure to Greece’s sovereign debt 
(Moss 2015). Both decisions convey little trust in the solvency of the Greek state. In addition, 
Greece missed a payment to the IMF on June 30, 2015 and ended its participation in the 
bailout program, making it difficult for the ECB to continue accepting Greece’s government 
securities as collateral under ELA (Jones 2015). Third, granting large amounts of ELA against 
collateral guaranteed by the Greek state has made the Bank of Greece extremely vulnerable. 
By July 2015 the Bank of Greece had granted ELA worth EUR 80 billion, but the Bank of 
Greece’s capital stands at only about EUR 4.5 billion plus EUR 36.5 billion in shares of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary base. Having to recapitalize the Bank of Greece would render Greece 
insolvent (Sinn 2015). To sum up, from the prospective assessment view, the bank run on 
Greece’s banks that occurred during the first half of 2015 appears to be rational, given the 
looming default of the Greek state. 
From an economic point of view, Greece’s banks’ solvency is therefore doubtful. While the 
point-in-time assessment suggests that they are solvent but illiquid, a prospective assessment 
of the situation suggests otherwise. The Greek state itself was on the brink of default during 
the first half of 2015, an event that would surely have pushed most of Greece’s lenders into 
bankruptcy.  The  discussion  of  the  point-in-time  and  prospective  assessments  of solvency 
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shows that the distinction between liquidity and solvency problems is difficult to draw and 
that there is a significantly large grey area in practice (Reichlin 2013; Pill 2013). As Helge 
Koenig, chair of Europe’s Single Resolution Board pointed out, “The line between ELA and 
delaying a collapse is fluid” (Speciale et al. 2015). The solvency of Greece’s banking system 
depends mostly on the choice of assessment: point-in-time versus prospective. 
8.2.2. Audience group pressure and the use of ELA 
According to authors like Götz et al. (2015) the ECB’s decision on the solvency of the 
banking system and, therefore, on the provision of ELA should be based solely on point-in- 
time assessments: As long as Greece is considered solvent or receives financial aid from the 
Eurozone, the banking system should be considered solvent as well. This argument is based  
on the idea that political decisions should be left to democratically legitimized actors. While 
Greece’s banking system can rely on ELA, political decision-makers have the time to decide. 
If ELA were discontinued, the resulting collapse of Greece’s financial system would likely 
push the real economy into the abyss and make a state default more probable, which would 
constrain the political decision-making process and its options (Götz et al. 2015). The ECB’s 
stance is more complicated. While Draghi (2015) points out that ELA is neither unlimited nor 
unconditional, the ECB has always operated under the assumption that Greece remains within 
the Euro and that Greece’s government will deliver on its promised reforms. At the same  
time, Draghi points out that the ECB applied a prospective assessment as well by including  
the debt crisis negotiation and its effects on government bonds in the evaluation of Greece’s 
banking sector’s solvency (Draghi 2015). In other words, while the ECB is not ignoring the 
results of the prospective assessment of Greece’s financial system, it is not willing to act 
decisively on its outcomes. This inconsistency between argumentation and action by the ECB 
illustrates the political dimension of ELA. 
As an audience group, the political actors involved had a vested interest in convincing their 
national central banks and the ECB to keep financial support for Greece available. Creditors 
and well as Greece’s negotiators were facing strong opposition from their respective publics. 
While in many creditor states public opinion was hostile toward any concessions, Greece’s 
negotiators were facing similar opposition to anything but an end of austerity and foreign 
intervention. With the risk of uncontrolled and perhaps accidental default off the table, 
creditors could negotiate much more aggressively and with less time pressure. In addition, 
even if they publicly condemned it, political actors from creditor countries probably tacitly 
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supported the use of ELA, as it meant that less of Greece’s financial needs had to be financed 
via taxpayers’ money from creditor states. ELA itself worked like a financial assistance 
program because of the importance of Greece’s financial sector for state finances. From 
Greece’s point of view, ELA permitted the government to continue negotiations without 
sliding into insolvency. The Greek side also knew that the longer the stand-off continued, the 
harder a default would be on its Eurozone partners because of the daily rising levels of ELA, 
as ELA had become the most important source of liquidity for Greece’s financial system and 
the Greek state. Unable to reach an agreement, politicians from creditor states and Greece 
forced the ECB to keep banks and the Greek state alive or risk a financial system meltdown in 
Greece (Reichlin 2013). As a result, the ECB had to succumb to being financially and fiscally 
dominated (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). 
Regarding the problem of financial dominance, the ECB used generous liquidity provisions to 
keep alive many banks in Greece alive that were struggling with liquidity and solvency issues. 
Banks acquired substantial amounts of their government’s debt, relying heavily on state 
guarantees, so the possibility of sovereign default would put their creditworthiness at risk. 
Especially the DTCs that make up the majority of banks’ capital would be worthless in the 
case of a default (Speciale et al. 2015). Therefore, the risk of the financial system’s collapse 
forced the ECB to continue ELA, as financial markets in the Eurozone were segmented along 
national borders, cross-border financial flows had dried up, and Greece’s banks were cut off 
from financial markets (Reichlin 2013; Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). It is this segmentation along 
national lines that weakened the political support for the ECB’s action in other Eurozone 
countries (Pill 2013). Greece’s sovereign debt crisis had, through the disentanglement of 
financial markets in the Eurozone, become mostly Greece’s problem again. Nevertheless, the 
liquidity needs of Greece’s financial system replaced economic fundamentals as the basis for 
monetary policy decisions. The ECB is also facing the risk of fiscal dominance, as the Greek 
state also depends on Greece’s banks for liquidity. As Greece’s banks have become the almost 
sole purchaser of Greece’s short-term debt, they have become important for the rollover of 
Greece’s sovereign debt (Ruparel 2015). The Bank of Greece provided ELA credit using 
state-guaranteed collateral and then used by Greece’s banks to buy Greece’s new government 
bonds. By using sovereign debt instruments as collateral and then using the liquidity to 
purchase additional Greek sovereign debt, ELA became government financing through the 
back door (Sinn 2015; Reichlin 2013; CESifo Group Munich 2015). The fact that there was 
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no legal objection to the monetization of private assets was used to circumvent the constraints 
regarding the purchase of sovereign debt (Bibow 2015). The economists Sinn and Fuest 
estimate that, since the beginning of 2015, the Greek state has received EUR 10 billion in 
financing through ELA, which exceeds by far the total amount of possible emergency funds 
discussed in negotiations with Greece’s debtors (CESifo Group Munich 2015). According to 
Sinn and Fuest, the ECB thereby delayed the insolvency of the Greek state and consequently 
violated the principle of non-intervention by the central bank in solvency issues (CESifo 
Group Munich 2015). The ECB’s deciding to continue ELA even after Greece missed its 
payment to the IMF, the EFSF’s declaring Greece’s government formally insolvent on July 3, 
and Greece’s announcing a referendum in which the government campaigned against a deal 
with debtors can hardly be explained along economic lines (CESifo Group Munich 2015; 
Jones 2015). Instead, these were political decisions on behalf of the ECB’s Governing 
Council. The incomplete nature of the Eurozone system, especially the lack of a fiscal 
backstop, means that the Eurozone would have to deal with substantial cross-border transfers 
resulting from the Eurozone’s balance sheet if there were a sovereign default. Sovereign 
default and the resulting risk of denomination of debt would have damaged the monetary- 
transmission channels because of financial fragmentation. In order to ensure the functioning  
of monetary policy across the whole Eurozone, the ECB had little choice but to support  
Greece (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). 
Finally, the ECB as an institution and a player also had several reasons for keeping the Greek 
state solvent but always on the brink of disaster. First, it ensured that the ECB did not have to 
make a decision that would likely have resulted in Greece’s default. Second, it made sure that 
the Greek side could not walk away from negotiations, as financial support was kept to a 
minimum. Third, ELA allowed the ECB to buy additional time for politicians to reach an 
agreement on financial aid for Greece. Draghi (2015) explains that the early discontinuation  
of ELA would have been a political decision on the future composition of the Eurozone. In 
other words, pulling the plug on Greece’s ELA would probably have resulted in a breakdown 
of Greece’s financial system, Greece’s default, and ultimately the country’s exit from the 




To conclude, granting ELA to Greece’s banks during the first half of 2015 was a difficult 
decision that can be explained only partly on economic grounds. While the ECB has 
repeatedly pointed out that Greece’s banks were illiquid but solvent throughout the whole 
crisis, a prospective assessment casts doubts on this statement. The rapid deterioration of 
Greece’s economy, coupled with banks’ capital that relied heavily on the Greek state’s 
solvency, and the high level of political uncertainty surrounding Greece’s membership in the 
Eurozone would have justified much shorter haircuts on the collateral provided by Greece’s 
banks or even an end to the ELA. While the likelihood of a Greek default kept growing, the 
ECB only banned Greece’s government debt from being used in the ECB’s own liquidity 
operations. However, the Bank of Greece was not hindered from using the same collateral the 
ECB deemed too unsecure for its own operation in its provision of ELA. As a result, the ECB 
allowed not only the financing of the massive capital flight from Greece but also the rollover 
of Greece’s sovereign debt. Without ELA, Greece’s financial system and government would 
have been forced into default or accepting a new financial aid package much earlier.  
However, the ECB used the assumption that Greece would remain within the Eurozone in an 
attempt to avoid the decision that a prospective assessment of Greece’s banks’ solvency 
situation would have dictated. By providing Greece’s financial system with excessive 
liquidity, the ECB prevented the insolvency that would result from rollover risks and ensured 
that its action, at least on paper, remained within the limits of the Eurozone’s treaties. 
Eurozone politicians’ had, through inactivity, forced the ECB into financing Greece’s 
financial system and state. Thus, the ECB accepted political dominance as well as fiscal and 
financial dominance. 
 
8.3. Eurozone Quantitative Easing 
 
On January 22, 2015, after months of debate, the ECB announced that it would launch QE to 
counter deflationary pressures in the Eurozone through the purchase of government debt on a 
large scale. At the time of the announcement, inflation had turned negative for a few months 
and had been below 1 percent for more than year (Dunne et al. 2015). The ECB’s Governing 
Council’s view was that the drop in crude oil prices would further embed expectations of low 
growth, inflation, and increased availability of credit (Dunne et al. 2015). Eurozone QE, 
named the public sector purchase program, was added to the already existing asset-backed 
securities purchase program (ABSPP) and the covered bond purchase program 3 (CBPP3)   to 
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form the expanded asset purchase program (expanded APP) (Dunne et al. 2015; Tonveronachi 
2015). Under QE, the ECB committed to purchasing EUR 1 trillion worth of debt by 
September 2016 or until the Governing Council was sure that inflation would reach the ECB’s 
inflation goal of just below 2 percent (Dunne et al. 2015). QE became operational in March 
2015 with monthly purchases of EUR 60 billion. Most of the EUR 60 billion was earmarked 
for public sector securities, including sovereign debt and debt issued by European agencies or 
other supranational entities (Dunne et al. 2015; Tonveronachi 2015). The ECB Governing 
Council also decided to keep purchases in line with the ECB’s capital key and committed only 
20 percent of the program to loss-sharing, with the remaining 80 percent to be bought by the 
respective national central banks and to remain on their balance sheets. The ECB also decided 
to buy no more than 25 percent of each issue and no more than 33 percent of any member 
state’s entire debt. Through these provisions, the ECB hoped to counter the fear of risk 
mutualization and government financing in the Eurozone. If a country’s debt did not have an 
investment-grade rating, a waiver would be granted if the country’s debt either fulfilled the 
ECB’s minimum collateral requirements or the country participated in a Eurozone rescue 
program (Tonveronachi 2015; Credit Agricole 2015; European Central Bank 2015). 
In contrast to the already existing asset purchase programs, the public sector purchase 
program’s goal was to battle deflation and to push households and firms to increase their 
consumption and investments by reducing interest rates through asset purchases, not to 
unblocking monetary policy transmission channels (Tonveronachi 2015). The goal was to 
push inflation back up toward the 2 percent goal by stimulating the European economy 
through a substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet, thereby firmly anchoring the  
mid- to long-term inflation expectations (Weidmann 2015b; BBVA 2015; Dunne et al. 2015). 
According to the ECB, QE is already generating some success in reducing economic slack  
and generating growth through reduced borrowing costs for companies and households 
(Draghi 2015). In addition, inflation expectations have stabilized, since inflation is back in the 
positive territory. While inflation rates remain low, the ECB expects a rise by the end of the 
year (Draghi 2015). This optimism is only partly shared by academics and financial 
institutions’ analysts, as empirical results regarding the effectiveness of sovereign debt 
purchasing programs have been inconclusive (Bernoth et al. 2015). While QE is expected to 
have a positive impact on growth rates, the risk of deflation remains, as QE will require a long 
time  to  increase  inflation  rates  to  the  ECB’s  target  of  close  to  2  percent  (BBVA 2015; 
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Delivorias 2015). In addition, mirroring the debate in literature, analysts are not convinced of 
the ultimate success of QE. Analysts from PwC, ABN Amro, Fidelity Worldwide Investment, 
and other institutions point out that high debt levels and low international competitiveness are 
at the heart of slow European economic growth, and as long as the Eurozone’s governments 
are not willing to engage in deep structural reforms, business will likely remain reluctant to 
invest, especially as long as the debt overhang persists (Jost 2015; Kollewe 2015; Praet 2015). 
Analysts also point to the already low interest rates that will likely limit QE’s impact  
(Kollewe 2015). According to Georgiadis and Gräb (2015), the only significant effects of the 
Eurozone QE so far has been the Euro’s depreciation and the boost in equity prices around the 
world. Rather than leading to portfolio rebalancing or increased bank lending, QE convinced 
market participants that the ECB would not tighten monetary conditions in the near future 
(Georgiadis/Gräb 2015). The debate illustrates the persistent skepticism with regard to the 
QE’s effectiveness in the Eurozone. In addition, the ECB’s past efforts to help the Eurozone’s 
economy recover have only increased the Eurozone’s dependence on central bank money 
without raising inflation and growth rates significantly (Akagawa 2015). 
Despite ultra-low inflation rates, the decision to launch QE in March 2015 was not made 
unanimously but by majority vote. While there has been consensus about the legitimacy of the 
purchase of government bonds on secondary markets according to the ECB’s capital share as 
a monetary-policy tool, there was no agreement on the necessity for QE at this stage 
(Tonveronachi 2015). 
The next section assesses the legitimacy of QE as a monetary policy instrument and the 
economic and political reasons for the launch of the Eurozone QE. 
8.3.1. Assessment of QE’s legitimacy 
The debate surrounding the use of QE in the Eurozone after interest rates have hit the zero 
lower bound usually follows three lines of argument: the purchase of sovereign debt is 
illegitimate, the purchase of sovereign debt is ineffective, and the side effects of asset 
purchases are damaging (Winkler 2015b). This assessment of QE begins with an analysis of 
QE’s legitimacy as a monetary instrument and its appropriateness in the Eurozone context. 
Perhaps the question concerning the legitimacy of sovereign debt purchases on secondary 
markets has been answered. The ECB’s Governing Council unanimously accepted QE as a 
legitimate monetary policy instrument in January 2015 (Tonveronachi 2015). Despite fierce 
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critique among public opinion and some academics in Germany, Bundesbank President 
Weidmann voted along with his colleagues on the question of legitimacy, even as he voted 
against its use (Winkler 2015a). However, the legitimacy of QE in the Eurozone is difficult to 
assess. The Governing Council did not answer the question concerning under what 
circumstances asset purchases should be considered legitimate. In light of the difference 
between the voting on legitimacy and that on the use of QE in March 2015, it is clear that the 
members of the Governing Council differed with regard to the requisite circumstances. 
According to Winkler (2015b), the dispute can be explained based on the economic theory 
dominant in each of the members’ respective national central banks. Most of the central bank 
governors followed Fisher’s, Keynes’, and Friedman’s argument that failure to meet the 
ECB’s inflation target would result in substantial costs; although inflation fell short of the 
target, this school of thought suggested that not using QE would have been irresponsible 
(Winkler 2015b). A number of scholars agree, including Fritsche and Tarassow (2015), who 
argue that the institutional malfunction that makes fiscal policy coordination undesirable 
comes at considerable cost. In the case of the Eurozone, political blockade and haggling over 
austerity forced monetary policy authorities to adopt an aggressive monetary stance,  
especially in light of the deflation risk (Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). The minority of central bank 
governors, including Bundesbank President Weidmann, adhered to a different school of 
thought, based on Hayek. According to this theory, low inflation rates or even mild deflation 
do not need to be combatted by monetary policy, although action to increase economic  
activity using interest-rate setting or unconventional monetary-policy support for the banking 
sector can be tolerated. The purchase of sovereign debt is a different matter entirely, as its 
negative side effects mean that it is warranted only in the case of a deflationary spiral, a 
situation not yet present in the Eurozone (Winkler 2015b). One of the most important negative 
side effects is the effect of QE on government finances. Because of QE’s incomplete nature, 
the Eurozone is faced with a constant struggle for dominance between national fiscal and 
Eurozone-wide monetary policy. The purchase of sovereign debt on secondary markets might, 
in this context, undermine fiscal discipline as one of the Eurozone’s core conditions (Winkler 
2015b). Therefore, the dispute between Bundesbank President Weidman and ECB President 
Draghi is not necessarily one of principle. Both accept QE as a monetary policy tool, but they 
differ in their assessments of the circumstances and QE’s possible side effects. The Governing 
Council faces two core dilemmas: an economic one and a political one. The economic 
dilemma is the decision about the economic necessity for QE in the Eurozone, including the 
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question concerning of the instrument’s effectiveness in the context of a common currency 
without a fiscal or political union. The political dilemma centers on the question concerning 
the extent to which QE will undermine the incentive for economic reforms in struggling 
Eurozone countries. In the following section, I will turn to the economic assessment. 
8.3.2. Economic reasons for QE 
While most of the literature suggests that the self-enforcing nature of the deflationary spiral 
requires forceful, credible monetary policy actions, Borio et al. (2015) point out that price 
deflations have not always resulted in negative growth rates. To the contrary, with the 
exception of the Great Depression, the price deflations of goods and services had a lower 
impact on growth rates than did the price deflations of assets. Nevertheless, most of the 
literature holds little disagreement with regard to the gravity of self-enforcing deflation. 
Usually one of the results of a decline in aggregate demand that forces companies to cut  
prices repeatedly, deflation affects the economy through two channels: First, deflation 
increases the real value of debt if debt is fixed in nominal terms, as an increase in real value 
pressures on debtors, and a lower demand for credits can pressure creditors and may cause a 
credit crunch. Second, expecting falling prices, households and companies postpone 
consumption and investments indefinitely (Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). 
If agreement about the negative outcomes of deflationary spirals is almost universal in the 
literature, the question at the heart of the debate concerns whether the Eurozone was on the 
brink of a deflationary spiral. Most of the ECB’s Governing Council seem to have believed 
so. The ECB announced the QE in January 2015 in an attempt to fulfill its price stability 
mandate by reducing the risk of a prolonged period of low inflation. According to the ECB, at 
the time of the decision, most indicators of actual and future inflation had reached historic 
lows. To battle deflation’s potential effects on wages and price-setting, the ECB Governing 
Council decided that a strong response was necessary to prevent a deflationary spiral 
(European Central Bank 2015). Measurements of inflation expectations that focus on the 
actual behavior of market actors instead of self-reported expectations have confirmed the 
ECB’s view. Breakdown inflation, which is defined as the yield differential between nominal 
debt and inflation-indexed debt and is many analysts’ preferred measurement of inflation 
expectation, has trended downward (Badel 2014). As calculated by Eurostat, core inflation 
adjusted for energy and unprocessed food reached its lowest levels in January 2015 at 0.6 
percent, with forecasts predicting a further reduction to -0.4 percent before a gradual  increase 
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to 1.4 percent in 2020. However, inflation rates in the Eurozone have been variable. While in 
Germany only 19 percent of prices have been declining, considerably more have declined in 
crisis countries like Spain and Portugal (Bernoth et al. 2015). As Fritsche and Tarassow 
(2015) point out, the share of products with falling prices has increased in the past months, 
reaching levels of up to 80 percent in Greece. Therefore, for Spain, Italy, and  Greece, 
deflation is not just a prospect but reality as prices across all product groups are falling. 
However, the ECB’s assessment of the situation in the Eurozone is not universally shared. 
Critics, most prominently Bundesbank President Weidmann, have pointed to low oil prices as 
the main source of low inflation rates, but this phenomenon, which is likely to be short-lived, 
serves as a massive support program for the Eurozone’s economy as companies pass on some 
of their savings to consumers. The extent to which a Eurozone economy benefits from low 
energy prices is not uniform but depends on the energy intensity of the country’s economy,  
the duration of the decline in oil prices, and the stability of income in the country. Another 
source of the low inflation rate is deflationary pressures in the crisis countries that are due to 
economic restructuring. As crisis countries can no longer use currency devaluation as a 
shortcut to competitiveness and lower deficits, they have to devalue internally to achieve  
these goals. As a result, either production costs must fall or productivity in the tradable sector 
must rise, making the tradable sector more profitable then the non-tradable sector. As long as 
the adjustment process continues, low import demand, underutilization of capacity, fiscal 
consolidation, and balance sheet adjustments through debt reduction will persist, leading to 
deflationary pressure on prices. Therefore, deflationary developments in countries like Spain 
and Greece could be attributed to the side effects of a generally desirable internal devaluation. 
However, the overall low inflation rates in the rest of the Eurozone complicate the situation in 
the crisis countries, as they have to push their own inflation rates down even farther in order  
to achieve real depreciation (Winkler 2015b; Weidmann 2015a, 2015b; Bernoth et al. 2015; 
Jost 2015; Polak 2014). 
Therefore, for the critics the low inflation rates do not point to a deflationary spiral, which 
they see as only a remote possibility, but to a variety of factors that monetary policy can 
influence to only a minimal degree. 
A core question in the debate about the economic necessity for QE and an important indicator 
for monetary policy makers concerns to what extent medium- to long-term inflation 
expectations have changed. Anchoring inflation expectations works along three parameters: 
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expectations must be stable, moving only in a narrow inflation-rate band; uncertainty about 
the realization of future rates should be low, as uncertainty is considered a sign of low trust in 
the central bank’s ability to control inflation, shaking inflation expectations; and expectations 
should react only marginally to political and economic news, reflecting the trust participants 
place in the central banks’ ability to keep inflation in check (Scharnagl/Stapf 2014). 
According to Scharnagl and Stapf (2014), average inflation expectations for the Eurozone 
have decreased over the past couple of years, and uncertainty regarding future inflation rates 
has risen because of the European debt crisis. Other authors confirm declining inflation 
expectations among professional forecasters and households (Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). At the 
same time that the effect of the ECB’s communication and the Eurozone’s macroeconomic 
news on inflation expectations has declined, macroeconomic news from crisis countries has 
gained influence. Heterogeneity among Eurozone countries in such areas as bond yields and 
inflation rates and resulting deflationary pressures have increased the effect of 
macroeconomic news from debt-crisis heavyweights like Italy. The observations point to 
increasing disagreement among market participants about the central banks’ ability to handle 
the potential for extreme outcomes like high rates of inflation and deflation (Scharnagl/Stapf 
2014; Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). 
To sum up, while optimists point out that the fall in energy prices and crisis countries’ internal 
adjustments are the core sources of low inflation rates, the weak economy and the high debt 
levels mean that deflation could have grave effects on the Eurozone. That deflationary 
pressures are partly the result of debt-depressed demand exacerbates the problem (Legrain 
2015). Overall, the ECB’s decision to engage in QE seems to be mostly the result of mounting 
unease about deflationary pressures, a fear that the general public would get used to 
stagnating prices, the disappointing results of previous measures, the feeling of urgency about 
battling falling inflation and inflation expectations, and significant public pressure to act 
(Bibow 2015; Jost 2015; Bernoth et al. 2015). As banking analysts point out, considering that 
fiscal policies were still heavily constrained by deleveraging and that it had few alternatives to 
QE, the ECB was forced to act (Kollewe 2015; Blackstone et al. 2015; Subacchi 2015). 
The success rate of QE in the US, the UK, and Japan is mixed. Central banks have employed 
QE in the US and the UK since 2008. According to the Fed, QE had some success in reducing 
the unemployment rate by 1.5 percent in 2012 and returning markets to normal during the 
crisis, and the Fed’s board concluded that QE had helped job growth (Delivorias 2015). The 
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cheap money provided by the Fed allowed market participants to dump assets that had 
suddenly become toxic (Seith 2014). Researchers at the Bank of England confirmed the 
positive effects, finding that 1 percent of GDP in purchases translated into 0.36 percent in 
GDP growth and a 0.38 percent rise in the consumer price index in the US and 0.18 percent in 
GDP growth and a 0.3 percent rise in the consumer price index in the UK (Delivorias 2015). 
In Japan, QE was successful only for a limited time. The strategy, called “Abenomics” for 
Japanese Prime Minister Abe, generated a short high in 2013 before the inflation rate and  
GDP growth started to drop again (Seith 2014). Despite launching its third round of QE in late 
2014, Japan is still trapped in low growth, which calls the program’s efficacy into question 
(Kollewe 2015). In addition, the yen’s depreciation did not have the necessary strong effect  
on exports (Delivorias 2015). Despite the massive influx of central bank money, households 
and businesses remain too indebted to borrow more, and banks have failed to clear their books 
of bad loans. According to Seith (2014), Japan provides a good example of QE’s low 
effectiveness when not coupled with much needed structural reforms. 
There remains some disagreement in the literature about the effectiveness of each  
transmission channel. Some studies see a strong effect of QE on the long-term interest rates of 
government bonds, especially at the beginning of QE (Seith 2014; Bernoth et al. 2015), but 
later rounds of QE had only small or even no statistically significant effects (Bernoth et al. 
2015). Other scholars claim that government bond purchases not only benefitted long-term 
interest rates of government bonds but also affected corporate bonds and, to a much lesser 
extent, the foreign exchange rate (Bernoth et al. 2015). On the other hand, Legrain (2015) 
contends that QE’s effect on the foreign exchange rate was the most important one and that, 
while it artificially inflated asset prices without increasing household consumption and 
corporate investments, the resulting currency depreciation had a strong effect on growth and 
inflation (Legrain 2015). 
As for QE in the Eurozone, Dunne (2015) argues that QE is ineffective as a monetary policy 
tool, as the mechanism through which QE is intended to work is the expansion of money 
supply, which increases asset prices, lowers bond yields, and reduces interest rates. 
The first core assumption of those who support Eurozone QE is that current bank lending has 
been decreasing because of restricted access to liquidity. According to theory, banks should  
be eager to lend liquidity to the real economy in excess of their capital reserves to make a 
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return. This transmission channel is called the bank lending channel (Dunne et al. 2015; 
Wyplosz 2014). However, that banks’ hold reserves in excess of EUR 100 billion in the 
Eurozone creates a flaw in the liquidity-shortage assumption. The two other theories are that 
there is low demand for loans in the real economy because of slowly growing economies in 
the Eurozone and that banks are too risk-averse to lend (Wyplosz 2014). Banks are still 
deleveraging in order to fulfill new regulations and pass European stress tests while, at the 
same time, ongoing weak economic growth reduces cooperate rates of return and high 
unemployment makes lending to private households risky (Wyplosz 2014; Subacchi 2015). If 
the observations of low loan demand and risk aversion are correct, there is little reason to 
believe that QE will be effective, as similar to previous liquidity provisions, liquidity will not 
filter through the banking sector into the real economy (Ruparel 2015). After all, the ECB’s 
quarterly lending survey shows historic lows across all loan categories (Delivorias 2015). 
Another channel through which QE is supposed to work is the portfolio re-balancing channel. 
QE forces additional liquidity into assets like corporate bonds and equity, driving down their 
interest rates and increasing their value. Similar to the bank lending channel, the portfolio re- 
balancing channel is unlikely to have much of an impact on the investment and consumption 
behavior in the Eurozone (Dunne et al. 2015). Interest rates have already dropped to historic 
lows because of previous interventions, without increasing economic activity or inflation. 
Almost a third of European debt, ranging from money market debt to sovereign debt, has 
shown negative interest rates for some time (Ruparel 2015; BBVA 2015; Delivorias 2015; 
Bernoth et al. 2015). In addition, unlike those in the UK and US, non-financial companies in 
the Eurozone receive roughly 85 percent of their funding from banks instead of capital 
markets, and households have considerably less exposure to financial assets. Therefore, the 
wealth effect of lifted asset prices will remain small and QE will probably be less effective in 
sparking more investments and consumption in the Eurozone than in other countries, and its 
success will depend to a great extent on the banks’ willingness to lend (Ruparel 2015; 
Delivorias 2015; Randow 2015; Subacchi 2015). 
The third channel through which QE works, the signaling channel, is likely to have a positive 
impact on inflation expectations through the purchase of inflation-linked assets and boosted 
confidence in the ECB’s promise to increase inflation. QE signals that the ECB is committed 
to its inflation target and that it intends to keep interest rates at low levels for the foreseeable 
future (Credit Agricole 2015; Dunne et al. 2015). In addition, QE will incent bond holders   to 
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sell their euro-denominated bonds and convert the proceeds into other currencies, thereby 
driving down the Euro’s value (Subacchi 2015). While the effect of signaling is often difficult 
to assess, as financial markets usually at least partly anticipate central bank measures, 
Georgiadis and Gräb (2015) identify the announcement of QE as the major reason for the 
Euro’s devaluation. In addition, banking analysts suggest that the ECB will adjust the size, 
pace, and composition of the program if necessary, boosting confidence in the ECB’s ability  
to achieve its desired outcomes (Credit Agricole 2015). 
8.3.3. Audience group pressure and QE 
The decisions for QE led to a lively debate within the ECB and among politicians, academics 
and the general public (Delivorias 2015). Commentators in the Eurozone’s biggest economy, 
Germany, claim that the tradition of stability-oriented policy has been abandoned 
(Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). 
The question concerning why Eurozone QE is so different from Fed-style QE is especially 
important. The easiest approach to QE would have been to buy government debt on large, 
liquid secondary markets. For example, the Fed and the Bank of England followed this 
approach, acquiring 20–30 percent of their respective sovereign bonds (de Grauwe/Ji 2015; 
Ruparel 2015). However, for the ECB this technically easiest and most promising approach 
has proven to be politically difficult. Its blurring of the borderline between fiscal and  
monetary policy has resulted in fierce resistance from Germany’s Bundesbank,  
administration, and academics, forcing the ECB to alter its QE program (de Grauwe/Ji 2015). 
Therefore, the alternations were essentially the result of political considerations. 
One of the core arguments made against the introduction of QE is that it would reduce 
governments’ incentives for deep structural reforms. While this argument appears to be an 
economic argument, it is a political one. Without the ability to coerce Eurozone governments 
into responsible fiscal and economic policy, policy-makers must rely on market pressure to 
convince unwilling governments. Germany’s administration fears that, by increasing growth 
and decreasing borrowing costs, the ECB will lift pressure off reform-weary Eurozone 
governments (Blackstone et al. 2015), a possible explanation for its fierce resistance. The 
critics anticipate that political pressure will keep interest burdens low in the long run but fear 
that market pressure and its disciplinary effect on Eurozone governments will once again 
crumble   (Weidmann   2015a;   Weidmann   2015b;   Bernoth   et   al.   2015;   Kollewe 2015; 
128  
Darvas/Merler 2013). In addition, there is concern that QE will distort the market for 
government debt, reviving the illusion that debt from all Eurozone countries is equally safe 
(The Economist 2015) and tempting market participants to ignore once again the risks 
associated with investing (Seith 2014). What’s more, primary market actors might acquire 
only certain sovereign bonds because they can off-load them to the respective national central 
bank on secondary markets (Darvas/Merler 2013). The closer the time of the purchases of  
debt on secondary markets is to the date of the issuance of the debt on primary markets, the 
lower the risk for the purchaser on primary markets (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012). As Ruparel 
points out, free-riding by politicians is most likely not sustainable in the long run, especially  
as the Eurozone remains reluctant to reform. Examples of such reluctance are plentiful, 
including the failure to make the Stability and Growth Pact more effective in controlling fiscal 
deficits and establishing a working banking union (Ruparel 2015; Akagawa 2015).  
Experience from the US and Japan suggest that structural reform is key, but there is little 
enthusiasm for reform in some of the Eurozone’s biggest economies, including Italy and 
France (Blackstone et al. 2015). Thus, the effects of QE will be short-term at best, buying 
governments additional time to restructure their economy. Monetary policy alone will not be 
enough to ensure sustainable and durable economic recovery (Bernoth et al. 2015; Draghi 
2015; Blackstone et al. 2015; Akagawa 2015). 
At the same time, the ECB is in danger of losing its independence to fiscal dominance.  
Central banks have become the Eurozone governments’ biggest creditors, and their swelling 
balance sheets might lead to difficult interdependencies between fiscal and monetary policy 
(Bernoth et al. 2015). Should markets lose confidence in sovereign debtors, the ECB would be 
forced into buying ever more debt in order to avoid massive losses. Both events would 
seriously damage the ECB’s reputation (The Economist 2015; Darvas/Merler 2013). 
As a result of these considerations and criticism about QE, the ECB decided to purchase 
government debt solely on secondary markets and in line with the ECB’s national capital key. 
Although it was still potentially borderline debt monetization, the first part of the decision was 
based on the Eurozone treaties’ prohibition of government financing through the money 
printing press. The split of purchases along the ECB’s capital key was introduced only after 
considerable pressure from Germany (Darvas/Merler 2013). Unlike the US and the UK cases, 
purchases of government debt that did not follow the capital key would result in redistribution 
of financial resources, as there are no Eurozone-wide debt instruments or common fiscal 
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backstops for the ECB (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012). While the split of purchases along the 
capital key prevents the redistribution of financial resources, it also undermines the program’s 
effectiveness The ECB will purchase EUR 7.2 billion from European institutions and other 
supranational institutions and spend the remaining EUR 52.8 on Eurozone government bonds 
(Bernoth et al. 2015). Of the total EUR 1 trillion, only a small amount will be used to buy the 
sovereign bonds of the countries that are most in need of cheap capital and where deflationary 
pressures are highest. For example, only 15 percent of all purchases will be of Spain’s 
government debt, while almost 25 percent of purchases will be Germany’s (Ruparel 2015). To 
be maximally effective, QE should focus on the worst-indebted countries, as their sovereign 
debt is already concentrated on their national central banks’ balance sheets (Wyplosz 2014). 
Instead of closing the interest rate spread gap between the crisis countries and the Eurozone 
core countries, the need to purchase German and other low-yield or even negative bonds will 
widen the gap, especially considering that market participants already seek the sovereign 
bonds of countries like Germany as zero-risk bonds (Jones 2015; Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). 
However, without sufficient political support, it is unlikely that the ECB will be able to ignore 
its decision to purchase government debt in line with its capital key, even though further 
reduction in Germany’s sovereign and cooperate bonds is unlikely to increase consumption or 
investment (Jones 2015; Ruparel 2015). Germany’s households and companies have enough 
cash that they choose not to spend, and its economy is already operating close to capacity 
(Ruparel 2015). At the same time, these limits might re-install a truly Eurozone-wide 
monetary policy and ensure that inflation, not government deficit financing, is at the heart of 
QE. By adhering to the capital key quota, the ECB limits the risk of unduly supporting debt- 
ridden countries. 
The second part of the ECB’s decision that makes Eurozone-style QE different to traditional 
QE is the low risk-sharing, which also appears to be largely a political concession (Credit 
Agricole 2015). While the ECB has repeatedly suggested that a default outside the Eurozone 
would be illegal, the question concerning how to handle government default risk has been a 
major concern in Germany (Legrain 2015). The example of Italy, the Eurozone’s biggest bond 
market and the living embodiment of the “too big to fail” theory, shows that the risk of default 
would put the ECB into the difficult position of having to face hefty loses, most of which 
Germany would have to bear, or continuing to purchase the debt of the by-then-insolvent Italy 
(Legrain   2015).   By  agreeing  to   only  20  percent  risk-sharing,  the   ECB  avoided      the 
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mutualization of risk for the remaining 80 percent of the program, as long as any country 
defaults only within the Eurozone (Bibow 2015). While some academics stress the beneficial 
side of the agreement, as the central banks in the Eurozone’s periphery do not have to share 
their higher interest proceeds with the whole Eurozone, others point to the fact that, past a 
certain threshold, possible losses by the respective national central bank will outweigh the 
gain from additional debt purchases (Credit Agricole 2015; Jones 2015). 
Therefore, QE is not designed only with economic necessities in mind; it is often a political 
compromise. The legality of QE, the pari passu clause, and its launch in March 2015 were 
traded against inflation targeting as the sole objective, purchases along capital shares, and 
limited risk-sharing (Tonveronachi 2015). 
Why did the ECB give in to these political considerations? An examination of the interests of 
core audience groups can provide the answer. One explanation is that the repeated outvoting  
of the Bundesbank at ECB meetings led to the hardening of political and public opinion in 
Germany, which might have reduced Chancellor Merkel’s room to manoeuver. Despite 
signaling that Germany is opposed to monetary easing and reducing pressure on profligate 
Eurozone countries, Merkel publicly assured the ECB’s independence to act as it sees fit 
(Ruparel 2015; Warner 2015). The time when Germany’s government at least tacitly 
supported the ECB in its quest to support debt-ridden Eurozone countries, despite the treaty’s 
prohibition of government financing, may have come to an end because of the rising political 
and economic costs (Streeck 2015). The ECB’s introduction of QE years after central banks in 
the US and UK did so is probably due in part to Germany’s opposition to it. Both Germany’s 
administration and the Bundesbank have consistently voiced their concerns (Warner 2015). 
According to some scholars, opposition to expanding money supply for the fear of inflation 
has become a matter of principle in Germany, even though falling prices have recently been a 
greater threat (Randow 2015). Others see an obsession with legality and rules at the heart of 
Germany’s opposition, that its resistance can be explained by historic fears of inflation, 
misplaced incentives for indebted countries, and the fact that QE might be illegal under the 
Eurozone treaties (Warner 2015). While ECB President Draghi could probably have received 
sufficient votes for traditional QE, he chose to adjust the program in a way that—at least in 
principle—was acceptable to Germany. As Fratzscher, the head of the German think-thank 
DIW, points out, Germany’s support is vital for the ECB’s monetary policy, as a rift would 
have put the Eurozone’s two most influential powers, Germany and the ECB, at odds  (Barkin 
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2015). Before the January 2015 ECB decision, a high German official stated off the record 
that the ECB had to be careful not to cross the red line of government financing if it were to 
prevent a fierce reaction from Germany and that a low level of risk-sharing, an idea first 
floated by Bundesbank President Weidman, could be an acceptable solution for Germany 
(Barkin 2015). Therefore, ECB President Draghi’s doctrine of “whatever it takes” appears to 
have limits that are set by the German members of the Governing Council. The price for 
Germany’s support was limiting debt mutualization (Subacchi 2015). 
Despite the changes to QE, audience groups in the Eurozone periphery hailed its launch as a 
victory over Germany. According to Streeck (2015), although Draghi is an outspoken 
neoliberal, he is regarded in Italy as a hero for forcing Germany into QE, as Germany had to 
compromise and accept southern European demands (Warner 2015). Akagawa (2015) 
observes that political pressure likely played a significant role in shoring up support for QE 
among governors of southern national central banks and that top Italian officials had tried to 
convince ECB President Draghi of QE in November 2014. For many Eurozone governments, 
monetary policy is an attractive way to support their economies through cheap liquidity and 
depreciation instead of reform (Akagawa 2015). QE also allows countries in the periphery to 
continue issuing high levels of sovereign debt at lower interest rates (Randow 2015). In fact, 
both Spain and Italy used the first four months of 2015 to place 40 percent of their total yearly 
issuance. Maturities have started to lengthen as well (BBVA 2015). Lower interest rates 
decrease the pressure on fiscal budgets, giving governments more room to maneuver (Bernoth 
et al. 2015). For governments, financing through monetary policy is worthwhile, as it allows 
politicians to reduce or at least postpone the pressure for structural reform (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2012). While the ECB has taken measures to limit the bailout of the most 
profligate debt-ridden countries that are dragging their heels on reform (e.g., Greece), 
Eurozone heavyweights like Italy and France are also counting on QE more than on structural 
reform (Akagawa 2015; Randow 2015). 
The financial sector as an audience group probably supported the launch of QE in all  
Eurozone countries, as from an investor’s point of view, it would be irrational not to try to 
profit from this almost risk-free opportunity. In addition, especially in the periphery, the 
holders of the most sovereign bonds are commercial banks. Over the last three years, their 
exposure has risen considerably, as sovereign bonds are still seen as a low risk investment. 
Therefore,  changes  in  states’ creditworthiness  directly affect  banks’ balance sheets  and, in 
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turn, threaten the stability of the respective country’s financial system. A good example of  
this dynamic was Greece’s banking system in spring and summer 2015. Countries in the 
periphery pay considerably higher interest rates than do the more stable countries of the core, 
but at the same time QE allows the sovereign bonds even from the periphery to be converted 
into liquidity rapidly if necessary (BBVA 2015). 
Another non-political explanation for the divergent interests of the audience groups in 
southern and northern European countries is the differing political economies in the Eurozone. 
Countries in the south of Europe have developed an economic system based on domestic 
demand, stimulated by public deficits, security of employment, and resulting inflation  
(Streeck 2015). Therefore, inflation is not necessarily seen as an evil, as it allows for large 
public debt through constant devaluation of the nominal stock. Countries that have operated 
under this economic model have used currency devaluation in the past to achieve international 
competitiveness. On the other hand, the northern European countries operate on an export- 
driven economy, and inflation, with its negative effect on international competitiveness, is the 
enemy. Instead of devaluation, these countries have relied on a tight grip on prices through 
rigorous monetary policy (Streeck 2015). Thus, QE benefits southern Europe’s economic 
system by bringing inflation up to 2 percent and devaluing the previously strong Euro, which 
political leaders like Italy’s Prime Minister Letta have made responsible for slow economic 
recovery (Streeck 2015). 
While no of the two economic system is inherently better than the other, the differing political 
economies on which the Eurozone is built can partly explain the heated debate over QE. 
Economic disparities are likely to cause additional conflict between Eurozone countries in the 
future, as southern European countries will continue to ask for financial support, while for 
political reasons northern European countries will be able to provide only a fraction of the 
demanded financial support in exchange for fiscal oversight (Streeck 2015). 
Finally, the years that it took the ECB to reach a conclusion in favor of QE show the deep- 
seated ideological beliefs that had to be overcome. ECB President Draghi had to enlist enough 
political support to defeat Germany’s opposition to QE while at the same time applying 
changes to traditional QE in order to reduce the level of resistance (Collins 2014). While the 
ECB sees QE as a necessary evil to prevent the Eurozone from sliding into deflation, and 
regardless of the apparent agreement across the Governing Council, parts of the literature  and 
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public opinion (e.g., in Germany) regard the purchase of government debt as a violation of 
principle. For them, the dispute is not about whether bond purchases are inevitable to prevent 
the Eurozone from sliding into deflation but whether QE is a violation of the principle that the 
central bank should not finance governments through the back door (Seith 2014; Subacchi 
2015). It is the violation of principle and of the Treaties that form the basis of the Eurozone 
that, even before QE, have resulted in numerous legal battles, especially in Germany’s 
Constitutional Court (Delivorias 2015). 
8.3.4. Conclusion 
To sum up, while the ECB Governing Council decided by majority vote to implement 
monetary easing via an asset-purchasing program, the outline of the program reflects a 
political compromise with QE opponents like Germany. Instead of implementing traditional 
QE along the lines of the policies enacted in the US and the UK, the ECB Governing Council 
chose to introduce alterations, the two most important of which reflect German concerns  
about risk-sharing and capital share quota purchases: the ECB would purchase sovereign debt 
in line with the respective country’s share in the ECB’s capital, and 80 percent of the risk 
associated with these purchases would remain on the respective countries’ central banks’ 
balance sheets. Low risk-sharing reflects the incomplete nature of the Eurozone, which lacks a 
common fiscal backstop, and reduces the incentive for reckless fiscal policies. Both  
alterations render the Eurozone’s QE less effective by steering almost 25 percent of total 
purchases to Germany instead of concentrating it on the countries that have to pay high 
interest rates on their government debt and that show the strongest deflationary signals. On  
the plus side, it marks a return to a common Eurozone monetary policy. National demand for 
debt relief and debt monetization will not be at the heart of QE, but battling deflation will 
(Tonveronachi 2015). QE is a renunciation of the ECB’s previous politically conditioned 
policies toward an approach driven by economic developments (Bibow 2015). The fact that 
opponents claim that QE is not intended to overcome the deep structural problems of the 
Eurozone is true but irrelevant; it is not the responsibility of monetary policy to overcome 
structural problems but to avoid deflation in order to improve growth conditions (Winkler 
2015a). 
To sum up, QE is the logical continuation of ECB President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” 
speech. Forced by political inactivity and the grave design flaws in the Eurozone, the ECB 
moved  beyond  simple  monetary  policy  to  become  a  political  institution.  By     assuming 
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responsibility for the survival of the Eurozone, the ECB lost its political innocence 
(Fritsche/Tarassow 2015). 
 
8.4. The Trichet/Draghi letter and the ECB’s implicit conditionality 
 
The decision to include Italy’s debt in the SMP program, while not necessarily the result of 
external pressure, demonstrates that, after the ECB accommodated political demands a first 
time by effectively bailing out the Greek state, there was no easy way back. Instead, faced 
with political inactivity, the ECB was forced to become even more political in order to guard  
a minimum of its monetary independence. 
Italy’s government and Italy’s financial system became the focal point of the European debt 
crisis in summer 2011. Because of several unfavorable events, including the long discussions 
surrounding the second bailout of Greece, Portugal’s need for financial assistance and the 
flawed stress test of European banks added up to a crisis in confidence. Despite solid budget 
surpluses for most of the preceding two decades and the fact that national aggregate wealth 
was vastly greater than national debt, Italy moved into the focus of the contagion debate, and 
political stalemate and structurally low growth rates fueled concerns (Sacchi 2015). Interest 
rates on Italy’s government debt rocketed to prohibitively high levels, risking an effective 
lock-out from financial markets. Italy’s prime minister’s speech to parliament on August 3, 
2011, denying the need for additional reforms did little to stop the flight to safety. On August 
4, after weeks of public discussion about the possibility of an ECB intervention on behalf of 
deeply indebted Eurozone countries and calls from politicians like French President Sarkozy 
for such a decision, the ECB Governing Council announced that it would resume its SMP in 
order to calm markets down. The decision was made by majority vote, with Germany’s, 
Holland’s, and Luxembourg’s Governing Council members in the minority (Sacchi 2015; 
Walker et al. 2011; Darvas/Merler 2013). 
While the argument concerning the resumption of SMP was the same as it had been in earlier 
cases, centering on dysfunctional transmission channels, the fact that ECB President Trichet 
and his successor, Italy’s Central Bank President Draghi, co-signed a confidential letter to 
Prime Minister Berlusconi outlining the conditions for the inclusion of Italy’s sovereign debt 
in SMP was new. While the letter never mentioned SMP, the intention of a quid-pro-quo deal 
was clear, as the letter specified the expected reforms and policy alternatives and demanded 
that  Italy’s  government  implement  the  reforms  swiftly.  Ratification  by  parliament    was 
135  
envisioned for September 2011 (Sacchi 2015). The ECB assumed that purchases of Italy’s 
sovereign debt, coupled with adequate austerity measures in Italy, would be enough to calm 
the markets and disperse doubts about Italy’s solvency (Zingales 2011). Prime Minister 
Berlusconi replied on August 7, pledging far-reaching reforms and deeper budget cuts, and a 
day later, the ECB started to buy Italy’s sovereign debt for the first time, calming markets and 
reducing the spread between Germany’s and Italy’s bonds. By the end of August 2011, facing 
national audience groups’ internal opposition to reform and feeling reassured by the drop in 
interest rates, Italy’s government again backed away from substantial reforms. As a result, 
investors took to flight, and Italy’s interest rates rose again. At the beginning of November 
2011, members of the ECB Governing Council publicly discussed the possibility of halting 
purchases of Italy’s bonds under SMP if Italy’s government did not successfully conclude the 
promised reforms. When the ECB eventually stopped buying Italy’s bonds, the resulting spike 
in interest rates led to Prime Minister Berlusconi’s replacement by the technocrat Mario 
Monti, whose government immediately pledged deep reforms (Sacchi 2015; Walker et al. 
2011; Zingales 2011; Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). 
With its decision to expand SMP to Italy’s debt only in return for reforms and budget cuts, the 
ECB introduced a monetary policy with conditionality (Darvas/Merler 2013). As there was no 
formal way to impose conditionality on Italy–Italy had never signed up for a formalized 
conditional aid program–the ECB resorted to the implicit conditionality of a letter to the  
prime minister (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015; Sacchi 2015). While implicit conditionality has no 
powerful public audience to ensure compliance, sensible monitoring, coupled with market 
discipline as a powerful enforcement mechanism, can make it an effective way for the ECB to 
influence sovereign actions (Sacchi 2015). At the same time, implicit conditionality attached 
to SMP raises two important issues: First and most important is that it moves the central bank 
into the fiscal space such that the central bank becomes a sort of European IMF, asking for 
detailed reforms in return for financial relief (Engelen 2011). In essence, the ECB assumed  
the roles and responsibilities that political actors had previously assigned to the European 
bailout fund EFSF (Hooper/Wilsher 2011). While such a move is difficult to defend for a 
mandate-driven, independent monetary institution, it also subjects a monetary-policy decision 
to fiscal-policy considerations, as only when the appropriate fiscal-policy actions are taken 
will the ECB engage in monetary policy (Darvas/Merler 2013). Second, implicit  
conditionality leaves  the  ECB with  the  dilemma  concerning how  to  react  to  a  breach  of 
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conditions. Should it ease off from its policy, despite the risk of systemic financial troubles 
(Darvas/Merler 2013)? A breach of conditions would likely result in further deterioration of 
the situation, but ending the intervention at that point would seriously undermine the  
argument about dysfunctional transmission channels on which the program was based in the 
first place (Deutsche Bundesbank 2012). At the same time, continued support despite a breach 
of conditionality would hurt the ECB’s credibility. In addition, it is unclear how a breach in 
conditions would be determined and whether there should be several stages of escalation in 
case of a breach (Darvas/Merler 2013). 
The letter ECB President Trichet and Bank of Italy President Draghi sent and the resulting 
sequence of events marked a new level of monetary-policy politicization. Facing political 
stalemate in Italy and rising risks of contagion, the ECB demonstrated that it was ready to 
assume a political role (Engelen 2011). The letter proved unsuccessful in the short run, and 
when it was made public, it caused the Italian public and political establishment to be 
disgruntled without initiating major changes in Italy’s fiscal policy. Therefore, at first glance, 
the ECB granted financial relief to a government that then backtracked on its promises, 
damaging the ECB’s credibility (Zingales 2011; Darvas/Merler 2013; Mabbett/Schelkle  
2015). In fact, the episode seemed to confirm the concerns of those who had warned of the 
moral hazard of purchasing government bonds (Darvas/Merler 2013). After November 2011, 
the ECB did replace a reform-weary government with a reform-oriented government of 
technocrats. While little is known about the decision-making process that led to this change, it 
is likely that pressure on the ECB to support Eurozone governments’ financing needs was 
mounting. Having shown their power in May 2010, it is unlikely that pressure groups in many 
Eurozone countries would have been willing to sacrifice the ECB’s access to unlimited 
liquidity for the principle of independent central banking. While ECB President Trichet tried 
to downplay the letter’s importance by pointing out that many letters are sent to Eurozone 
governments, the link to SMP and the letter’s content, which drew out what was almost a new 
government program, made it special (Dinmore/Atkins 2011). According to the Eurozone 
treaties, monetary policy is to be clearly separate from fiscal policies. 
While implicit conditional monetary policy proved to be somewhat effective, it threatened the 
credibility and popular support of the ECB. By bending to political pressure and inactivity,  
the ECB turned SMP interventions from a one-time exception into a regular monetary-policy 
instrument (Kaiser 2011). Attaching implicit conditionality in order to safeguard a   minimum 
137  
of independence might lead to a popular backlash if the ECB continues to push Eurozone 
governments to do their duty. In addition, the ECB’s credibility will surely suffer from  
failures to convince governments to take necessary steps. The episode outlines the concept of 
relative audience costs, as until the inauguration of the technocrat Monti as Italy’s prime 
minister, the power of national audience groups over Italy’s government were stronger than 
the fear of skyrocketing interest rates. In fact, by turning national audience groups against the 
ECB, Prime Minister Berlusconi almost managed to extract concessions from the ECB  
without having to make any reforms. 
 
8.5. ECB decision-making process and external pressures 
 
To sum up, some external influence on the ECB’s decision-making can be established, even 
though its extent remains unknown. The ECB’s new role as a strategic actor at the negotiation 
table paved the way for a more political interpretation of the monetary-policy mandate. The 
assumption of this new role can be attributed in part to continued pressure from audience 
groups for a more active monetary policy. However, the decisions the ECB made also 
introduced new risks into the system. All of the decisions invited pressure and criticism from 
audience groups, as these decisions blurred the line between fiscal and monetary policy, 
increased moral hazard, and transferred credit risk to central banks. 
Concerning the question of fiscal and monetary policy, the targeted purchase of bonds from 
certain countries under SMP contains elements of subsidy and selective advantage. From an 
economic point of view, whether bonds are purchased on secondary markets or primary 
markets when they are bought at face value is irrelevant (Belke 2010), and accepting bonds as 
collateral at face value, regardless of credit rating, transformed the ECB into a money printing 
press, as indebted countries can continue to issue unlimited quantities of new debt at low 
interest rates. The extent to which sterilizing purchases can be successful when providing 
unlimited liquidity to banks remains to be seen (Sinn 2010; Hayo et al. 2010; Belke 2010; 
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2011). 
While QE removed the selective advantage, its sheer magnitude will affect government debt 
markets and reduce the incentive to embark on the painful but ultimately more sustainable 
path of structural reform. In addition, the ECB’s decisions foster moral hazard. On the state’s 
side, the decisions tolerate irresponsible fiscal behavior and punish fiscally solid governments 
(Hayo et al. 2010; Belke 2010). The case study of the Trichet/Draghi letter underscores this 
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view: as soon as market pressure was lifted and unpopular reform measures had to be enacted, 
Italy’s government chose to ignore its promises by betting on the ECB’s unwillingness to 
confront. On the commercial banks’ side, the ECB’s decisions increase investor’s motivation 
to purchase even more high-yield government debt, as the ECB’s “insurance policy” makes 
more cautious behavior less attractive and resembles a bailout since the bonds were purchased 
outside of profit considerations (Sinn 2010; Hayo et al. 2010). What’s more, credit risk has 
become an issue for the ECB because of the increasing amount of risky public and private 
debt on its balance sheet, amassed through the change in the collateral requirements, the direct 
purchase of debt, and the provision of ELA. If debt-ridden countries are finally forced into 
restructuring or waiving debt, the ECB would be forced to write down substantial amounts of 
credit, which could either reduce governments’ receipt of seignorage or, in the worst case, 
force them to recapitalize their national central banks. Therefore, credit risk is rolled over to 
taxpayers in the end (Belke 2010; Hayo et al. 2010; Demary/Matthes 2013b). In the long run, 
the inability to end the purchase of public and private debt—despite unfulfilled reform 
promises and because of such a step’s dramatic effects on crisis countries’ deficit financing 
ability and the loss the ECB would incur in case of default—could subject the ECB to 
blackmail and undermine its independence (Demary/Matthes 2013b). 
Finally, being constantly overruled in ECB Governing Council decisions may well turn public 
and political opinion in northern European Eurozone countries against the ECB. Even among 
Bundesbank bankers, fears are growing that the Bundesbank has been taken over by the 
national central banks of southern Eurozone countries (Engelen 2011). The “one country, one 
vote” rule has led to a politically explosive situation in which the Eurozone’s most indebted 
countries can access Germany’s financial resources to soften the blow. The idea of creating a 
depoliticized monetary policy has been overturned by the differences in national approaches  
to and beliefs about overcoming the current crisis (Engelen 2011). Lacking an effective 
instrument with which to counter the apparent hijacking of monetary policy, Germany’s 
central bankers have inflicted massive public audience cost on the ECB by encouraging and 
feeding into an ongoing public debate on the legitimacy of the ECB’s crisis management. 
While legal challenges in Germany’s Constitutional Court have so far failed to overturn the 
ECB’s policy measures, the Bundesbank’s testimony in front of the court favored the plaintiff, 
showing the frustration among Germany’s central bankers (Mabbett/Schelkle 2015). The 
attacks have put the ECB into a politically difficult situation: the close relationship between 
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bank and government financing means that walking away from buying government bonds is 
not an option, so the ECB has responded to audience costs by moving even deeper into the 
fiscal space, expanding its jurisdiction over fiscal policy through implicit conditionality and 




The pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy broke down during the crisis, damaging the 
perception of independent central banks’ successful monetary policy-making. The certainty 
that, left to a technocratic and independent central bank, price stability and monetary policy 
would be sufficient to guarantee financial stability and economic well-being no longer hold 
true. Focusing on price stability as a core goal, independent central banks around the world 
could not prevent or even predict the financial crisis. The use of unconventional monetary 
policy, which blurs the boundary between fiscal and monetary policy, was also only partially 
successful at best. While the ECB prevented the breakdown of the Eurozone and the collapse 
of the financial system, the side effects—especially the functional and distributional risks—of 
ultra-lax monetary policy are becoming increasingly evident. However, most worrisome is the 
significant reliance of public and private parties on cheap central bank liquidity, as any  
change in policy would likely be met with fierce opposition. Now that central banks have 
shown both the public and politicians just of what they are capable, the way back to 
conventional monetary policy will be rocky. The failure to prevent the crisis, the raising 
expectations about what monetary policy can achieve, and the resulting risks have led to a 
discussion in public and academic circles about central banks’ structure and mandate. Central 
banks’ sovereignty in the interpretation of monetary policy and their assumed status as 
independent bodies have come under attack. 
Against this background of strained support and recurring debate on central banks’ structure 
and mandate, this dissertation addresses why the ECB continues to engage in ultra-low 
monetary policy. It is my conclusion that the measures’ limited success raises questions about 
why the ECB continues to engage in them. The hypothesis tested here is that  external 
audience groups—the general public, political actors and economic actors—are influencing 
the ECB’s decision-making. Applying the Political Audience Cost Theory, the dissertation 
shows that the ECB is susceptible to external audience groups’ preferences about monetary 
policy. The analysis shows that these preferences are a good indicator of the ECB’s policy- 
making between 2007 and 2014. For most of the time period covered by this analysis, the 
ECB’s refinancing rate moved in line with the average preference for monetary policy in the 
Eurozone. Today, the majority of audience groups in all Eurozone countries support the 
ECB’s policy-making, and a reversal of preference is unlikely, despite the increase in 
economic well-being and  a projected  surge in  inflation  rates.  The support  for the     ECB’s 
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current policies is almost universal, applying to both the crisis countries of Europe’s south and 
the northern European member countries that were far less heavily hit by the crisis. In no 
Eurozone country does a majority of audience groups currently demand a more restrictive 
monetary policy. 
The core strength of the Political Audience Cost Theory is that it allows social, cultural, and 
political variables to be incorporated into the explanation of institutional behavior. Contrary to 
conventional economic theory and its unrealistic assumption of homo economicus, Political 
Audience Cost Theory acknowledges that other non-economic factors shape institutions’ 
structure and behavior. Going beyond a simple cost-benefit calculation, Political Audience 
Cost Theory provides scholars with a mechanism by which to transmit the actors’ underlying 
institutional and political economic motives into actual policy-making. In addition, through 
the choice of variables and possible audience groups, Political Audience Cost Theory allows 
numerous other explanatory concepts currently discussed in the literature to be incorporated 
and tested. Most of the limitations of the theory are grounded in the difficulty in measuring 
audience cost, especially the measurement of the costs that audience groups can inflict. Even 
the most detailed country-specific analysis must rely on some arbitrarily attached weights. 
With regard to central banking and the specific case of the ECB, another general limitation for 
scholars studying the ECB is the secrecy surrounding the ECB’s Governing Council meetings. 
Without more access to the council’s decision-making criteria and records of its members’ 
voting behavior and meeting minutes, applying the Audience Cost Theory to the ECB is 
difficult. 
The dissertation outlines a plausible explanation for the observed accordance between the 
Eurozone audiences’ preferences and the ECB interest rate: that national central bank 
governors vote with their home countries’ interests, ensuring a monetary policy that is to their 
domestic audience groups’ liking. This explanation rests on two conclusion: First, de-jure 
independence does not directly map into de-facto independence. While the ECB has a high 
level of de-jure independence, which is of constitutional character, national central banks  
have both lower de-jure and lower de-facto independence. National central banks in the 
Eurozone have remained parts of national political systems, they operate in domestic political 
spheres, their governors have to face re-election, and their de-jure independence is often 
protected only by a simple-majority law. It is against this background that national central 
banks are forced to take their key domestic audience groups’ preferences into account in order 
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to protect their independence and (ultimately) existence. No national central bank can ignore 
domestic preferences for an extended period of time; even central banks considered highly 
independent such as the Bundesbank face such constraints. The central banks’ de-facto 
independence has always been a question of degree, influenced by variables like the 
chancellor’s popularity, so many national central banks’ de-facto independence often does not 
match their formal de-jure independence. The need to incorporate domestic preferences 
becomes even more pressing when one considers that the ECB as an institution is facing low 
and deteriorating trust levels across the Eurozone, and about half of the Eurozone has an 
economic culture that does not value the independence of a central bank over the primacy of 
politics. The second explanation on which the conclusion that national central bank governors 
vote with their home countries’ interests rests is the effect of the quasi-intergovernmental 
character of the ESCB and the “one country, one vote” principle, which leads national central 
banks’ governors to place more weight on national interests than they do on a Eurozone-wide 
view. They show a regional bias and, regardless of official ad personam rules, act as 
representatives of their home countries. Through the majority of national central banks’ 
governors in the ECB’s Governing Council, national interests dominate monetary policy- 
making in the Eurozone. 
To support my conclusion that the ECB’s decision-making relies on other than economic 
considerations, the dissertation includes an analysis of the influence of public and private 
pressure groups on the ECB’s most controversial decisions. All four decisions—the 
suspension of collateral requirements for Greece’s bonds and the purchase of public and 
private debt on secondary markets, the excessive use of ELA during Greece’s debt crisis, the 
launch of QE, and Trichet and Draghi’s use of implicit conditionality–were highly 
controversial and can be explained only partly by economic arguments. The decision to  
launch the Securities Market Program on May 10, just after the Eurozone’s heads of state 
announced their EUR 750 billion rescue package, raises particular suspicion about external 
pressure on the ECB. In all of these decisions, the ECB appears as a highly politicized 
institution, as monetary policy decisions seem to be based more on political considerations 
than on economic necessities. There is little to refute such suspicions. 
To sum up, this dissertation provides support for the conclusion that the ECB is susceptible to 
external pressure. Political Audience Cost Theory offers helps to reveal the central banks’ 
approach  to  monetary  policy-making  and  provides  an  explanation  for  the  link   between 
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domestic audience groups’ institutional and political motives and the ECB’s Governing 
Council members’ preferences. While the theory rests on the conclusion regarding the 
presence of regional bias and lower de-facto independence for national central banks, both 
explanations are plausible. 
Finally, one must ask how the ECB’s de-facto independence can be strengthened. Surely, any 
attempt to do so will be difficult, not least because low de-facto independence is partly a  
result of the economic culture in the Eurozone member states. Even so, the new rotation  
model for the Governing Council will strengthen the ECB. From a purely technical point of 
view, the reduction in the council’s size did not necessarily demand rotation groups with 
diverging voting rights to be established. A simple reduction of members would have been 
sufficient as, according to the ad-personam assumption, every governor should be equally 
capable of deciding on monetary policy for the Eurozone. Nevertheless, while the reform is 
proof of my conclusion that national central banks’ governors have a regional bias, it goes a 
long way toward eliminating the negative side effects of the “one country, one vote” principle 
by acknowledging a regional bias exists that is likely to persist. Reassigning the voting rights 
based on a country’s size and GDP will lead to a monetary policy that, despite regional biases, 
will be a more fitting policy for the whole Eurozone. The ECB’s de-facto independence could 
be strengthened further if voting power were distributed proportional to each country’s share 
of total Eurozone GDP, as doing so would increase the ECB’s perceived success in setting 
monetary policy and increase legitimacy and de-facto independence. Finally, politicians could 
also attempt to increase the ECB’s directorate strength, assuming that they have a Eurozone- 
centered view. Doing so would eliminate national audience groups’ access to monetary policy 
decision-making but would depend on member states’ willingness to sacrifice the influence. 
The analysis in this dissertation suffers from a number of limitations that invite further 
research. First, because of the dissertation’s nature and limited scope, its analysis of the 
preferences of individual member states’ audience groups is comparatively crude. 
Forthcoming research should specify country-specific models by analyzing power and 
preference structures in greater depth. Possible improvements include additional variables to 
identify audience groups’ preferences, which would improve the predictive power of the 
model. Second, clarification of the ECB’s de-facto use of decision-making criteria would be 
helpful. The official two-pillar system is vague—particularly the so-called second pillar, 
which offers justification for almost any thinkable policy turn. Third, future research should 
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focus on a decisive “moment of truth” in the sense of fundamentally diverging economic 
necessities and audience group preferences. Such a scenario—which is likely to occur in the 
near- to medium-term future if inflation rates increase as predicted while most countries’ 
growth remains sluggish and unemployment rates high—will be the real test to the theory. In 
that case, the ECB’s Governing Council will have to choose between protecting price stability 
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